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This dissertation consists of three essays on decision making in real and hypothet-
ical insurance contexts and the factors that impact those decisions. Risky and
complicated dynamic decisions are virtually unavoidable in health and property
insurance contexts, and these studies help us to gain a greater understanding of
how individuals respond and their underlying preferences.
In Chapter 1, I examine prescription-drug purchasing behavior of enrollees in
Medicare Part D, and in particular I study the extent to which their behavior
changes in anticipation of uncertain but predictable changes in insurance-coverage
generosity. I develop a simple heuristic model that illustrates how enrollees ought
to behave. The model predicts that any changes in spending should be smooth
and occur far in advance of changes in insurance-coverage generosity (except at the
end of the year). I then find empirical evidence that enrollees do anticipate and
respond more optimally to the Medicare Part D pricing schedule than suggested
by prior literature.
In Chapter 2, with coauthors, I conduct a novel experiment to understand how
risk preferences in insurance contexts differ between the lab and the field. We
employ an experimental setting to identify objective versus subjective beliefs and
to evaluate how ambiguity might contribute to those beliefs. We find that, similar
to prior work using field data, subjects are virtually risk-neutral and probability
distortions are an important factor to explain behavior; however, there is more
heterogeneity in probability distortions in the lab. We further find that subjects
respond to ambiguity by making less risky choices, and their preferences may be
consistent with maxmin utility.
Finally, in Chapter 3, with coauthors, I examine the stability of risk preferences
across contexts involving different stakes. Using data on households’ deductible
choices in three property-insurance coverages and their limit choices in two liability-
insurance coverages, we assess the stability across the five contexts in the ordinal
ranking of the households’ willingness to bear risk. We find evidence of stability
across contexts involving stakes of the same magnitude, but not across contexts
involving stakes of very different magnitudes. Our results appear to be robust to
heterogeneity in wealth and access to credit.
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CHAPTER 1
DYNAMIC PURCHASING BEHAVIOR IN HEALTHCARE
CONSUMPTION
1.1 Introduction
With the rapid growth of the US healthcare sector and the accompanying financial
burden it poses, the government and insurers have responded by experimenting
with insurance plan characteristics and cost-sharing aimed at reducing their costs.
Policy makers and academics have long had an interest in understanding how peo-
ple’s healthcare spending and health outcomes respond under these plans. How-
ever, it is only recently that economic research has begun to emphasize the extent
of the dynamics and complexity of beneficiaries’ decisions when facing multiple
levels of cost-sharing within health insurance plans. This paper studies beneficiary
behavior in the context of the Medicare Part D prescription drug insurance mar-
ket in 2009-2012, where the government has had significant regulatory oversight
on imposing plans with these features.
I focus on beneficiary responses to plans where the marginal out-of-pocket
(OOP) price that the beneficiary is required to pay out of the total cost of a
prescription is not constant (or non-linear) between coverage regions. Figure 1.1
illustrates an example Medicare Part D 2009 plan contract. The generosity of the
plan explicitly depends on the cumulative total expenditure, i.e. the cumulative
amounts that patients, the insurance company, and Medicare have spent on pre-
scriptions within the plan-year. In this example, there is an initial coverage region
(ICR) where the beneficiary is responsible for 33.2% of the total prescription costs
(33.2% coinsurance), followed by a coverage gap or “donut hole” where beneficia-
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Figure 1.1: Example Medicare Part D 2009 contract design
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Note: The figure depicts the nonlinear structure of an example Medicare Part D benefit con-
tract with no deductible from 2009. The plan depicted here is actuarially equivalent (with no
deductible) to the government-defined contract depicted in Appendix Figure A.1. The premium
or the amount the patient pays for the benefit package is not displayed. The bottom panel dis-
plays the marginal cost in each of the coverage regions, or the proportion that the beneficiary is
responsible to pay of the total expenditure cost.
ries are fully responsible for costs (100% coinsurance), after which beneficiaries
reach the catastrophic region and have a minimal 5% coinsurance.1
1The actual 2009 coverage benefit requires beneficiaries to pay the maximum of either 5%
2
See Section 1.3 for more information on the types of plans.2 After the plan-
year elapses, plans reset or beneficiaries switch to new plans, and the cumulative
total spending for the new plan-year is reset to zero. Within a plan-year, benefi-
ciaries face a truly dynamic problem—consuming healthcare today can impact the
marginal price of future healthcare consumption.
It is important then to study the actual beneficiary response to these types of
nonlinear pricing structures even before the actual nonlinearities. The coverage
gap was initially included as a cost-saving measure for the government similar to
a deductible but positioned in the middle of the patient benefit schedule (Baker,
2006). In addition to directly saving money in the donut hole, the presence of the
donut hole mechanism was meant as an incentive to beneficiaries to restrain their
spending even prior to the donut hole and avoid the catastrophic spending region
altogether.
Much of the literature has focused on beneficiary behavior at or around the
controversial coverage gap, which has been shown to have a negative effect on
drug adherence. Joyce et al. (2013) and Zhang et al. (2009) find that having
a coverage gap disrupts the use of prescription drugs, with a higher decline on
more expensive medications as compared to cheaper ones. And while Joyce et al.
(2013) fail to detect a corresponding substitution from drugs to medical treatment
in concurrent Medicare claims, if one believes that adherence to drug treatments
is good for patient outcomes, discontinuing the use of these drugs would have a
negative welfare effect on patients.
In order to fully understand the ways in which changes to nonlinear plans can
the cost of the drug or $2.40 and $6.00 for a one-month supply of generic and branded drugs
respectively. This means that patients may pay either the copay dollar amount or a percentage
share of the drug price where the remainder is covered by insurance or the government.
2In general plans are structured similar to this example with either three or four regions.
3
impact beneficiary behavior and welfare, researchers must also determine whether
beneficiaries respond sub-optimally to them. The current consensus in the litera-
ture is somewhat mixed. Some of the literature cites the initial lack of knowledge
of the donut hole, where in 2007 only 40% of individuals knew about the cover-
age gap (Polinski et al., 2010). There are papers where beneficiaries appear to be
somewhat optimal and fully forward-looking (Aron-Dine et al., 2015; Einav et al.,
2015), and there are papers that support the conclusion that beneficiaries overly
respond to the “spot” or current price (Dalton et al., 2018; Abaluck et al., 2018).
As evidence of suboptimal behavior, Dalton et al. (2018) also present the stylized
fact that even among individuals in their sample who were very likely to end the
year in the coverage gap or beyond, there is a sharp drop in average spending on
prescription purchases at the coverage gap.
Ignoring liquidity constraints, fully forward-looking optimal behavior suggests
that beneficiaries should use their expected end-of-year marginal price for each
purchase decision throughout the year. For example, a Medicare Part D beneficiary
who fully expects to end the year in the catastrophic phase of their insurance
coverage should not respond to temporary changes in their plan coverage and spot
prices as they spend through earlier benefit phases. Under uncertainty about the
end-of-year region and price, however, the beneficiaries may adjust their expected
marginal prices as risks are realized. Assuming standard geometric discounting
(δ >> 0), these transitions should be smooth, especially early in the year.
In Section 1.2, because of the beneficiary’s complicated optimization problem
under uncertainty, this paper first approximates optimal behavior by developing
a heuristic for constructing a beneficiary’s perceived marginal out-of-pocket coin-
surance rate. This rate is generated from the entire population’s probabilities of
4
ending the year in each region and is meant to help visualize how the average
beneficiary’s expected coinsurance rate may evolve across the different weeks of
the year and cumulative spending levels. It differs from the optimal beneficiary’s
expected prices because it uses ex-post population outcomes, which may not be
representative of rational agents. Further, because beneficiaries may themselves
have difficulties anticipating their cumulative total end-of-year spending and prices,
the heuristic approach may provide intuitions on behavior as well. The heuristic
approach predicts that, because probability distributions are quite smooth out-
side of the last weeks of the year, the expected marginal prices and thus spending
should also be smooth with any pricing updating occurring prior to the kink.
Further, intuitions from this paper’s heuristic approach indicate that errors
in time discounting such as present bias may not be an appropriate model to
represent beneficiary behavior that resemble a sharp spending drop at discrete
changes in spot prices. A key takeaway from the heuristic model is that, outside
of the last weeks of the year, only sharp discontinuities in a beneficiary’s perceived
marginal price or coinsurance rate should result in sharp discontinuities in bene-
ficiary spending. As long as beneficiaries continuously update their expectations,
only zero discounting would predict sharp changes at the coverage gap.
Section 1.3 provides background information on the structure of the Medicare
health insurance program and details on the prescription insurance program, Medi-
care Part D. The section also discusses the data and sample. The data studied
comes from the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ (CMS’s) 5% sample of
all beneficiaries in Medicare, with administrative information on enrollee selected
plans and claims. The sample selected include enrollees, who are continuously
in Medicare Part D plans without deductibles over the 2009-2012 period and who
5
meet criteria to make sure they do not have unique pricing or non-optional choices.
Then, the heuristic from Section 1.2 is applied to the empirical data in Section 1.4,
supporting the intuitions developed.
In Section 1.5, this paper uses a flexible nonparametric regression approach
to provide a graphic representation of the empirically observed shape of spending
patterns through the entirety of a beneficiary’s plan year and across a wide range
of cumulative spending levels. In part, the goal of this empirical exercise is to gen-
erate a low-assumption view of the extent of a beneficiary’s anticipatory response
to the different pricing regions as a function of both the time of the year and the
beneficiary’s cumulative total spending. The regression approach uses an individ-
ual fixed effect to control for individual heterogeneity in spending frequencies in a
dynamic panel that includes four years of claims data.3
My estimates show that across four quarters of the year and across cumulative
total spending amounts, beneficiaries have a statistically significant anticipatory
response far in advance of the coverage gap. As expected, the reduction in spending
in advance of the coverage gap occurs at higher cumulative total expenditure values
(closer to the ICL) in later parts of the year.
This paper contributes to the existing literature studying how individuals re-
spond to nonlinear contracts in healthcare and supports findings that people do
respond to these plan structures. Previous papers had found that individuals are
at least partially forward-looking in the non-linear contract context. Aron-Dine
et al. (2015) find that employees that join health insurance plans in the later parts
of the year (and thus have less time in their respective plans) respond to future
expectations of prices of healthcare. Einav et al. (2015) show that people exhibit
3See Section 1.5.3 for a discussion regarding dynamic panel bias and why it is less of a concern
in this setting.
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bunching behavior at the donut hole and decrease their probability of spending at
the entrance to the donut hole early in the year.
Our findings differ from the literature in that we do not observe the same
extent of “myopic” behavior and do not detect a large discontinuity in beneficiary
spending frequencies directly at the coverage gap except in the last quarter of the
year. The estimation strategy in this paper is most comparable to a specification in
Dalton et al. (2018), who use a fixed-effects-regression as their empirical evidence
of “myopic” behavior. They analyze Medicare Part D claims of a 2008 subset of
employer-sponsored Medicare Part D individuals that were likely to end the year
in the coverage gap. Unlike me, they found few changes in spending in anticipation
of entering the donut hole. Their analysis differs from mine in that they only had
indicators to measure the level of spending response (and other dependent variables
including prescription occurrence) in four cumulative total spending zones ($310
before, between $310-$110 before, $110 before, and after the coverage gap), while
my paper measures a continuous response to cumulative total and cumulative out-
of-pocket spending. They found no economic or statistically significant evidence of
spending or claims frequency decreases in the $310-$110 leading up to the coverage
gap, but they found a sharp decrease in spending and claims frequency in the $110
right before the coverage gap.
My paper’s reduced-form estimates provide a simpler alternative to studying
beneficiary behavior under nonlinear contracts as compared to the estimates of
Einav et al. (2015) and Dalton et al. (2018). The reduced-form estimates provide
a graphical explanation of why these papers found both evidence of forward-looking
behavior and over-response to spot prices respectively. Einav et al. (2015) estimate
a model with standard geometric discounting that allows for five types of individu-
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als with different risk levels and sensitivities to the coverage gap, and they recover
a weekly discount factor δ equal to 0.96 that roughly translates to a yearly discount
factor of only 11%, far lower than what is accepted as standard in the literature.4
In order to explain observed drops in spending just prior to the coverage gap, Dal-
ton et al. (2018) estimate two models that allow for a sharp drop in spending at the
coverage gap, comparing a model with salience to the gap with a model with beta-
delta time-inconsistency or present bias.5 In both models their estimates support
the empirical finding of beneficiaries lacking an anticipatory spending response to
the coverage gap, and in the beta-delta model, the discounting rates they estimate
are indistinguishable between β = δ = 0 indicating that beneficiaries only consider
the spot price.
Another unique feature of my paper is that unlike the majority of the healthcare
literature, I mainly focus on the frequency of beneficiary claims. When a benefi-
ciary has a prescription to be filled, they have two broad decision options: wait to
fill the prescription, or switch the prescription either from branded to generic or
with more effort acquire an alternative prescription. The decision to stop taking
a course of chronic treatment likely has more of a negative effect on beneficiary
health than a decision to switch medication. Thus, this paper measures changes in
claims frequency, which should capture the beneficiary’s first decision to postpone
or stop (postpone indefinitely) taking a course of treatment.
4Einav et al. (2015) refer to this estimate as a “‘behavioral’ parameter that also reflects
individual’s understanding of the insurance coverage contract, in particular the salience of the
(future) nonlinearities of the contract”, as part of the reason why δ is so low.
5Present bias, also known as hyperbolic discounting, is a form of time-inconsistent preferences
where subjects show a tendency to overweigh the “present” and have self-control problems.
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1.2 Intuition
In the Medicare Part D setting, patients make a combination of periodic and
unexpected purchases of prescription drugs within a year. Within the decision to
fill each prescription purchase, assume a beneficiary compares her costs with the
perceived benefits of purchasing and then consuming drugs.
Suppose, in week w of the year, a beneficiary with observablesX faces a decision
whether to fill a prescription that has a total cost of s, where the total cost is to
be paid between the insurer and beneficiary. The beneficiary chooses to purchase
if the perceived benefit of the drug exceeds her perceived cost of the drug under
the insurance plan—that is, if
B(s|X) > sPMC(Zw, w|X)
where B(s|X) is the benefit of the drug, Zw =
∑w−1
u=1 su is the cumulative total
amount spent up until week w, and PMC(Zw, w|X) is the perceived marginal cost
of the drug to the beneficiary who has spent Zw by week w conditional on their
observables X.
Because of the structure of her nonlinear insurance plan, the cost a beneficiary
considers is not necessarily just her out-of-pocket (OOP) cost, so her marginal cost
for an additional dollar of total prescription spending is not just her coinsurance
amount. Certainly she should consider her OOP cost, which in the plan is defined
by how much she has cumulatively spent in the year Zw up until that week w,
but if she is forward looking, the impact that spending today has on her future
costs should also enter into her decision. This paper focuses its discussion on the
beneficiary’s beliefs on his or her monetary costs with insurance and not on the
beneficiary’s beliefs on the medical benefits of consuming certain drugs. I assume
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that the benefits of drug purchase and consumption do not depend directly on the
arbitrary contract design.
To build intuition, consider how the beneficiary’s perceived marginal cost may
differ under two simple pricing contracts in Panel A and B of Figure 1.2. If the
beneficiary were in a plan with contract A, she should always expect that her
marginal cost of purchasing a drug would be equal to cL, as it is the coinsurance
rate applied to all purchases. It does not matter if she has to make a purchasing
decision in the beginning of the year or the end, her PMC(Zw, w|X) = cL. Then
her out-of-pocket (OOP) payment or the amount that she is responsible for is cLs.
Figure 1.2: Marginal prices
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N ote: The marginal price (or cost) is the beneficiary’s price for an additional dollar of prescription
spending.
In contrast, Plan B is a nonlinear cost structure, and thus a beneficiary’s
perceived marginal price for purchasing a drug is less clear. Under this plan if
Zw < L, her spot price and actual out-of-pocket payment in a given week would be
MC(Zw) = cL and cLs, respectively, and if Zw ≥ L, they would be MC(Zw) = cH
and cHs, respectively. At the two extremes of behavior, a beneficiary may only
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respond to the spot marginal price determined by the current insurance region, or
a beneficiary may be a “fully forward-looking”, perfectly rational economic agent.
If she only responds to the spot price, then her PMC(Zw, w|X) = MC(Zw). Her
PMC is just her coinsurance rate in the region she is currently in, and she does not
take into consideration how her spending can impact her future marginal costs.
If a beneficiary is “fully forward-looking”, in each purchasing period decision, she
optimizes her decision by discounting the future stream of expected benefits and
costs that result from her current decision, including any changes to her expected
marginal prices due to the non-linear pricing. Ultimately if a beneficiary is fully
forward-looking, she should anticipate her full stream of expected payments, and an
additional prescription should be considered with her expected year-end marginal
price. Thus, her expectation of ending in Region 1 or 2 matters. If she is entirely
confident in week w that her end-of-year (week W ) cumulative total expenditure
will be below the limit L, Pr(ZW < L|Zw) = 1, then her perceived marginal price
should be PMPw = cL. Similarly if she is confident that her end-of-year cumula-
tive total expenditure is greater than L, P (ZW ≥ L|Zw) = 1, then her end-of-year
marginal cost should be the cost in Region 2, or PMPw = cH . Depending on the
beneficiary’s perceived uncertainty about spending past L, and conditional on not
passing L when evaluating her problem in week w, her perceived marginal price in
w may be somewhere between cL and cH .
Within the “in-between” response, Dalton et al. (2018) have tested a model
of inconsistent time-discounting and salience of the “donut hole” to explain ben-
eficiaries’ behaviors in a subset of 2008 Medicare Part D claims. Their structural
model that allowed for present bias was a better fit than a standard discounting
model, but their estimation result of discount factors that were indistinguishable
from β = δ = 0 is indicative that present bias may not be an appropriate model.
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Abaluck et al. (2018) also allow for an “in-between” response to inter-year changes
in the coinsurance rates by estimating the weights beneficiaries in Medicare Part
D place on changes in coinsurance rates in the initial coverage region or coverage
gap. While Abaluck et al. (2018)’s heuristic is somewhat similar to mine, in part
due to the nature of their empirical approach, they limit their study to individuals
who the researchers were confident to end the year in either the initial coverage
region or coverage gap.
This paper proposes an alternative “in-between” response that a beneficiary
may use to make the prescription purchasing decision. She may use a heuris-
tic mental shortcut to calculate her objective expected year-end marginal price.
Rather than comparing the net present value of the costs and benefits to conceive
of an optimal expected year-end price, she may estimate a perceived marginal price
based on her beliefs of the population objective probability of ending the year in
any contract region. Using the objective population probability of being in any
contract region, she can then infer the price in that region. In the two region case,
Prw(in Region 2 in W|Zw) = 1− Prw(in Region 1 in W|Zw).
If a beneficiary were to make a decision to spend on prescriptions in the last
period of the year, no-matter her method of evaluating her “in-between” response,
her perceived marginal price is just her marginal spot price. There is no uncertainty
as to what her marginal cost is. However, at earlier parts of the year w < W ,
her beliefs on her probability of ending the year in any particular region and the
associated expected marginal price can impact her spending patterns.
Consider the example probabilities of ending the year in Region 2 presented in
Figure 1.3. In the series of Panel A graphs, suppose it is early in the year, the
beneficiary who has $0 cumulative total spending believes that there is only a 20%
12
Figure 1.3: Example probabilities of ending the year in Region 2, perceived
marginal price, and predicted spending
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Note: The example assumes an individual faces the contract in Figure 1.2 Panel B.
chance of ending the year in Region 2 (and necessarily a 1 − 0.2 = 0.8 chance of
ending the year in Region 1). As her cumulative total expenditure Zw approaches
the threshold L, the probability of ending the year in Region 2 approaches 1. Even
before she reaches Zw = L, because there are still many weeks left in the year, she
anticipates an almost 100% chance of ending the year in Region 2.
Suppose she employs the heuristic with no discounting to generate her marginal
cost, then her objective expected marginal price (HMP) is below.
HMPw = cLPrw(in Region 1 in W |Zw) + cHPrw(in Region 2 in W|Zw)
Her overall expected marginal price would then be the function depicted in in Fig-
ure 1.3 A. Her perceived marginal price transitions from 0.8cL + 0.2cH to cH as
the cumulative total expenditure increases. If demand is a monotonically decreas-
ing and continuous function of price, this implies that her spending should be a
monotonically decreasing function of her perceived marginal price and should also
13
adjust far prior to the limit L.
Suppose Panel B represents a week at the end of the year. Towards the end
of the year, the beneficiary’s uncertainty around ending the year in Region 2 de-
creases, because there is less time left in the year for health shocks as compared to
Panel A. Any uncertainty only remains if she is in a narrow range of cumulative
total expenditure values just prior to L. As she approaches the end of the year,
her probability of ending the year in Region 2 approaches a piecewise formula,
where this probability is 0 if Zw < L and 1 otherwise. Similarly, if demand is a
monotonically decreasing function of price, then her spending should also approach
a piecewise formula. If she has spent very little, she may be certain to end the
year in Region 1 and subsequently uses the cL rate, while if she has crossed the
limit L, she should spend according to the cH rate, i.e. sw = s(cL) if Zw < L and
sw = s(cH) otherwise. In aggregate data, it is natural to see how these expecta-
tions could generate spending that may appear to be discontinuous at the limit L,
especially if there are few individuals observed in the transition region.
1.2.1 Discounting
While the examples in Figure 1.3 did not include any explicit discontinuities in
the probabilities or expected marginal prices, an alternative scenario could exist.
For example, suppose that in a period w early in the year beneficiaries believe
that there is a 20% chance of ending the year in Region 2 for all Zw < L and by
necessity the probability is 1 if Zw ≥ L. The explanation for why a beneficiary
near the limit may not upwardly revise her 20% probability of ending the year in
Region 2 may include her inattention to being so close to Region 2, or completely
ignoring her potential future health shocks (having a zero discount factor).
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This paper argues that non-zero geometric discounting and present bias models
should not generate such discontinuities. Consider the adaptation to the heuristic
model that allows for present bias. Assume the decision in the heuristic approach
only considers today’s medical impact (or benefit of the drugs) compared to the
total cost today multiplied by the future perceived marginal price. The benefi-
ciary would necessarily be making her spending decisions by discounting her entire
heuristic marginal price PMPw = βδ
W−w ∗ HMPw, so she would purchase her
prescriptions if
B(s|X) > βδW−wHMP (Zw, w|X)s
where β is the “present bias” discounting factor that represents the difference be-
tween the present t and all future outcomes and δW−w is the geometric or standard
discounting factor that is the product of discounting in every week from the current
week w to the end of the year W .
Assume a beneficiary has Panel A probability beliefs that generate a contin-
uous heuristic marginal cost. Denote β′w = βδ
W−w for a given week w. Then,
introducing a β > 0 and δ > 0 implies β′w > 0 and will not generate a significant
discontinuity in her perceived marginal prices. Instead her perceived marginal
price would fall somewhere between β′w(0.8cL + 0.2cH) and β
′
wcH in week w.
Further, introducing present bias as a explanation of suboptimal behavior ob-
served in the empirical data is not necessarily appropriate. Present bias models of
behavior only generate suboptimal behavior when decisions are made between “the
present” and “the future” and not when considering different time points within
the future. The assumption that the benefits of prescription coverage are incurred
“today” and in the present, while prevalent in the literature is not necessarily
accurate. When beneficiaries fill prescriptions, they are often not for immediate
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consumption with 30 and 90 day supplies. Further, even if consumption was im-
mediate, as Baicker et al. (2015) explain, the effects of many prescriptions such as
statins to treat high cholesterol have far delayed benefits rather than any immedi-
ate symptomatic changes.
1.2.2 Intuition with three regions
The three-region setting is slightly more complex than the two-region setting, but
the intuitions are similar. Assume a beneficiary has the example Medicare Part D
contract and region limits displayed in Figure 1.1. Figure 1.4 displays hypothetical
probabilities of ending the year in the three regions: the initial coverage region
(ICR), the coverage gap (aka the donut hole), and the catastrophic region.
Similar to the probability of ending the year in Region 1 in the 2-region example,
the probability of ending the year in the ICR is high at low cumulative spending
values and low at high spending values. If it is earlier in the year, the probability of
ending the year in the ICR can approach zero far prior to the subject crossing the
$2,700 spending threshold. The catastrophic region is the terminal state and the
probability of ending in that state is similar to the probability of ending the year
in Region 2 displayed in Figure 1.3. It is the intermediate state of the donut hole
which differs, and the probability of ending the year in the donut hole peaks when
the probability of ending the year in the other two regions are at their lowest. As
shown in this example, the peak of the probability of ending the year in the donut
hole can occur prior to an individual even entering the donut hole depending on
their end-of-year expectations.
Figure 1.5 presents the difference between the response of an agent A who re-
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Figure 1.4: Hypothetical Probabilities
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Note: An example graph of the probability of ending the year in any of three regions: initial
coverage region (ICR), donut hole, or a catastrophic region. The region limits are based off of
the 2009 example Medicare Part D contract from Figure 1.1. The probabilities are a stylized
example.
sponds only to the spot price in panel A with the response of an agent B who
responds using the Heuristic Marginal Price presented in panel B. The subject
in panel A has a perceived marginal price that is equal to the Medicare Part D
contract, while the panel B agent has a perceived marginal price that is equal to
contract prices weighted by the probability of ending the year in each region. As-
suming the agent’s spending is still a continuous function of her perceived marginal
price, then agent A’s spending would be discontinuous at the boundaries of the
Medicare Part D contract regions, while agent B’s spending would change continu-
ously. As the agents approach the end of the year, the probabilities should change
and approach 1 if they are in the region and 0 otherwise, and agent B’s perceived
marginal price and spending should approach agent A’s.
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Figure 1.5: Three regions: Perceived price and spending response
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Note: Assuming the hypothetical probabilities of ending the year in each region displayed in
Figure 1.4, these panels show stylized examples of perceived marginal price and spending of
hypothetical agents who respond to the spot price (A) and use the heuristic (B).
Section 1.4 applies this intuition to the data, and specifically presents the ob-
jective probabilities of ending the year in each of the spending regions and the
implied perceived marginal price based on the observed data from Medicare Part
D.
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1.3 Background on Medicare Part D and data
Before discussing the data that is used in this study, this section covers the insti-
tutional details about the Medicare Part D program and the specific plan types
that are part of the program.
1.3.1 Background
In the United States, Medicare is a health insurance program for the elderly that
covered approximately 46 to 51 million individuals from 2009 to 2012.6 It is struc-
tured in four parts: A, B, C, and D. Parts A and B include hospital and medical
insurance for in- and outpatient care. Patients who are enrolled or eligible for Parts
A and B, are also eligible to enroll in Medicare Part D, which provides insurance
for prescription drug purchases, covering mostly self-administered drugs. Unlike
Parts A and B, which are administered by the government, the Part D plans are
administered by private insurers who are subject to the rules and regulations laid
out by the government. Part C, also known as Medicare Advantage, is also ad-
ministered by private insurers and is an all-inclusive alternative to Parts A, B, and
D. While enrollment in Medicare is voluntary, individuals face significant penalties
within the program if they choose not to sign up when first eligible (usually at 65)
or have creditable (similar) health insurance coverage.
This paper focuses on beneficiary purchasing behavior of enrollees in Medicare
Part D with stand-alone Prescription Drug Plans (PDP). In 2009, there were al-
most 18 million enrollees, with almost 20 million by 2012. The program began with
6Program statistics from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ Statisti-
cal Supplement https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-
and-Reports/Archives/MMSS/index.html
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the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003, which was enacted in 2006. The govern-
ment regulates a “standard” plan with a baseline minimum amount of coverage,
and private insurers can offer a variety of plans that on an actuarially equivalent
basis meet or exceed the generosity of the standard plan. This results in a signif-
icant variety in prescription coverage plans with 1,689 stand-alone PDP plans in
2009 (“The Medicare Part D”, 2016).
In the context of studying beneficiary behavior when faced with nonlinear
prices, the main advantage of studying Medicare Part D is the highly nonlin-
ear structure of the coverage regions in the stand-alone Prescription Drug Plans
(PDPs). This paper will focus on plans that do not have a deductible because
the majority of beneficiaries do not choose plans with deductibles, but this section
will discuss the full variety of plan structures. The 2009 standard Part D Plan
included a deductible of $295, an initial coverage limit (ICL) of $2,700, and an
out-of-pocket threshold (OOPT) of $4,350. The specific deductibles, ICLs, and
OOPTs differ every year, but the structure of the standard plans and thus plans
in the market are similar. The example plan in Figure 1.1 is actuarially equivalent
to the standard plan displayed in the Appendix Figure A.1.
In the standard plan in 2009, patients are responsible for 100% of the cost of
prescriptions until their current year cumulative spending reaches the deductible
amount, after which they are in the initial coverage region (ICR). Note that both
patient out-of-pocket (OOP) and “total” spending (the total amount spent through
a combination of patient, insurance company, and drug companies) are the same up
to the deductible. Patients in the initial coverage region (ICR) are then responsible
for 25% or less of the total price of prescription purchases. If the cumulative total
spending amount reaches the ICL amount, patients enter the phase often referred
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to as the coverage gap or “donut hole” where they are again responsible for 100% of
the total spending amount. If patients’ prescription needs are so high that within
one plan-year the sum of their OOP payments surpasses the OOPT, patients enter
the “catastrophic” phase and are responsible for paying a greatly reduced share of
the total costs of drugs. Specifically, they pay either the maximum of 5% of the
total price of prescriptions or a $2.40 and $6.00 copay for a one-month supply of
generic and branded drugs respectively. The pricing schedule resets at the end of
the calendar year, and at the beginning of the next year beneficiaries begin anew
with a total cumulative spending of 0 and the associated marginal costs.
The standard plan up until the catastrophic region has an exact mapping of
out-of-pocket and total payments—an ICL of $2,700 corresponds exactly to cu-
mulative OOP costs of $896.25, and an OOPT of $4,350 corresponds to $6,153.75
in total expenditures. In practice, an exact mapping between the two cumulative
spending measures is difficult to ascertain in all plans. Plans only have to meet (or
exceed) the coinsurance generosity of the standard plan on an actuarially equiva-
lent basis through coinsurance, copays, or a combination of the two. Because of
the actuarially equivalent clause, insurance companies have tremendous flexibil-
ity in structuring plans. Often, the cost sharing can be specific to drug tier or
whether it is branded or generic. Regulation just requires that on average, the
plan is expected to be similar to or more generous than the standard plan.
The inclusion of the Part D coverage gap or “donut hole” (and a main compo-
nent of the plan’s nonlinear structure) has been widely criticized and analyzed in
the healthcare literature. The coverage gap was initially included as a cost-saving
measure for the government similar to a deductible but positioned in the middle of
the patient benefit schedule (Baker, 2006). The health policy literature has both
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criticized the arbitrary location of the donut hole and the impact it has on drug
adherence.
Every year, the standard plan’s spending limits are updated to adjust for ris-
ing costs. And under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA),
the government began to fill in the coverage gap and will continue to increase the
plan benefits in this region through 2020. The phase out began in 2010 when the
standard plan included an automatic $250 rebate for beneficiaries who reached
the coverage gap. Further coverage in the donut hole increased in 2011 and 2012,
when instead of a rebate, standard plans included a 50% discount on brand-name
prescriptions that was paid by the drug manufacturer. This means that in 2011
and 2012, patients in the donut hole only paid 50% of the cost of branded drugs. In
most cases, while not paid by the beneficiary, the 50% covered by drug manufactur-
ers did contribute towards a beneficiary’s cumulative out-of-pocket expenditures.
Because of this set up, the discount did not significantly change the cumulative to-
tal expenditure amount it took for patients to get out of the donut hole. Table 1.1
shows the changes in the standard plan from 2009-2012.
This paper will focus on plans that have the government-defined ICL and
OOPT, but not plans with the government-defined deductible. Enrollees have
choices over a wide variety of Part D plans, with a majority of patients opting
for plans with more generous plan benefits than the standard plans including no
deductible plans. In 2006, fewer than 10% of beneficiaries were in plans with the
standard design (Abaluck and Gruber, 2016), and my data supports this finding
as well. Even prior to 2010 when the ACA started phasing out the coverage gap,
many plans offered some type of gap coverage, though these were typically on
generic prescriptions. See Section 1.3.2 for a deeper discussion of plan types.
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Table 1.1: Medicare Part D benefit parameters for defined standard benefit 2009-
2012
Plan Characteristics 2009 2010 2011 2012
Deductible 295 310 310 320
Initial Coverage Limit (ICL) 2700 2830 2840 2930
Out-of-Pocket Threshold (OOPT) 4350 4550 4550 4700
Total Expenditure equivalent OOPT 6153.8 6440 6447.5 6657.5
Rebate (1) 250
Brand discount(2) 50% 50%
Generic copay (3) 2.40 2.50 2.50 2.60
Branded copay (3) 6.00 6.30 6.30 6.50
Note:
(1) The rebate begins when patients reach their out-of-pocket threshold (OOPT).
(2) The brand discount only applies when patients are in the coverage gap, i.e. when their
cumulative total spending is above the ICL, and their cumulative non-insurer spending
(patient payments, any subsidies, brand discounts paid by the drug manufacturers) is
below the OOPT.
(3) In the catastrophic region, beneficiaries pay the maximum of the copay or 5% the total
cost of the prescription.
For the purpose of understanding beneficiary behavior in the face of nonlinear
contracts, there are other advantages to studying Part D plans instead of other
nonlinear employer-sponsored health insurance plans. These advantages include
the high frequency of claims and large percentages of beneficiaries experiencing
different coverage phases year-over-year. Hoadley et al. (2011) indicate that 16% of
Medicare beneficiaries ended the year in the coverage gap, with 3% of beneficiaries
reaching the gap and passing it to end the year in the catastrophic region. Across
2008-2009, almost 30% of patients experienced the gap. Further, they document
that reaching the coverage gap is persistent, as 71 percent of enrollees who reached
the gap in 2008 did so again in 2009. This recurrence of reaching the coverage
gap is due to the fact that many patients take medications for chronic conditions
rather than for acute, short-term medical needs.
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Another advantage of studying Part D is that many of the medications patients
take in Part D are for chronic conditions, so enrollees in the nonlinear Part D set-
ting may have a better ability to forecast their yearly spending on prescription
drugs than in other types of health insurance. In a MedPac report on Medicare
Part D, they state that the list of top 15 therapeutic classes of drugs by spending
and volume has remained relatively consistent since 2007. The values from 2013
indicate that drugs in the diabetic, asthma/COPD antihyperlipidemics,7 antipsy-
chotics, antihypertensive,8 and peptic ulcer therapeutic classes are responsible for
approximately 40% of drug spending (MedPAC, 2016). These drugs are all used
to treat ongoing chronic conditions.
Further, in studying beneficiary behavior, it is also an advantage that Part D
claims only cover self-administered drugs and do not cover drugs administered at
the doctor’s office or in the hospital. Unlike hospital claims, there is an increased
likelihood that filling prescriptions are decisions made by beneficiaries rather than
decisions made directly by a medical professional. However, it is still a concern for
older patients that drug purchases could be done by a proxy.
One of the challenges of the Medicare Part D data for studying spending in
the non-linear pricing schedule across years is that the pricing schedules change
over years. As mentioned, each year the standard plan adjusts, and it is highly
likely that the individual private plans adjust. Patients also have the choice to
switch plans to different insurers or to Medicare Part C at the end of each year.
However, while plans change every year, the schedule remains similar with mostly
minor increases in the exact limits of each coverage region. The literature also
documents a significant amount of inertia and inattention in patient choice of
7Used to treat high cholesterol
8Used to treat high blood pressure.
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plans, indicating that approximately 10% of Part D patients switch their plans
between every two years (Abaluck and Gruber, 2016; Abaluck et al., 2018; Ho
et al., 2017).
1.3.2 Data description
The primary dataset includes the prescription drug and medical claims from a
random 5% subsample of Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in Part D in the years
between 2009 and 2012, with approximately 2 million individuals per year.9 The
data come from the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services. Broadly, the
data cover the beneficiary demographics, their Part D prescription claims, and the
plan characteristics of the specific Part D plan that each beneficiary chose. The
prescription drug claims include the exact drug purchased, days supply, purchase
date, the proportion paid by both the patients and insurance companies, and the
benefit phase each claim occurs in. The plan characteristics supplement contract
information with full details on the plan premiums and the exact cost-sharing
characteristics: deductibles, coinsurance, copays for specific drug types and tiers.
Basic demographic information of the beneficiaries (gender, age, race) along
with hospitalization and doctor claims information from Medicare Part A and B,
which are used to determine patient health conditions, are also observed. With
these data, I use the CMS-provided risk model to calculate a “risk score” or sum-
mary estimate of the expected average drug spending implied by patients’ demo-
graphics and health conditions.10 In order to normalize the risk score comparison,
9This analysis does not consider patients enrolled in Medicare Advantage (Part C), because
while the Medicare Part D claims data include Part C prescription claims, the dataset does not
include the doctor and hospitalization claims, which are used to control for heterogeneity.
10CMS use Hierarchical Conditional Codes (HCC) and RxHCC to adjust the reimburse-
ment payments to insurance companies that offer plans in Medicare Advantage and other pro-
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I use the risk and demographics score translation from 2011. Individuals who
have a combined risk and demographic weight of 1 have an average prescription
reimbursement liability of a typical Medicare Part D enrollee in 2011.
The analysis sample for this paper is constructed by keeping only individuals
in the Medicare system who had Medicare Part D from 2009 through 2012 with
specific beneficiary and chosen plan characteristics. To list the beneficiary char-
acteristic restrictions, the sample contains beneficiaries who are 65 or older, are
enrolled in Medicare PDPs from 2009-2012 through the Old Age and Survivors
Insurance (OASI), and are not enrolled for disability insurance or other qualifiers
for Medicare. The sample also excludes individuals who are dual eligible for Med-
icaid financial assistance or receive other types of low-income subsidies (LIS) for
premiums or cost-sharing. These individuals are excluded because they face very
low cost-sharing and minor changes in their marginal costs. Even individuals who
only receive premium subsidies are omitted, because they are more likely to be
lower income and are more likely to be influenced by budget constraints. Further,
the analysis of the paper also excludes individuals whose Medicare Part B claims
indicate they were in long-term care institutions (LTI) such as nursing homes in
the prior year. Including also a restriction for individuals who were in Medicare
Part D for all twelve months of each year, this leaves approximately 300,000 bene-
ficiaries in each of the 2009-2012 years respectively. This is the “full” sample and
is used as a comparison group to the analysis sample.11
There is a substantial amount of plan variety in this data set that is subject
grams. The HCC and RxHCC scores are used to reimburse the plans for managing patients
with illnesses with expected increased medical and prescription medication costs, respectively.
http://setma.com/EPM-Tools/tutorial-hcc-rxhcc-risk
11The sample exclusion restrictions are further discussed in Appendix Section A.1 and listed
in Appendix Table A.1 with the percentage of the entire Medicare/Medicaid 5% sample they
encompass. Note that not all individuals have Medicare Part D. See Appendix Table A.3 for
summary statistics before plan choice restrictions.
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to further restrictions to construct the analysis sample. The plan variety and
the beneficiary’s opportunity to switch plans between years pose a challenge for
studying beneficiary behavior. There may be an endogenous relationship between
a beneficiary’s choice of plans and her spending patterns. That plan variety can
be seen in Table 1.2. Across the four years, very few enrollees chose plans with
deductibles; 65-75% of enrollees have plans without deductibles. Overall only 15-
20% of enrollees have plans with the standard government-defined plan limits in
the deductible, initial coverage region, and out-of-pocket thresholds. However, a
majority of patients still have the same ICL and OOPT limits with 76% without
a deductible. Despite the pervasiveness of the ICL and OOPT spending limits,
less than 2% of beneficiaries have plans that use the exact 25% coinsurance rate
suggested by the government for the initial coverage region. Because many benefi-
ciaries do have plans with the Medicare-defined spending limits for their ICL and
OOPT, this paper will focus on the beneficiary’s response to approaching these
limits rather than her response to the specific coinsurance rates.
Table 1.2: Summary of full sample of Medicare beneficiary plans 2009-2012
2009 2010 2011 2012
Deductible: None 0.76 0.68 0.63 0.67
Deductible: Other 0.04 0.17 0.19 0.15
Has Standard Deductible 0.20 0.15 0.18 0.18
ICR: Standard Coinsurance 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
ICR: Cost Share Tiers 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00
ICL: Standard 0.99 0.93 1 1
OOPT: Standard 1 1 1 1
Standard Plan Limits 0.20 0.15 0.18 0.18
No Deductible, Standard ICL & OOPT 0.75 0.61 0.63 0.67
Main 4 Year Sample 0.34 0.32 0.31 0.29
Observations 291,550 304,477 317,670 333,309
Note: The full sample includes individuals in each year who satisfy the criteria for the “Full 12
Month Sample” from Table A.1.
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The analysis sample or baseline “No Deductible” sample then focuses on the
balanced panel of individuals who qualify under the prior restrictions discussed,
had the government prescribed limits for the ICL and OOPT, and who did not
have deductibles. Individuals were also omitted if they were observed to have
either zero spending in any year or had claims in every week of the year. The
final sample contains 89,354 beneficiaries or about 30% of the full sample. Part
of the reason for this restriction is to help standardize the spending limits for the
analysis in later sections. This restriction has the negative effect of decreasing the
sample size and reducing the generalizability of these results. Further, because
these individuals choose plans without deductibles, the selected sample may be
simultaneously more risky, more risk averse, and richer than an average Medicare
Part D enrollee. Also because the sample requires the beneficiary have the same
plan structure in all four years, they have higher inertia and may have higher costs
of switching.12
The dataset of 2009-2012 claims differs from the data used in the papers previ-
ously mentioned. In all cases, this sample draws from a later sample of individuals
with Medicare Part D than individuals who are in Joyce et al. (2013)’s 2006, Dal-
ton et al. (2018)’s 2008, Einav et al. (2015)’s 2007-2009, and Abaluck et al. (2018)’s
2006-2009 sample. My panel is a longer sample than most other papers and cov-
ers 2008 medical history and four years of claims. Because this sample involved
individuals who retained similar plan structures through all four years, they are
mechanically more likely to have experience with Medicare Part D13, their plan
structure, and their prescription needs than individuals described in these other
12An additional “Standard” sample is also created from the 9,178 individuals who signed up
for plans with the government-defined deductible, ICL, and OOPT, for whom summary statistics
are presented in Appendix Section A.1.
13Remember also Medicare Part D began in 2006, so papers using earlier samples may study
have less experienced subjects.
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papers. These differences possibly translate to different findings in the empirical
section.
Table 1.3 displays the demographics of the baseline sample of individuals with-
out deductibles. The average age of the population in 2009 is about 75, which is
slightly older than the average Medicaid 5% sample population, but is consistent
with the ages of beneficiaries enrolled in Medicare Part D. The vast majority (ap-
proximately 95%) of beneficiaries are white. The sum of the 2011 RxHCC and
demographic weight is less than one, indicating that the average person in this
sample is healthier than the average Medicare Part D participant and reflecting
the fact that disability, LIS, and LTI individuals were not included. However, they
are sicker than the average individual in the full sample, which may reflect both
the higher age and the optional nature of joining Medicare Part D for prescription
purchases.
A majority of individuals have chronic conditions with 66% and 73% of indi-
viduals having hypertension and high cholesterol in 2008. Also, almost a quarter
of the sample has diabetes and 10% has had cancer treatment of some kind in
2008. These are all conditions that often require constant prescription refills and
spending using the Medicare Part D benefit. The Kaiser foundation documents
that patients who took drugs to treat some of these conditions are far more likely
to reach the coverage gap and catastrophic regions (Hoadley et al., 2011). They
observed that the average Part D enrollee’s probability of reaching either of the
two regions as 19% in 2009 but 56% for patients on breast cancer treatment drugs,
40% for those taking oral anti-diabetics, 32% for those on statins etc. Also, as the
beneficiaries progress through the years, they get older and sicker. The increase in
sickness is reflected in the claims data with an increasing trend in spending amount
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Table 1.3: Demographics of baseline No Deductible sample of Medicare beneficia-
ries in 2009-2012
Mean SD
Age at End of 2009 74.94 6.58
Start Medicare 1999.11 6.55
Female 0.65 0.48
Race: White 0.95 0.21
Race: Black 0.02 0.15
Race: Other 0.01 0.11
Race: Asian 0.01 0.08
Race: Hispanic 0.00 0.06
Observations 89,354
2009 2010 2011 2012
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
2011 RxHCC weight 0.48 0.29 0.51 0.29 0.53 0.30 0.55 0.31
2011 RxHCC demo. weight 0.42 0.01 0.42 0.01 0.42 0.01 0.42 0.01
Diabetes 0.24 0.43 0.26 0.44 0.27 0.44 0.28 0.45
Hypertension 0.67 0.47 0.69 0.46 0.70 0.46 0.71 0.46
Has Cancer 0.10 0.30 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.31 0.12 0.32
High Cholesterol 0.73 0.44 0.76 0.43 0.76 0.42 0.77 0.42
Note: The baseline No Deductible sample includes individuals in each year who satisfy the criteria
from Table A.1 and also were in a plan with standard ICL and OOPT limits with no deductible
from 2009-2012. Risk scores are normalized to 2011 RXHCC scores for consistency across years.
and frequency through 2009-2012.
Even though the majority of beneficiary plans do not follow the standard
Medicare-defined coinsurance amounts, the coinsurance levels between the different
coverage regions are on average still economically and significantly different from
each other. Table 1.4 displays the average coinsurance amount that beneficiaries
in the baseline No Deductible sample face. Because the plans patients choose do
not have deductibles, their effective coinsurance rate in the initial coverage region
(ICR) is higher than the standard plan at 39% to 41% of the total cost of care.
The coinsurance rate in the donut hole in 2009 and 2010 prior to the ACA legisla-
tion to filling in the donut hole was not quite 100% but still significantly high at
approximately 92%. The beneficiary responsible portion of the coinsurance rate
during the coverage gap in 2011-2012 was significantly lower at approximately 54-
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55% with the addition of the 50% discount on branded drugs. While the difference
between the ICR and Coverage Gap coinsurance rates in the first two years of the
sample is higher than the latter two years, there is still a difference in the latter
two years. This means that beneficiaries should qualitatively still respond to these
plan characteristics in the way laid out in Section 1.2. It is expected that any
beneficiary response to the coverage gap in 2009-2010 may be muted in 2011-2012,
because the marginal price difference between the two regions is smaller. The av-
erage coinsurance levels for patients with standard plan limits follow closer to the
government recommended plan and are shown in the Appendix Table A.4.
Table 1.4: Average (person-week) coinsurance by insurance region 2009-2012
2009 2010 2011 2012
Percent Count Percent Count Percent Count Percent Count
ICR 38.63 4,285,602 40.69 4,300,522 39.75 4,277,143 40.71 4,293,291
Coverage Gap 92.23 319,117 91.55 306,331 55.08 325,492 54.28 309,185
Catastrophic 5.87 32,100 5.80 30,742 5.95 36,657 5.97 38,708
Note: Table is generated from the baseline No Deductible sample. The coinsurance rates are
averaged over the amount the patient pays (does not include the drug manufacture discounts
in 2011 and 2012) divided by the total expenditure cost in the person-week observation where
spending occurs. This rate is effectively weighted by the time individuals spend in each phase.
The count reflects the fact that there are more person-week observations in the ICR region than
others. These sums do not reflect the counterfactual coinsurance rates that beneficiaries with
low spending would have faced if they had reached higher spending. While the data contain the
actual structure of the beneficiary plans with exact coinsurance and copay rates for drug tiers,
it is difficult to summarize in a specific coinsurance rate without knowing the mix of drugs that
patients may consume.
The baseline sample is used to study beneficiary behavior as they cross spend-
ing phases, and the sample does include individuals who are likely to reach the
coverage gap and beyond. Table 1.5 shows that while the majority of the benefi-
ciaries without deductibles end the year in the initial coverage region, over 21% of
enrollees end the year past the coverage gap with approximately 2-3% reaching the
catastrophic coverage region. While heterogeneity among beneficiaries mean that
many would not have realistic expectations of reaching the higher spending cover-
age regions, there is certainly a significant subset of enrollees who might expect to
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end the year in these regions.
Table 1.5: Proportion of beneficiaries in each insurance region at the end-of-the-
year
2009 2010 2011 2012
ICR 76.47 77.70 76.93 78.81
Gap 21.03 19.97 20.28 18.46
Catastrophic 2.49 2.32 2.79 2.73
Observations 89,354 89,354 89,354 89,354
Note: Table is generated from the baseline No Deductible sample. The proportion of beneficiaries
that end the year in each phase is averaged over the individual beneficiary.
The sample beneficiary’s average raw claim occurrence probability (i.e. the
probability of submitting a claim) in each of the Medicare Part D insurance cov-
erage regions is depicted in Table 1.6. Across the four years, while the probability
of ever making a prescription claim in a week is 32-34%, the raw probabilities do
differ significantly within the insurance regions. Of the beneficiaries who are in
the initial coverage region, their average probability of spending is in the 31-33%
range. The weekly claim probability for the observations in the coverage gap is
higher at 43-47% and highest in the catastrophic region at 56-57%. The overall
average is very similar to the average in the ICR region, since the majority of the
individual-week observations occur in the ICR. This pattern can also be seen in
Figure 1.6, which displays both the frequency of claims and the mean claim occur-
rence within $50 bins in 2009 as a function of the cumulative total expenditures.
This image illustrates the raw probabilities of beneficiary’s spending.
Given the number of individuals who end the benefit year in each region and
the large number of person-week observations in the ICR relative to the catas-
trophic region, it makes sense that the ICR probability is closer to the total av-
erage probability. The differences in the probabilities across regions is a possible
indication of heterogeneity in the probability of spending, where individuals with
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Table 1.6: Average probability (%) of weekly spending in coverage regions
2009 2010 2011 2012
ICR 31.48 31.90 32.15 32.71
Coverage Gap 42.65 43.63 45.01 46.93
Catastrophic 56.22 56.84 55.87 56.84
All weeks 32.44 32.86 33.26 33.87
Note: Table is generated from the baseline No Deductible sample. Table displays the raw prob-
ability of spending in a week in each coverage region and year. The coverage regions are the
initial coverage region (ICR), the coverage gap (aka the donut hole), and the catastrophic region.
The average is of the probability of a person-week observation having a claim and is low because
there are more observations in the ICR as seen in Table 1.4.
Figure 1.6: Weekly claim occurrence conditional on cumulative total expenditures
Note: Using a $50 dollar bin, the points are the average probability of spending on prescription
purchases in a week conditional on the quarter of the year and the cumulative total expenditure.
Einav et al. (2015) produced very similar graphs of the probability of a prescription purchase in
a month rather than the week level. This image is only of 2009 claims.
higher probabilities of claims, who may also have higher average spending amounts,
are more likely to have observations in the coverage gap and catastrophic regions.
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Einav et al. (2015) uses a similar graph to Figure 1.6 of the monthly probability of
spending to help illustrate the empirical patterns that beneficiaries engage in at the
coverage gap. However, in order to fully understand beneficiary behavior at and
before the kink, researchers must take into consideration the significant amounts of
heterogeneity in prescription needs that exist in the Medicare Part D population.
Beneficiaries who are more likely to spend (and spend more), are also more likely
to be observed in higher cumulative spending bins, while those who spend less are
observed at the lower cumulative total expenditure levels. The approach that is
taken in this paper to handle this heterogeneity is through the use of fixed effects
in Section 1.5.
The limitations of these data include the fact that they do not capture pre-
scription purchases outside of Part D such as large retailer generics since those
purchases are outside the scope of the Medicare system. Further, this paper has
limited data on beneficiary incomes. One potential explanation for non-standard
behavior could be patients reaching budget constraints, and this paper is not able
to directly measure individual liquid wealth.
1.4 Heuristic approach applied to Medicare Part D
This section applies the heuristic approach proposed in Section 1.2 to the empirical
data. The goal is to recover the average objective expected end-of-year prices
beneficiaries should expect as a function of week and current cumulative spending.
One drawback of the heuristic method is that it requires a strong assumption that
a beneficiary has access to the data to know her objective probabilities; however,
this heuristic is still useful as a tool to understand how optimal agents should
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behave. Further, if the stylized facts about beneficiaries sharply reducing their
spending when approaching the coverage gap earlier in the year are generally true,
then under this heuristic this behavior would only be explained by discontinuities
in beneficiary’s subjective end-of-year probabilities, i.e. if they fail to update their
beliefs or receive health shocks that lead to surprises.
There are more regions and more noise in these estimates than the simulated
example, but basic interpretations hold. First, the probability distributions of
ending in each of the contract regions based on the time of the year and beneficiary
year-to-date spending are constructed. While these graphs are constructed at the
cross-individual level, they should still provide insight for individuals to construct
their internal beliefs.
For the baseline No Deductible sample, Figure 1.7 displays the raw probability
in weeks 13, 23, 33, and 43 of ending the year in each coverage region conditional
on their cumulative total expenditures (through week 12, 22, 32, and 42 respec-
tively). The heuristic expected marginal price (HMP ) is constructed using these
probabilities as discussed in Section 1.2, and it is displayed in Figure 1.8. Both
probabilities and marginal costs are calculated from beneficiaries whose weekly
cumulative total expenditure amounts fall in $50 bins in the x-axis. The red line
represents the initial coverage limit and the boundary between the initial coverage
region of low coinsurance and the coverage gap. There are significantly more dif-
ferences in the bin means for the probability ending the year in the catastrophic
and initial coverage gap conditional on the cumulative total spending. This is
due in large part because the out-of-pocket threshold (i.e. the boundary between
the coverage gap and catastrophic region) translates to different cumulative total
expenditures for different insurance plans and drug consumption patterns. The
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noise in probabilities is exacerbated in the week 13 panel because there are few
individuals who have accumulated high spending levels that early in the year.
Figure 1.7: Distribution of the probability of reaching each coverage region in 2009
conditional on cumulative total spending
Note: The graph depicts an Epanechnikov kernel-weighted polynomial of the probability of a
beneficiary being in coverage region r at the end of the year given week w and within a $50
bin of the cumulative total spending Zw. This makes up the distribution Fr(Zw, w). The figure
is generated from the baseline No Deductible sample. The bin size = 50 and was chosen for
illustrative purposes. Similar images for 2010-2012 are included in the Appendix. Because the
out-of-pocket threshold limit for entering the catastrophic coverage region does not on aggregate
map to a specific cumulative total amount, the average probability of ending in those phases as
a function of the cumulative total amount has a wide dispersion of points.
While much of the prior literature has focused on the behavior directly at the
initial coverage limit, the effect of the non-linear pricing structure could be evident
far prior to the coverage gap earlier in the year. In week 13, if a beneficiary’s
spending is between $500 and $1,500, she is most likely to end the year in the
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Figure 1.8: Heuristic expected marginal price in 2009
Note: Depicts the expected marginal price based off of the objective distributions of the prob-
ability of ending the year in each coverage region depicted in Figure 1.7. The heuristic ex-
pected marginal price is HMP (Zw, w)) = FICR(Zw|w)∗MC(ICR) +FGap(Zw|w)∗MC(Gap) +
FCat(Zw|w) ∗MC(Cat), where MC(ICR) = .33, MC(Gap)=1, and MC(C=.05) the government
standard plan amounts.
coverage gap, and this translates to her highest HMP being in that region. If a
beneficiary’s spending is already over $1,500, she is most likely to end the year in
the catastrophic zone, even though she is still far away from even the transition
from the ICR to the coverage gap. If a beneficiary uses the HMP as her perceived
marginal price, she should increase her spending as the HMP decreases, which
begins well before the 2009 ICL of $2,700.
As time progresses, the probability of ending the year in any of the regions also
shift to higher cumulative totals and tend closer to 0 and 1, and the beneficiary’s
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highest heuristic expected marginal price more closely resembles the plan spot
prices. Over time the cumulative total spending level at which she experiences
her highest HMP moves closer to the discontinuity between the initial coverage
and the coverage gap regions. While the distribution of the probability of ending
the year in the coverage gap was a maximum of 80% in week 13, there is an
increasing group of individuals who have spent around $2,000 by week 20 and
$2,700 in week 33 who are certain to end the year in the coverage gap. Thus the
highest HMP , which should correlate with a beneficiary’s lowest levels of spending
move to about $2000 in week 23 and to the ICL or $2,700 in week 33. In week
43, or approximately 2 months before the end of the year, there already exists
a discontinuity in the probability of ending the year in the coverage gap at the
initial coverage limit. These graphs are not generated based on the behavior of
necessarily standard forward-looking agents, so the HMP may approach the spot
price earlier than for standard rational agents.
In translating the beneficiary’s perceived marginal price to their spending pat-
terns, if the demand function is smooth and quantity demanded is decreasing with
the marginal price of prescription purchases, broad predictions can be made. The
expectation is that within any time period the cumulative total expenditure with
the lowest heuristic expected marginal prices in a time period should correspond
with the cumulative total expenditure amount that has the highest level of spend-
ing. Similarly, within a time period, the cumulative total expenditure with the
highest heuristic expected marginal price should correspond with the lowest levels
of spending. If the demand function is smooth and the transitions in the HMP
are smooth (as they are for the majority of the periods), then the spending should
also be smooth.
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The relationship between the HMP and spending is not necessarily expected to
be one-to-one and would not be as dramatic as a simple “flip” of the HMP curve,
but the expectation is that the location of spending changes should correspond
with the peaks and troughs of the HMP . In fact, because prescription purchases
often have immediate and significant health benefits, these drugs may be relatively
inelastic goods and respond little if at all to the marginal price changes. Using
the end-of-year purchases, Einav et al. (2018) measures the elasticities of different
drug classes and find an overall elasticity of -0.037 so that a one percent increase
in out-of-pocket cost leads to a 0.037 percent decrease in the probability of filling
a claim. Thus, the expectation is that the HMP would result in small changes in
the probability of filling a claim as well.
The next section will discuss the empirical approach to estimate a graphical
representation of beneficiary spending patterns. It will also discuss how consistent
behavior is with the simple heuristic model of spending.
1.5 Estimation model and results
This section details an empirical model of prescription purchasing behavior under
Medicare Part D that ascribes prescription spending to both opportunities to spend
and then beneficiary decisions to spend. The model emphasizes the effects of past
cumulative spending on weekly prescription purchases. Ultimately the estimation
shown in this paper lumps both the opportunity to spend and the decision to spend
as one process, but the model is laid out to provide intuition on the beneficiary’s
underlying motivations. The intent of the estimation is to document the patterns of
consumer behavior that emerge as patients progress through their insurance plans
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and not to capture the full dynamics of the consumer prescription choice problem.
The beneficiary’s prescription spending decision is aggregated and examined on
the weekly level to reduce the size of the problem.
Figure 1.9: Spending Decision
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The initial model shown in Figure 1.9 assumes beneficiaries have a choice
whether to spend on prescriptions and a separate limited choice on the amount
to spend. The only observables that are available in Medicare Part D data are
prescription purchases and not the beneficiary’s direct consumption of drugs. Be-
cause of the nature of chronic prescriptions, many are offered in 30 to 90 day
refill amounts, which means that there is a periodicity to beneficiary’s spending
patterns that are not necessarily driven by a choice to spend or not. In order to
capture some of this, the model assumes that the personal utility from medications
should only apply if a patient has a medical event or shock that requires treatment
(determined by Nature). Thus, the decision to use Medicare Part D to purchase
prescriptions should only occur when those events arrive and a doctor has writ-
ten the patient a prescription. These events can be temporary health shocks that
require treatment such as antibiotics for pneumonia, or continuations of existing
conditions that require a prescription refill. The probability of a medical event
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occurring q depends upon observables X such as demographics (age, risk scores,
historic Medicare Part D usage, etc.) and observable environment characteristics
(e.g. time of the year). It may also depend upon unobservable patient charac-
teristics and health shocks. However, essential to the model is the idea that the
actual probability of a true medical event occurring should not change due to the
arbitrary insurance coverage region (defined by the cumulative total spending Zw
up until week w) imposed by the patient’s insurance plan coverage—that is the
model assumes E(q|X,Zw) = E(q|X)∀r.
Once a patient receives a medical event, they have a choice whether to spend
on prescriptions and a choice on the exact amount of out-of-pocket and total
prescription spending. Within the second stage prescription filling decision, the
patient has some flexibility in the total prescription costs and thus their out-of-
pocket costs. They can choose branded or generic drugs, or they can potentially
ask their doctor to prescribe alternative drugs in a class of drugs that treat their
medical shock. I assume that beneficiary spending, conditional on receiving an
event, falls in some truncated distribution. Willingness to consume given a medical
shock is s, and the dollar amount of prescriptions patients actually purchase is
censored at 0, and the probability Pr(s > 0) = qPr(B(s|X) > PMC(s, Zw|X)).
The total payment amount s depends on the patient’s observable and unobservable
characteristics X, but also depends on the region r of the beneficiary’s insurance
plan and the distance in spending to them. Changes in a patient’s total spending
between insurance regions is meant to capture changes in the patient’s expectations
of or response to out-of-pocket marginal price changes.
From what has been laid out so far, it is clear why a censored regression spend-
ing model such as a Tobit would be inappropriate. There are legitimate zeros when
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beneficiaries do not have prescriptions to refill or health events, where the benefit
of any drug spending is minuscule and the cost would require a doctor’s visit for a
new prescription.
Rather than estimating the more complicated model of both the choice to
spend and spending amount, this paper focuses on the empirical probability of
observing non-zero spending in a week. This probability is represented by 1−p′ =
1 − q + qP (s ≤ 0) the probability of observing zero spending either because the
beneficiary did not have a claim, or because she had a claim and she chose not to
fill the claim.
This paper takes a reduced-form fixed-effects approach that differs from the
prior literature in order to control for the heterogeneity in the enrollees’ spend-
ing patterns shown in Figure 1.6. Einav et al. (2015) and other papers take a
structural approach that imposes substantial assumptions on beneficiary behavior.
Along with a dynamic optimization model, Dalton et al. (2018) run simple linear
regressions with fixed effects to examine the flat effect of being within $110 of and
in the donut hole on individual’s average weekly spending (and other measures of
spending). This paper improves upon their reduced-form approach by applying it
to a four-year panel of observed weekly spending patterns over a much larger num-
ber of beneficiaries to reduce the negative dynamic panel bias with fixed effects (see
Section 1.5.3). Also, rather than using a single linear indicator of being near the
coverage gap, this paper’s analysis allows for a flexible cubic spline to characterize
beneficiary’s spending patterns. This is described in detail in Section 1.5.1.
Among the reduced-form literature, other papers have handled the heterogene-
ity in other ways. Kowalski (2016) uses a quantile regression with an instrumental
variable to analyze the change in people’s healthcare spending when their year-
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end marginal prices change due to accidental (and assumed exogenous) injuries
to family members. Since Medicare consists of only individual plans, this paper
does not use a similar instrumental variable approach. Abaluck et al. (2018) effec-
tively net out individual fixed effects by levering their panel data and observing
the difference in individual spending due to plan changes between different years.
However, their analysis is purposefully focused on spending for individuals who
are unlikely to cross coverage regions and is thus limited at spending kinks. Joyce
et al. (2013) compares the difference in the spending patterns of patients who have
standard Medicare Part D Plans with plan non-linearities with the patients who
receive low-income subsidies (LIS) and thus do not have significant coverage gaps.
However, using the spending patterns of the LIS as a baseline comparison group
for non-LIS patients may ascribe inherent differences between the groups to the
plan coverage structure.
1.5.1 Estimation
In order to identify how the probability of claims occurring responds to the nonlin-
ear marginal prices of the Medicare Part D nonlinear contract, this analysis takes
a fixed-effects-regression approach with a dynamic panel.
Model 1 is represented by Equation 1.1, a linear probability model and the
main estimation approach for this paper. Suppose Medicare Part D individual
claims are grouped on a weekly level with spending siyw in year y and week w. Let
the occurrence of spending oiyw = I(siyw > 0) be a binary variable. Let
oiyw = αi + γXiy + f(Qiyw, Ziyw, Z˜iyw) + τy + εit. (1.1)
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The variable Ziyw =
∑w−1
u=1 siyw is a measure that represents the cumulative total
expenditures within year y up until week w, and the variable Z˜iyw =
∑w−1
u=1 OOPiyw
is a measure that represents the cumulative total out-of-pocket expenditures in the
same time frame. The variable Qw ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} indicates whether a week is in the
first, second, third, or fourth set of 13 consecutive weeks in a year (simplified to
be called quarter variables). While the data is observed on a weekly level and the
heuristic in Section 1.4 was also presented on a weekly level, this estimation aggre-
gates the time fixed-effects on the quarter level. The variable αi is an individual
fixed effect that is constant across years and nests any gender, race, and age in
2009 information about the beneficiary. Xiy is the set of year-varying individual
demographics that include beneficiary RxHCC 2011 demographic and risk scores
are based off of their known health conditions from the prior year.14 The purpose
of the risk scores are to reimburse prescription spending, and as such they are an
important measure to capture any between year changes in beneficiary’s probabil-
ities of spending. The variable τy is the year fixed effect y that is the same for all
individuals.
The variables Ziyw, Z˜iyw, and Qiyw enter the estimation through a flexible
functional form:
f(Qiyw, Ziyw, Z˜iyw) =
4∑
q=1
∑
r∈R
I(Qiyw = q)
(
ηqr + g(dZ
r
iyw) + g˜(dZ˜
r
iyw)
)
(1.2)
This function f is parameterized as a piecewise function of 12 restricted cubic
splines for each of the two cumulative spending measures over the interaction of
14While the demographics score is a function of an individual’s fixed characteristics, it is a
non-linear function and thus still included in this analysis. Within a year, the demographics
score plus the risk score is a relative measure of the riskiness of an individual compared to others
in Medicare Part D. People who have a demographics plus risk score equal to 1 are considered
to have an average reimbursement liability.
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four quarters of the year and three separate spending regions: ICR, donut hole,
and catastrophic region. The limits that define the spending regions, ICLy and
OOPT y, change every year. Hence, in order to study the response as beneficiaries
reach these limits, define dZiyw ≡ Ziyw − ICLy and dZ˜iyw ≡ Z˜iyw − OOPT y. The
cumulative spending measures are denoted within each region r ∈ R as dZriyw and
dZ˜riyw, where the regions are defined as functions of both the cumulative total
spending and the cumulative out-of-pocket spending.
r =

ICR, if dZ < 0 & dZ˜ < 0
DonutHole, if dZ ≥ 0 & dZ˜ < 0
Catastrophic, if dZ ≥ 0 & dZ˜ ≥ 0
(1.3)
The functions g and g˜ denote the cubic splines for dZ and dZ˜ respectively.15
Each cubic spline is a natural spline and has 3 knots located at the 10, 50, and
90 percentiles suggested by Harrell (2001).16 The cumulative total and cumulative
out-of-pocket expenditure measures both define the spending regions and allow us
to understand how beneficiaries change their spending patterns as they approach
the regions across the year. Table 1.7 displays the percentile values of the cumu-
lative spending measures dZ and dZ˜ that are used to define the spline knots.
This functional form allows the slope (and form) of the relationship between the
cumulative spending measures and the beneficiary weekly claim probability to vary
separately in each of the 12 region-quarter grids. It assumes that the relationship
in f is the same across all four years, with the year effects only altering the level
of spending across all beneficiaries through τy in Equation 1.1. Alternative models
15The function differs for dZ and dZ˜ because of the exact placement of the knots and thus the
spline function notation differs slightly. Let ki, i = 1, 2, 3 be the knot values, then the g(V) func-
tion is a linear regression of V1 = V and V2 = (V−k1)
3
+−(k3−k2)−1{(V−k2)3+(k3−k1)−(V−k3)3+(k2−k1)}
(k3−k1)2 .
16 Section 1.5.4, discusses how this specification was selected for over alternative cubic splines
with 3 knots and one with 4 knots.
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Table 1.7: Percentile values
dZ dZ˜
Percentile ICR Gap Catastrophic ICR Gap Catastrophic
5 -2,849 48 3,777 -4,674 2,976 11
10 -2,827 100 4,034 -4,593 -3,695 20
35 -2,565 432 5,258 -4,443 -3,848 84
50 -2,340 717 6,373 -4,342 -2,933 145
65 -2,565 1114 8,362 -4,233 -2,561 252
90 -981 2426 24,435 -3,882 -1,349 1,074
95 -577 2977 38,488 -3,720 -835 1,768
Note: Shows select percentile values of dZ and dZ˜ in each coverage region. These percentile
values are used in determining the location of the knots in the estimation results.
were considered such as ones that included an individual-year fixed effect for more
flexibility. However, such models were rejected in order to mitigate the potential
bias with dynamic panels and fixed effects. See the discussion in Section 1.5.3.
1.5.2 Baseline estimation results
Figure 1.10 and Table 1.8 present the results of Model 1’s linear probability fixed-
effects estimation using a cubic spline. Errors are clustered at the individual level.
Rather than displaying the coefficient estimates of the piecewise f function, the
figure displays the predicted values from those estimates that describe the effect
the cumulative spending values on the probability of filling a prescription claim
in a week. The remaining coefficient estimates for the beneficiary risk scores and
year (γ and τy) are included in Table 1.8.
The main takeaway from this analysis is that patients do anticipate and respond
to the pricing incentives in the Medicare Part D contract. This analysis indicates
that on average patients decrease their spending patterns far in advance of entering
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Figure 1.10: Model 1: Probability of claims occurring in a week
Note: Displays the predicted values of the claims occurrence probability oˆiyw from the fixed-
effects panel regression of Equation 1.1 on the beneficiaries in the No Deductible sample. Each
panel represents a quarter of the year where a quarter consists of 13 weeks except for quarter 4,
where the last “week” of the year consists of the remainder 8 or 9 days of the year. Images display
a 95% confidence interval around the predicted values. The predicted values are generated within
each panel by holding all variables constant except for the cumulative total expenditure displayed
on the x-axis and the cumulative out-of-pocket expenditure, which increases with the cumulative
total expenditure at the average coinsurance rates presented in Table 1.4. The probabilities
are predicted assuming that beneficiary has the sample average risk and demographic scores
from 2009, 0.4753 and 0.4196 respectively. Each line segment represents a prediction made
assuming the year is 2009 with 2009 spending limits and across time average individual risk and
demographics. Since the estimates are from a linear fixed-effects-regression, the predicted values
are plotted assuming the mean fixed-effects coefficient, which is zero.
the donut hole and begin to increase it prior to exiting; however, these changes are
smooth except in the end of the year. This analysis did not find the behavioral
break at the entrance to the donut hole early in the year that previous literature
has suggested.
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Table 1.8: Model 1: Impact on the probability (%) of a claim in a week
Coefficient Estimate Std. Error
RxHCC Risk Weight 3.57 0.11
RxHCC Demographic Weight -26.71 6.12
2010 0.30 0.05
2011 0.61 0.05
2012 1.42 0.08
N 18,585,632
Note: The estimated coefficients on the risk scores Xiy and year-time dummies τy from the
fixed-effects panel linear probability regression of Equation 1.1 on the beneficiaries in the No
Deductible sample. All estimates in the table are significant at less than the .1% level.
The coefficients of individual risk and demographics scores are highly signifi-
cant, but the scale of the effects may be economically small. On average for the
predicted sample, the point estimates of the probability of a claim occurring in a
week all fall in the range of around 25-35%. If these predicted values of weekly
claim probabilities are extrapolated multiple weeks, this translates into an eco-
nomic meaning of visiting the pharmacy once every 4 weeks versus once every 2.9
weeks. These differences would be higher for individuals with lower risk scores and
the differences would be smaller for high-risk types.
Holding individuals and other characteristics constant, if a patient’s risk score
increases by one standard deviation (approximately 0.3), the probability of claims
being observed in a week is expected to increase by approximately 1%. Riskier
patients result in higher prescriptions as expected. Also, if a patient’s demographic
score increases by one standard deviation (approximately 0.01), the probability of
observing at least one claim in the week is expected to drop by 0.25%. At first
glance the negative coefficient on the demographics score appears counter intu-
itive; however, this can be explained since the demographics score is a nonlinear
function of age, race, and other fixed characteristics. Holding all else constant, the
demographics score actually decreases as age increases. The positive and signifi-
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cant coefficients on the year fixed effects also capture both the effect of aging on
the sample population and any year trends that lead to increases in medication
purchasing frequency. Individuals who are older and in 2012 are 1.4% more likely
to have claim in a week than in 2009. Because this is a fixed-effects-regression on
a balanced panel in all four years, this regression does not differentiate the effects
of aging versus the year fixed effects.
Figure 1.10 depicts in four panels the predicted probability of a claim occurring
in a week in each of four quarters (13 week periods) in the year as the beneficiary’s
cumulative total spending (Ziyw) changes.
17 Within each panel, the predicted
probabilities are displayed as a piecewise function with the first segment repre-
senting the initial coverage region, the second the coverage gap, and the third the
catastrophic region. Further these estimates are predicted assuming other coef-
ficients are held constant with year 2009 fixed effects, average demographics and
risk scores for the sample, 2009 ICL and OOPT limits, and average coinsurance
rates in each spending region. Because the prediction assumes fixed coinsurance
rates, the cumulative total is a one-to-one mapping of the cumulative out-of-pocket
expenditures. The example out-of-pocket total of $4,350 translates to a cumulative
total expenditure amount of $7,200.
Focusing first on the Quarter 1 panel, the probability of a claim occurring in a
week are tightly estimated for low cumulative expenditures and decreases from 35%
to 25% prior to spending even $1,000, indicating that high spenders may anticipate
entering the donut hole. The point estimates as individuals cross from the ICR
to the coverage gap do not indicate a discontinuity and the probability of claim
occurrences increase prior to entering the catastrophic region. The point estimate
at the entrance to the catastrophic region indicates that individuals decrease their
17The cumulative out-of-pocket expenditures also change here but this is not displayed.
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spending. The confidence interval around these estimates do become progressively
wider as the cumulative total expenditure values increase, because there are few
individual-week observations at such high spending levels early in the year. Even
with the wide confidence intervals, the claim occurrence probability is lower for
individuals who just entered the donut hole than for individuals who have spent a
thousand more. The predicted values show a drop in claim occurrence frequency
when exiting the donut hole into the catastrophic region, however, the confidence
intervals around these predictions are wide at approximately 10 percentage points
and are not significant.
The behavior observed in Quarter 2 and 3 are similar to Quarter 1. There is
a significant decrease and then an increase in the claims occurrence probability
in the ICR and donut hole, respectively, as the cumulative total expenditure in-
creases. These changes are smooth, and there is no evidence for a discontinuity
in the spending measure at either the entrance to the donut hole nor the start of
the catastrophic region. The predicted values are generated off of more precise
estimates in the later quarters with a maximum confidence interval around the
entrance to the catastrophic region of 5% and 2.5% in the second and third panels
respectively. The predicted values in Quarter 2 and 3 differ from Quarter 1 in
that the decrease in the cumulative total spending in the ICR is not as steep, and
the lowest probability occurs at a higher cumulative total expenditure in the later
periods.
In Quarter 4, the probability of spending is still in the 25% to 35% range for cu-
mulative total expenditures below $12,000, but the predicted spending values differ
at specific cumulative total spending and are estimated with very tight confidence
intervals. They indicate sharp discontinuities in spending at the entrance to the
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donut hole with a 4% drop in the probability of claims occurring in a week, and
they indicate a 3% increase in claims occurrences upon entering the catastrophic
region. The slope of the claim occurrence probabilities in the ICR and donut hole
regions are a much lower magnitude and less economically significant even as they
are estimated with more precision as time progresses. In addition, the slope within
the ICR region appears to be convex.
This pattern supports the theory and simulations from Section 1.2, which pre-
dict that discontinuities in the probability of spending are most likely in the last
time period because there is less ambiguity as to the beneficiary’s end-of-year
marginal costs. The lower magnitudes of the changes in the claim occurrence
probability within each coinsurance region also reflect the theory that the per-
ceived marginal cost should approach the actual coinsurance rates which are flat
within a region. The convexity in the ICR that begins in Quarter 3 and is more
evident in Quarter 4 was not predicted from the heuristic marginal price applied to
data, but it is consistent with theory. At the end of the year, beneficiaries would
have more information on their end-of-year region, and in the last months of the
year, enrollees in the low values of the ICR may decrease their perceived marginal
price as the probability of entering the donut hole decreases (and then increase
their spending).
1.5.3 Bias in a dynamic panel with fixed effects
The estimates of fixed-effects models applied to a dynamic panel are known to be
biased if the number of time periods (T ) is small and the cross sectional size of
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the panel (N) is large (Nickell, 1981).18 This model is affected by Nickell bias be-
cause the cumulative total and out-of-pocket expenditures Ziyw and Z˜iyw are both
functions of the lagged dependent variable, the claim observation oiyw. The paper
does take precautions to reduce the influence of this bias on the analysis. First,
the analysis spans beneficiary behavior over four years, or T = 208 weeks, a longer
time span than normally cited in the literature. As Nickell (1981) demonstrates
with a simple lag, as N →∞, the inconsistency of the estimated lagged parameter
is of the order 1/T . So while the number of beneficiaries in the No Deductible
sample N = 89, 354 is large, the potential bias with a larger T is greatly reduced.
The classic Nickell bias as it applies to the coefficient on the lag of the dependent
variable is negative, and the coefficient on the cumulative spending measures in
each region would be similarly negatively biased. To verify, the direction of the
bias as it applies to the specific types of lags in this estimation are simulated with
noise and presented in the Appendix Section A.3. Any bias in the estimates are
more likely to be observed at low cumulative spending levels and leads to a more
negative slope. The bias alone does not lead to discontinuities in the effect of the
cumulative spending measures on the claim occurrence probability.
Other estimation approaches that would have circumvented the bias problem of
the fixed-effects approach such as that presented by Anderson and Hsiao (1982) or
Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) (popularized and more commonly known as Arellano and
Bond (1991)) have their own problems. These methodologies use a first-differences
approach to net out the fixed-effect αi and then use further lags of the lagged
variable (in this case the Ziyw and Z˜iyw) as instruments in a 2SLS and GMM style
18Nickell (1981) highlighted that the time demeaning operation of fixed effects in a dynamic
panel data model yit = αi + βyit−1 + it leads to a transformed regression model yit − y¯i =
β(yit−1− y¯it−1)+(it− ¯i) where the y¯i, y¯it−1, ¯i indicate time averages. The error terms (it− ¯i)
and regressors (yit−1 − y¯it−1) are correlated even as N →∞.
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estimation respectively. While not biased, Anderson and Hsiao (1982) does not
use all available data and can result in imprecise estimates. Further, because of
the large size of the data, the number of interactions of Ziyw and Z˜iyw terms, and
the long length of the panel, the Arellano-Bond methods are not computationally
tractable in this specification.
1.5.4 Robustness
I consider additional models to address some of the concerns of model specifica-
tion and find results that support the initial findings. Alternative splines of the
cumulative total and cumulative out-of-pocket spending measures are included as
a falsification test to verify that the functional form definition is not driving the
result. I also consider an alternative spending measure (the count of the number
of claims in a week) and present both the results of a linear and Poisson model as
an alternative to the linear probability model.
Falsification test
In order to more fully verify the results of the estimation, this paper conducted
falsification tests with different spline functions and discontinuities allowed at dif-
ferent points.
Model 1 used a cubic spline with 3 knots located at the 10, 50, and 90 percentile
values for dZ, the cumulative total expenditures (centered on the ICL), and for dZ˜,
the cumulative OOP expenditure (centered on the OOPT). One potential concern
is that the cubic spline with 3 knots may over-smooth the beneficiary’s response
especially close to the region boundaries. Two alternative splines were tested in
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models called False 1 and False 2. One included three knots located at the 5, 50,
95 percentile values for both regressors and another with four knots at located at
the 5, 35, 65, and 95 percentile values for both regressors. The knot values are
displayed in Table 1.7. Model 1 was selected over these other two models by both
the AIC and BIC criteria.
Another approach to verifying the accuracy of Model 1 was taken by introducing
additional potential discontinuities in the domain. In False 3, the following linear
probability model was conducted where the initial coverage region is broken down
into two separate regions ICR1 and ICR2. Then the cumulative measures that
enter Equation 1.1 and 1.2 are dZriyw and dZ˜
r
iyw where r ∈ R′ such that
r =

ICR1, if dZ < −1000 & dZ˜ < 0
ICR2, if − 1000 ≥ dZ < 0 & dZ˜ < 0
DonutHole, if dZ ≥ 0 & dZ˜ < 0
Catastrophic, if dZ ≥ 0 & dZ˜ ≥ 0
(1.4)
Equation 1.1 is estimated with the regions in R′ and standard errors clustered
at the individual level.
Table 1.9 displays the estimated coefficient values for the year fixed effects and
risk scores for False 1-3. The predicted values of the claims occurrence as the cu-
mulative total and out-of-pocket expenditures change are displayed in Figure 1.11
for False 3. The figures for False 1-2 are displayed in the Appendix Tables A.2 and
A.3 respectively.
The results from these falsification tests are all very similar to the results from
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Table 1.9: Falsification 1, 2, 3: Impact on the claims occurrence probability (%)
False 1 False 2 False 3
Coefficient Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE
RxHCC risk weight 3.57 0.11 3.57 0.11 3.58 0.11
RxHCC demo. weight -26.63 6.12 -26.73 6.12 -26.58 6.12
2010 0.32 0.05 0.31 0.05 0.23 0.05
2011 0.63 0.05 0.61 0.05 0.53 0.05
2012 1.41 0.08 1.43 0.08 1.27 0.08
N 18,585,632
Note: The estimated coefficients on the risk scores Xiy and year-time dummies τy from the
fixed-effects panel linear probability regression of Equation 1.5 under different spline and region
assumptions. In False 1 and 2, the spline of the cumulative total and cumulative out-of-pocket
expenditures are defined by a cubic spline with four and three knots at the 5, 35, 65, 95 and 5, 50,
95 percentiles respectively. The percentile values are shown in Table 1.7. In False 3, the spline is
defined as in Model 1, but it introduced an additional potential discontinuity at $1000 less than
the initial coverage limit (ICL) in the estimation. All estimates in the table are significant at less
than the 0.1% level.
Model 1 and did not have a large impact on the coefficient estimates or the pre-
dicted claims occurrence values as the cumulative expenditures changed. In False 3,
while we allowed for a discontinuity at ICL-$1000, neither a statistically significant
nor economically significant discontinuity was estimated at this point. One minor
but noticeable difference between these models and Model 1 is that in Quarter 1,
the point estimates of the predicted values of the claims occurrence at the high
values of the ICR are slightly higher than in Model 1, but they still fall within the
confidence interval of the original estimates. Also from False 3, we observe that the
predicted values in ICR2 do have a larger confidence interval than the predictions
over the same domain in Model 1. This pattern does highlight the low number of
observations of such high cumulative spending in the first quarter of the year.
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Figure 1.11: False 3: Probability of claims Occurring in a week
Note: Displays the predicted values of the claim occurrence probability oˆiyw in a week from the
fixed-effects panel regression of Equation 1.5 under the assumptions of False 3 on the beneficiaries
in the No Deductible sample. Each panel represents a quarter of the year where a quarter consists
of 13 weeks except for quarter 4, where the last “week” of the year consists of the remainder
8 or 9 days of the year. Images display a 95% confidence interval around the predicted values.
The predicted values are generated within each panel by holding all variables constant except
for the cumulative total expenditure displayed on the x-axis and the cumulative out-of-pocket
expenditure. See Figure 1.10 for the exact values used to generate the prediction.
Fill count
The original dependent variable in Model 1 is the binary variable of the occur-
rence of any claim in a week and was chosen to highlight the extensive margin
of the beneficiary’s prescription purchasing decision. However, beneficiaries often
have multiple health conditions and multiple prescription claims that they have
the choice to fill in a week. Hence, I also study the results using an alternative
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consumption measure of the number of prescriptions filled in a week.
Alternative specifications use the number of claims observed in a week niyw
as the dependent variable in both a linear regression in Model 2 and one that
assumes a Poisson regression in Model 3. The fixed-effects linear and Poisson
regressions face the same critique due to dynamic panel bias as the prior Model 1
linear regression.
The linear model is described in Equation 1.5 while the Poisson model in de-
scribed in Equation 1.6 with a log-linear regression model where λ represents the
mean number of claims.
niyw = αi + γXiy + f(Qiyw, Ziyw, Z˜iyw) + τy + εit (1.5)
lnE(niyw) = lnλiyw = αi + γXiy + f(Qiyw, Riyw, Ziyw) + τy (1.6)
For both models, the f retains the same functional form as in Equation 1.2 and
the X variables are the same as in Model 1.
Table 1.10: Model 2 and 3 estimates: Impact on the number of claims in a week
Linear Estimates (x100) Poisson Estimates
Coefficient Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
RxHCC Risk Weight 8.37 0.26 0.12 0.004
RxHCC Demographic Weight -34.31 13.6 -0.70 0.222
2010 -0.41 0.1 -0.0017 0.001
2011 0.25 0.12 0.0103 0.002
2012 1.11 0.02 0.0221 0.003
N 18,585,632
Note: The estimated coefficients on the risk scores Xiy and year-time dummies τy from the
fixed-effects panel linear probability regression of Equation 1.5 and the Poisson regression of
Equation 1.6 on the No Deductible sample. All estimates in the table are significant at less
than the 5% level. While the estimates from both models are presented in the same table, the
interpretation for the Poisson estimates is multiplicative of the exponential of the estimate.
Qualitatively, the estimates are very similar to those estimated from Model
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Figure 1.12: Model 2: Incidence of claims occurring in a week
Note: Displays the predicted values of the average number of claims in a week nˆiyw from the
fixed-effects panel regression of Equation 1.5 on the beneficiaries in the No Deductible sample.
Each panel represents a quarter of the year where a quarter consists of 13 weeks except for quarter
4, where the last “week” of the year consists of the remainder 8 or 9 days of the year. Images
display a 95% confidence interval around the predicted values. The predicted values are generated
within each panel by holding all variables constant except for the cumulative total expenditure
displayed on the x-axis and the cumulative out-of-pocket expenditure. See Figure 1.10 for the
exact values used to generate the prediction.
1 where the dependent variable was the occurrence of claims. In Models 2 and
3, the level of claims incidence is much higher, which reflect the fact that many
beneficiaries file multiple claims in a week. The point estimates in both Models
2 and 3 are very similar and range from approximately 0.3 to 0.7, translating
to a claim occurring every three weeks to every 10 days. The estimates from
Model 3 are slightly less extreme than Model 2, particularly in Quarter 1. The
confidence intervals in Models 1 and 2 are similarly scaled and precise (except in
the high values of Quarter 1), but the confidence intervals from Model 3’s Poisson
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Figure 1.13: Model 3 Poisson: Incidence of claims occurring in a week
Note: Displays the predicted values of the average number of claims in a week nˆiyw from the
fixed-effects panel regression of Equation 1.6 on the beneficiaries in the No Deductible sample.
Each panel represents a quarter of the year where a quarter consists of 13 weeks except for
quarter 4, where the last “week” of the year consists of the remainder 8 or 9 days of the year.
Images display a 95% confidence interval around the predicted values. The predicted values are
generated within each panel by holding all variables constant except for the cumulative total
expenditure displayed on the x-axis and the cumulative out-of-pocket expenditure. The values
used are similar to those from Figure 1.10; however, it differs in that the fixed effects used to
generate these values is not zero. Unlike the linear model, the mean fixed-effects coefficient in
the Poisson model is not zero, so the predicted values are scaled by the exponential of the mean
fixed effect estimated αi = −0.145.
regression are much wider than those from the linear case averaging about a 0.2
band around the estimates.
The results from Models 2 and 3 support the findings from Model 1, even though
a different spending measure is used. While there are changes in the average
number of claims in each week as the cumulative spending measures increase,
these changes are smooth except potentially in Quarter 4. Claims decrease prior
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to entering the donut hole and increase prior to entering the catastrophic spending
region, though both changes have lower magnitudes in the later quarters of the
year.
1.5.5 Discussion
The conclusion from the estimation of Models 1-3 is that on average, individuals
behave more optimally than some of the literature has found, because on average
enrollees anticipated and responded to the pricing structure in Medicare Part D.
This analysis is aggregated over many heterogeneous actors, and while the fixed-
effects approach helps to control for individual unobserved heterogeneity, it may
still complicate the analysis. That is to say, not that any one individual behaves
optimally, but there does not appear to be a systematic decrease in spending in
this sample prior to entering the coverage gap. Further, it is also important to
understand why these results differ from some of the previous findings.
The results are aggregated over various heterogeneous variables. While the
analysis included year fixed effects to control for differences in the levels of spending
across year, slopes were not allowed to vary by year. It is possible that the slopes of
the beneficiary claims response within the coverage gap differ across years, because
the beneficiary plans differ across the years. The marginal costs in the 2011 and
2012 coverage gap are significantly closer to the ICR coinsurance levels, and thus
this should result in fewer changes in spending. The expectation then by the
estimation presented in Equation 1.1 and 1.2 across all four years is that the
predicted f is “too flat” to describe 2009-2010 and not flat enough to describe
2011-12.
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Further, in analyzing the f function estimates, it is important to remember
that, while the fixed effects may “net out” the heterogeneity in the probability of
spending between individuals, it does not control for the heterogeneity in health
shocks or expectations that may exist at any point in time and cumulative ex-
penditure level. This means that there are potentially heterogeneous responses to
the nonlinear contract. For example, in any quarter, but particularly earlier in
the year, the estimates for the change in the claims occurrence probability include
both individuals who do not expect to end the year in the donut hole and decrease
their spending as the probability of that outcome increases, and individuals who
expect to end the year in the catastrophic region and may increase their spending
as this outcome becomes more certain. This paper’s conclusions on not finding
a discontinuity at the region boundaries is still reasonable even in light of this
potential heterogeneity. There is not a reasonable prior to think that individuals
would have a discontinuous increase in their claims occurrence that perfectly offset
another set of individuals discontinuous decrease.
Another source that could increase the heterogeneity in the response to the
cumulative spending measures is the experience and knowledge individuals have
with nonlinear pricing structures in general and each year’s Medicare Part D plan
specifically. Individuals with more experience (and no surprises) would be expected
to have more constant spending patterns that result in a flatter overall f response
curve. Further work should be done to understand how experience impacts the
beneficiary response to the contract features.
Experience, sample selection, and estimation methods could be why this paper’s
estimates on finding a discontinuity at the donut hole differed from Dalton et al.
(2018). Individuals in their dataset come from one year of observation in 2008,
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are not on traditional Medicare, are known to be richer, and have higher spending
than Medicare patients. The sample in this paper joined prior to 2008, and we
observe four years of their choices. The fact that this paper’s sample is from later
years also increases the probability that they either had more personal experience
with or opportunities to learn about Medicare Part D which started in 2006.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper builds on the existing literature on beneficiaries’ dynamic response as
they approach the many discontinuities in the Medicare Part D pricing structure.
Throughout all health insurance, the government and insurers have significant
control over the cost-sharing features that are responsible for non-linear pricing,
and with the rise in health-care costs, these institutions are more likely to use them
as cost-control measures. Unfortunately, the effect of these cost-control measures
on beneficiary behavior and health is not fully understood. While the literature
has identified sharp drops in spending particularly at the Medicare Part D coverage
gap, trying to explain this behavior using time-discounting models has resulted in
discounting estimates far lower than the broader economics literature.
The first main contribution of this paper is its discussion of an expected price
model that uses the objective probability distributions of beneficiaries’ end-of-year
prices given their spending probabilities. The key takeaway from this heuristic
model is that if beneficiaries know the objective probabilities of ending the year
in each region for the population, the expected marginal price that a beneficiary
responds to can be constructed and be used to make purchasing decisions. Because
the end-of-year region probabilities have relatively smooth transitions (in all but
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approximately the last 10 weeks of the year), beneficiaries’ marginal price and then
spending should also be smooth (except for the last weeks). Even if beneficiaries
have inaccurate beliefs on their objective end-of-year probabilities or are present-
biased, as long as they update those beliefs in each time period, a heuristic marginal
price would not generate sharp spending changes unless there were sharp changes
in probabilities.
A second significant contribution of this paper is the graphical representation
of beneficiaries’ claims rates conditioning on the cumulative sums of their total
spending. Using separate linear probability and Poisson regressions with individual
fixed effects to control for heterogeneity in base levels of spending, this paper
illustrates beneficiary claims rates in a way that allows direct visual comparison
with their heuristic marginal spending.
The estimation finds that there are significant changes to beneficiaries’ claims
rates, some of which are consistent with the predictions of the heuristic marginal
price, but that those changes may not be economically significant. The lowest
amount of claim rates in each quarter of the year broadly matches the cumulative
total expenditures values that produced the lowest expected marginal prices. The
changes in claims rates for a predicted beneficiary with average risk and demo-
graphic scores indicate that the economic magnitude of the claims occurrences are
on the scale of filing claims every three weeks versus filing claims every four weeks.
Further work to understand the welfare consequences of these reductions would be
to analyze whether the claims changes were by discontinuing drugs entirely or just
small delays in going to the pharmacy for refills.
This finding in the paper differs from empirical results in the prior literature.
This difference may be due in part to the sample selection. Because this sample
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involved individuals who retained similar plan structures through all four years,
they are mechanically more likely to have experience with Medicare Part D, their
plan structure, and their prescription needs than individuals in the papers in the
prior literature. Further, individuals who do not switch between plans with differ-
ent limits may be different onto themselves as people who have high inertia and
do not switch plans or just happen to have expected spending amounts that align
well with their chosen plans. Further work could explore whether experience with
Medicare Part D promotes individuals to exhibit more optimal behavior, because
that would imply that informational and educational programs could promote that
behavior. A more detailed subsample analysis may be warranted.
The role of heterogeneous types of responses to the coverage gap should also
be considered in future work. While this paper controlled for heterogeneous levels
of claim rates for individual beneficiaries, it is likely that due to random health
shocks or experience with the Medicare Part D pricing schedules, individuals may
separately increase or decrease their claims in a predictable way that adds noise
to this paper’s estimates.
Another challenge to this paper’s research question was the large variety of
plans and coinsurance rates offered from 2009-2012 and the policy changes intro-
duced by the Affordable Care Act to fill in the donut hole. The lower coinsurance
rates within the donut hole in 2011 and 2012 could be partially responsible for the
more stable spending estimates that are found throughout this paper. An obvious
related research project would be to study the actual impact of the Affordable
Care Act’s policy of filling in the coverage gap and subsequent health outcomes to
determine whether it truly impacted beneficiary spending rates. The plan variety
that was a challenge for the analysis in this paper, could be a boon for follow-up
64
research projects.
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CHAPTER 2
THE NATURE OF RISK PREFERENCES: EVIDENCE FROM
EXPERIMENTAL INSURANCE CHOICES (WITH LEVON
BARSEGHYAN AND TED O’DONOGHUE)
2.1 Introduction
The question of how individuals make choices under risk is central to most fields in
economics. Recent research has made significant progress estimating risk prefer-
ences using field data. (For a survey see Barseghyan et al. (2018)). Of course, field
data has its own limitations. In particular, there are two main issues. First, it is
often impossible to know how accurately individuals can predict/estimate proba-
bility distributions in a given field context. Second, the estimated risk preferences
derived from one market setting may not accurately predict household behavior in
other markets. In fact, the issue of external validity is even broader, because ideally
we aim to know whether risk preferences estimated in the field are systematically
different from those estimated in the lab.
To address these issues, this paper leverages a controlled experimental set-
ting, where we can manipulate subject’s beliefs on probabilities within questions
designed to mimic choices faced by households in typical property insurance mar-
kets. In particular, our benchmark experiment is designed to replicate deductible
choice sets in three lines of property insurance: auto collision, auto comprehen-
sive, and home all-perils. Each of our subjects faces deductible menus, prices, and
(rounded) claim rates that are randomly drawn from the benchmark data used in
the field study of Barseghyan et al. (2013) (hereafter referred to as BMOT).
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This paper contributes to the literature on estimating risk preferences in the
field by addressing some of the common assumptions made in field studies, specifi-
cally (i) the difference between subjective and objective beliefs and (ii) the role that
ambiguity aversion might play in insurance choices. This paper also contributes
to the experimental and behavioral literature on estimating risk preferences. By
formulating our questions to be similar to the actual menus that households face in
the real world, our experiment presents a real insurance choice and is less abstract
than the binary or certainty-equivalent choices that are often used in the lab.
Section 2.2 describes our experimental design. Subjects are recruited both from
Amazon Mechanical Turk and from a more traditional student population. Sub-
jects are asked to make an insurance choice of a premium-deductible pair given
a known loss probability. We have three between-subject treatments: Insurance,
Ambiguity, and Abstract. The Insurance treatment is framed to closely resem-
ble a real life insurance choice to study the difference between the field and the
experimental context. The Ambiguity treatment is similarly framed as a real life
insurance choice, but the subjects are given a range of possible loss probabilities
without any information about which probability is likely to apply to understand
the role that ambiguity aversion might play in their choices. Finally, the Abstract
treatment is derived from a real life insurance choice, but it is framed as a generic
lottery without any insurance context. The Abstract treatment is included to
investigate whether the context of questions matters.
The motivation for the experiment is recent research that estimates risk prefer-
ences in the field such as BMOT, Snowberg and Wolfers (2010), and Sydnor (2010).
They have empirically shown that rank-dependent probability weighting (Kahne-
man and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Quiggin, 1982) explains
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consumer risk-taking decisions better than classic expected utility theory (EUT)
or alternative models. However, in the applications of probability weighting to
economic field data, these papers cannot distinguish between whether households
overestimate the probability of a claim and whether they are indeed overweighting
the probability of tail outcomes. Thus a key benefit of our experiment is to provide
our subjects with the known loss probabilities or ranges of known loss probabilities.
Unlike most of the experimental literature on estimating risk preferences and
probability weights, our experiment uses insurance language to provide four to six
different risky options in each choice set. While some of the literature on estimat-
ing risk preferences does use insurance language (Bruhin et al., 2010), they elicit
risk preferences through binary choices over risky gambles and certainty equiva-
lents. Further, our experiment is concerned with how beneficiaries make choices
over the low risks that occur with property insurance events, so our subjects are
presented with choices where their risk exposure span 1-12% with more questions
on lower probabilities. The majority of the experimental literature has elicited
risk preferences over more widely spaced risks such as 5%, 10%, 25% and higher in
Bruhin et al. (2010); 8.3%, 16.7% and higher in Prelec (1998); 1%, 5%, 10%, 15%
and higher in Fox and Tversky (1998).
Section 1.3.2 includes summary statistics on the premiums and claim rates
presented to subjects along with their deductible choices.
We evaluate the effects of our experiment and treatments in three ways. First,
in Section 2.4, we take a traditional approach to evaluating a controlled experiment
and compare how the three different treatments changed the premium-deductible
choices made by our subjects. From our reduced form results, we find that the ex-
perimental subjects were significantly more likely to choose the least risky (lowest)
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deductibles in the Ambiguity treatment and the most risky (highest) deductibles
in the Insurance treatment.
Then, in Section 2.5.1 and Section 2.5.2, we build models that allow us to
estimate our subjects’ underlying homogeneous and heterogeneous risk preferences,
respectively. Our models of risk preferences are built with both a standard risk
aversion parameter and a nonparametric probability distortion function following
BMOT. Because our experiment focuses on a dense set of claim probabilities in the
range of 1-12%, our nonparametric probability distortion function provides better
estimates of the shape of the true functional form than the experimental literature
at low probabilities.
Our estimation of risk preferences reiterates the importance of probability dis-
tortions in explaining choices under risk. We recover substantial probability over-
weighting and negligible curvature in the utility. In our estimation of heterogeneous
risk preferences, we also find substantially more heterogeneity in the probability
distortion function than in the prior literature, concluding that a heterogeneous
model is more suitable for our analysis.
The estimated risk preferences from the three treatments also support our re-
duced form results with a significantly and statistically higher probability distor-
tion function estimated for the subjects in the Ambiguity treatment compared to
the baseline Insurance treatment. The estimated probability distortion functions
in the Abstract treatment were also higher than the Insurance treatment but not
significant. The findings from the Ambiguity treatment imply that ambiguity aver-
sion could have a substantial impact on the choices people made in our experiment
and the lab, causing them to respond as if there was more risk.
69
Further, we show in Section 2.5.2, our estimates of risk preferences are con-
sistent with predictions of a classic model of maxmin ambiguity aversion where
subjects respond to the riskiest in a set of possibilities (Etner et al., 2012; Gilboa
and Schmeidler, 1989).
In comparing our findings to the prior literature, our experimental estimates
indicate there is substantially more probability distortions in our data than found
in both the field data such as BMOT and Sydnor (2010) and prior experimental
analysis (Prelec, 1998; Fox and Tversky, 1998; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979;
Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). The raw choices of our subjects, the reduced form
results, and estimated heterogeneous risk preferences all indicate that there is
substantially more heterogeneity in the premium-deductible choices and estimated
probability distortions than found in field data such as BMOT. Our experimental
estimates are most comparable to the risk preferences estimated by Bruhin et al.
(2010), whose model of heterogeneous risk preferences allowed for multiple discrete
“types” of subjects who acted according to EUT and CPT individuals with extreme
probability distortions.
Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Experiment
The experimental laboratory setting is particularly suited to address common foun-
dational assumptions made in studies estimating risk preference using field data.
In field studies, researchers often assume subjects are fully informed agents and
respond to their objective risks. Further, field studies on insurance commonly sim-
plify away external influences on subjects choices, assuming that households’ choice
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of insurance plans are active choices that are made independently of other choices1
and reflect true preferences as opposed to recommendations from insurance agents
or family members. In the experimental setting, researchers can inform subjects of
their risks directly and generally can exert greater control on subjects’ tasks and
perceptions.
2.2.1 Design
This paper designs a between-subject experiment where two groups of subjects
were randomized into one of three treatments: Insurance, Ambiguity, and Ab-
stract. Subjects were then presented with three insurance deductible-premium
choices with known loss probabilities and a financially incentivized payoff. In each
question, the choice can be decomposed into a lottery. Subjects are presented with
the probability (or probability range) of a loss µ and a menu of premium-deductible
pairs {(pd, d) : d ∈ D}. If subjects choose to pay premium pd for deductible d,
then they choose the lottery
Ld = (−pd, 1− µ;−pd − d, µ).
The experiment was designed with three distinguishing features that enable
us to draw conclusions on how choices in the lab differ from the field. First, by
using known probabilities, we distinguish between households’ subjective beliefs
on risk and their probability distortions.2 Second, the experimental treatments
1The independence of choices is also known in the literature as narrow bracketing (Read et al.,
1999)
2In our model and estimation, while we alleviate the issue of probability misperceptions, we
continue to estimate a probability distortion function Ω(µ) because we cannot distinguish between
probability weighting and editing as proposed in Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979;
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differ in language in order to offer a direct comparison between the “insurance
choice” offered in the Insurance treatment versus a general lottery in the Abstract
treatment. The difference in language helps us draw conclusions on general dif-
ferences between the lab and field. Last, in order to draw conclusions on the role
that ambiguity aversion may play for individuals who are not aware of their risks,
the Ambiguity treatment provides a range of loss probabilities as opposed to one
discrete probability in the other two treatments. The treatments are further dis-
cussed in Section 2.2.3. Refer to the Appendix B.1 for additional experimental
materials.
2.2.2 Subjects
Subjects for the experiment were recruited from two different sources and directed
to our web-based experiment. On February 10-16 of 2014, we collected responses
from 950 Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) workers who were restricted to be
located in the US, have greater than 1000 HITS, and have greater than 95% ap-
proval rating.3 In addition, on April 16-24 of the same year, 689 undergraduate
student subjects from Cornell University4 were recruited via email solicitation.
The experimental survey presented to the MTurk and student subjects differed
only in the payment schemes and some demographics asked of the students (gender
and graduating class year). MTurk workers were paid 50 cents to complete the
experiment and had a one-in-five chance of earning a bonus incentive payment in
Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).
3We chose the restrictions in an effort to guarantee quality work. With a high number of HIT
completions, it is likely that these subjects are frequent MTurk workers, so our base and bonus
payments would be considered generous to them.
4Student emails were acquired from the major lists in the Economics, Government, and Biol-
ogy Departments, three departments with large student bodies.
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the range of zero to five dollars; student subjects were not given a participation fee,
and they had a one-in-twenty chance of a bonus incentive payment in the range of
0-$40 dollars depending on their answers and chance.
We chose to sample the two subject groups for separate reasons. Amazon
Mechanical Turk has a large diverse set of workers who can quickly be recruited
for low-cost experiments (Paolacci et al., 2010; Buhrmester et al., 2011; Berinsky
et al., 2012; Mason and Suri, 2012). While evaluating studies that use Amazon
Mechanical Turk samples for political science experiments, Berinsky et al. (2012)
find that MTurk samples are often more representative than student and in-person
convenience samples. Because of these features, many social scientists have turned
to MTurk to run their experiments (Paolacci et al., 2010). In addition to the
MTurk subjects, the student subjects serve as a more traditional subject pool for
experiments.
While neither of these two experimental subject groups are expected to be
representative of the households in BMOT or other insurance settings, we believe
they offer insight into the decision making process.
2.2.3 Treatment design
Insurance treatment
In the baseline Insurance treatment, subjects were asked to choose a deductible
and premium in each of three insurance scenarios: home (H), auto comprehensive
(M), and auto collision (L), in random order. Figure 2.1 Panel A displays an
example of the language used from the home scenario, and the language between
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the scenarios only differs in the scenario given.
Within each insurance scenario j, subject i was presented with a probability of
a loss µij and a choice over deductible and premium menu pairs {(pdij , dij) : dij ∈
Dj}, where pdij is the premium associated with deductible dij, and Dj is the set of
deductible options.5
The data for the claim rates and deductible-premium menus do differ be-
tween subjects and between insurance scenarios. For each subject, their claim
rate and menu values were randomly selected and rounded from a random
sample of 1,000 households present in the BMOT insurance data. For each
of the 1000 households and three insurance contexts (1000×3), the data in-
cludes the estimated claim rates as calculated in BMOT’s analysis in the range
of 1-12% rounded to the nearest percent and the the insurance deductible-
premium menus rounded to the nearest dollar terms. Note that this means
µij ∈ {0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.04, 0.05, 0.06, 0.07, 0.08, 0.09, 0.10, 0.11, 0.12}. The auto
collision insurance question offers deductibles DL = {100, 200, 250, 500, 1000}, auto
comprehensive insurance offers deductibles DM = {50, 100, 200, 250, 500, 1000},
and home insurance offers deductibles DH = {100, 250, 500, 1000} presented in
dollar terms along with their respective prices.
Because these are deductible choices and not liability choices, subjects were not
given the distribution of accident losses. Their exposure with insurance is only the
deductible. Not purchasing insurance was not an option.
5These are deductible choices and not liability choices.
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Ambiguity treatment
In order to investigate the possible role of ambiguity aversion in the decision making
process over risky and ambiguous prospects, the Ambiguity treatment differs from
the base Insurance treatment in that claim rate probabilities are specified within
ranges. These ranges µij are deterministic sets centered around the claim rate µij
that subject i would have received in context j under the other treatments.
If a given µij ≥ 0.02
µij = {µij − 0.02, µij − 0.01, µij, µij + 0.01, µij + 0.02},
otherwise
µij = {µij − 0.01, µij, µij + 0.01}.
Refer to Figure 2.1 Panel B for an example of the home insurance question from
the Ambiguity treatment. We focus one of the treatments on ambiguity because the
Ellsberg paradox illustrates that decision makers often prefer lotteries with known
distributions rather than unknown ones (Ellsberg, 1961). In real life, it is possible
that households have some sense of their true claim rate, be it a distribution or a
range, but do not know the exact probability of a loss. If households do incorporate
ambiguity aversion in their decision making process, it could explain some of the
probability overweighting found in the field.
If subjects are indeed ambiguity averse, subjects in the Ambiguity treatment
should choose less risky deductibles. In estimating their underlying risk prefer-
ences, conditioning on using µij in the estimation, the ambiguity treatment should
result in an estimate with a higher probability distortion function than other treat-
ments.
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Abstract treatment
The last treatment is referred to as the Abstract treatment. The language within
this treatment differs from the previous two treatments in that the questions are
stripped of the insurance context phrasing. Regardless of whether the household’s
claim rates and deductible-premium menus come from the home, auto collision,
or auto comprehensive context, the questions presented to the subjects were iden-
tically worded. The purpose of this treatment is to be more closely comparable
to past experimental work on choices over risky lotteries that employ abstract
language. It also serves as a comparison to determine how the context of the ques-
tions can impact choices. Refer to Figure 2.1 Panel C for an example of the home
insurance question from the Abstract treatment.
Incentives
For all treatments, subjects are incentivized to answer truthfully through a pay-
ment scheme that depends on the answers they choose. Before seeing the question,
subjects are endowed with $2,000 laboratory dollars. They know that there is a
chance (1-in-5 and 1-in-20 for MTurk and student subjects, respectively) that one
of the three questions they receive is randomly selected to be played out, and sub-
jects must pay the premiums and deductibles (if it applies) out of their laboratory
dollars. The $2,000 laboratory dollar endowment is enough such that there is no
scenario of a premium and deductible exceeding this amount.
After completing the experiment, if subjects were selected for bonus payments,
these subjects are issued a payment in actual dollars. They receive a conversion
of their laboratory dollars to real dollars by dividing by 400 and 50 in the MTurk
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Figure 2.1: Treatment designs in web experiment
Panel A: Insurance treatment
Panel B: Ambiguity treatment
Panel C: Abstract treatment
Note: These questions all refer to the home insurance context, and similar language is used for
the auto collision and auto comprehensive contexts.
and student subject pools, respectively. MTurk workers received the bonus through
Amazon Mechanical Turk and students are emailed Amazon.com gift card. This
payout scheme is consistent with the literature on narrow bracketing, because
subjects only receive a payout from one of the three questions. It is in the subjects’
best interests to optimize their choice at the individual question level.
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Our experiment was designed to be short, consisting of only the three main
questions so that subjects would be attentive throughout. We included a series
of attention checks in order to alert the subjects to pay attention. Immediately
following the consent form, subjects were asked an attention check question, and
if subjects failed this attention check twice, they were excluded from our sample
entirely.6 Subjects were also asked a question regarding the payment scheme in
order to verify that the subjects both understood and could compute their potential
payoffs. If subjects failed this question, they were warned and could not proceed
until it was correctly completed. We record the number of times a subject fails
this question.
See Appendix B.1 for additional experimental materials.
2.3 Data Summary
Recall that the choice sets presented to subjects were a random draw from choice
sets faced by field households in the BMOT data. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 describe the
realized choice sets seen by the experimental subjects. Table 2.1 presents summary
statistics for the realized premiums of the $500 deductible in the three insurance
contexts.7 The premiums of these insurance plans are quite large for home insur-
ance and are lower for the auto collision and comprehensive insurance questions.
Table 2.2 present statistics on the realized claim rate distribution presented to the
6This initial attention check question was pulled from Example 1 of Qualtrics’s “4 Ways to
Ensure Valid Responses for your Online Survey” (Smith, 2013).
7We only display the summary statistics for the price for the $500 deductible because the
premium (pricing) structure for all deductibles in a coverage are linearly related. This means
that the price to switch between deductibles in a set increases as the premium of the $500
deductible P500 increases. This pricing structure is explained in further detail in BMOT p.1505.
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experimental subjects.8 The observed claim rates in the data are similar to the
estimated claim rate distributions presented in BMOT.9
Table 2.1: All Subjects: Summary of Premium Menus
1st 99th
Mean SD percentile percentile
Auto comprehensive premium for $500 deductible 100 49 25 278
Auto collision premium for $500 deductible 163 80 54 511
Home all perils premium for $500 deductible 566 182 198 1056
Cost of decreasing deductible from $500 to $250:
Auto collision 49 25 15 156
Auto comprehensive 26 13 6 74
Home all perils 47 16 10 98
Savings from increasing deductible from $500 to $1,000:
Auto collision 37 80 12 117
Auto comprehensive 20 49 5 55
Home all perils 62 182 15 130
Note: Amounts in dollars. Sample of 1639 subjects.
Table 2.2: All Subjects: Given Claim Probabilities
Auto Auto
collision comprehensive Home
Mean 6.7 2.1 7.3
SD 2.0 0.9 2.4
Note: Sample of 1639 subjects. Probabilities are presented as percentages.
Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 present the percentage of the subjects who chose the
specific deductibles in the three insurance contexts (auto collision, auto compre-
hensive, and home insurance) between the subject groups and between treatments
respectively. Table 2.5 presents the rank correlations between the subject’s choices
across the three insurance contexts for all subjects and within each treatment
group.
8The average claim rate in the Ambiguity treatment is presented here.
9Because we replicated the field data, there are few subjects who drew probabilities in the
high 10%-12% range. In later sections, we will not be able to say much regarding the probability
distortions in this range due to the small sample size.
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Table 2.3: Summary of deductible choices between subject groups
All Subjects MTurk Student
Auto Auto Auto Auto Auto Auto
Deductible coll comp Home coll comp Home coll comp Home
$50 11.3 12.8 9.3
$100 16.4 13.6 11.2 17.5 12.3 12.6 14.8 15.4 9.1
$200 13.8 15.9 13.8 15.1 13.8 17.0
$250 33.9 14.5 43.0 29.6 14.9 36.9 39.8 13.9 51.4
$500 21.5 19.4 25.9 22.5 16.9 27.3 20.2 22.8 23.9
$1000 14.5 25.3 20.0 16.6 27.9 23.2 11.5 21.6 15.5
N 1639 950 689
Note: Values are percent of subjects.
Table 2.4: Summary of deductible choices between three treatments
Abstract Ambiguity Insurance
Auto Auto Auto Auto Auto Auto
Deductible Comp Coll Home Comp Coll Home Comp Coll Home
$50 8.0 12.3 13.7
$100 11.1 12.4 8.3 17.1 18.9 12.7 12.6 17.6 12.4
$200 13.9 12.4 19.3 13.4 14.4 15.5
$250 13.0 31.0 38.2 16.2 39.7 45.6 14.4 30.9 45.1
$500 23.7 27.6 26.9 17.8 18.8 29.6 16.7 18.3 21.2
$1000 30.2 16.5 26.5 17.3 9.2 12.1 28.2 17.6 21.2
N 556 544 539
Note: Values are percent of subjects.
Table 2.5: Rank correlations between treatments
All Subjects Insurance Ambiguity Abstract
Comp Coll Comp Coll Comp Coll Comp Coll
Coll 0.530 0.564 0.488 0.521
Home 0.591 0.544 0.655 0.584 0.515 0.482 0.581 0.542
N 1639 539 544 556
Note: Spearman rank correlation of deductible choices between all three questions. All correla-
tions are significant at less than the 0.1% level.
Across the different insurance contexts, our subjects choose the whole spectrum
of available deductibles. Compared to the choices made in the field data, there
is more heterogeneity in the choices made in the laboratory setting. Higher and
lower deductibles are chosen more often. For example, in the “All Subjects” panel
of Table 2.3, 16.4%, 11.3%, and 11.2% of our 1639 subjects chose the smallest
deductible in auto collision, auto comprehensive, and home insurance compared to
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the 1.0%, 5.2%, and 0.1% of people who chose them in BMOT (Table 2). Similarly
14.5%, 25.3% and 20.0% chose the $1000 deductible in our sample for the three
insurance categories while only 6.7%, 3.6% and 15.9% chose them in the field data.
While the experimental data has a wider dispersion of choices than the field,
the within-subject choices were moderately consistent. The Spearman rank corre-
lations of the deductible choices between insurance context pairs are all approxi-
mately 0.5 or higher. If a subject chooses a low deductible in one question, they are
likely to choose low deductibles in all questions. The correlation between insurance
choices and overall heterogeneity in choices suggest that there may be substantial
between-subject heterogeneity.
These results preview differences in the estimation results on the choices our
experimental subjects make compared to households in the empirical data. These
differences may be attributed to the input of other people such as the insurance
agent or family members, or it could be a symptom of lower stakes, salience,
inattention, and random choice (though we took measures to prevent this) in the
experimental subjects.
Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 also highlight small differences in choices between
the subject groups and between treatments. Subjects in the Ambiguity treatment
made more conservative deductible choices and were less likely to choose the highest
$1000 deductible in all three contexts compared to the other two treatments. These
differences will be further addressed in the experimental and risk preference results
sections Section 2.4 and Section 2.5.2.
Refer to the Appendix Tables B.1 and B.2 for the statistics on within subject
group treatments.
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2.4 Results from a reduced-form analysis
We present the results of our experiment from two perspectives. In this section,
we first discuss the effect that the treatments and menu variation had on the
deductible-premium choices in each insurance context. Then, we build a model
of our subjects’ underlying risk preferences and analyze how the experimental
treatments impact their estimated risk preferences in Sections 2.5, 2.5.1, and 2.5.2.
We conduct an ordered-probit analysis of the effect of the experimental treat-
ments on the deductible choices in each insurance context. For each insurance con-
text j ∈{Home (H), Collision (L), Comprehensive(M)}, the dependent variable
is the probability that subjects choose deductible dj from the set of deductible-
premium menu pairs Dj. Among the deductibles-premium choices in each of the
three insurance contexts, there are 4-6 choices that have an ordinal rank from
most conservative (lower deductible amount, higher price) to more risky (higher
deductible, lower price).
The ordered probit model that we run for the home insurance context (H) is
below. The models for the other two insurance contexts are similar. Assume
d∗H =X
′
HβH + H
dH =

100, if y∗H ≤ κH1
250, if κH1 < y
∗
H ≤ κH2
500, if κH2 < y
∗
H ≤ κH3
1000, if κH3 ≤ y∗H
(2.1)
where XH are the independent variables that pertain to this specific insurance
context. These include the price for the $500 deductible plan, the average claim
rate that the subjects were given, the treatment group, and the subject pool. H is
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the error term for the regression of home insurance questions and is assumed to be
normally distributed. Because we maintain the assumption of narrow bracketing,
these regressions are run separately for each of the three contexts. We recover
coefficients βj for each insurance context j. We do not analyze the cross context
effects.
The results of the ordered probit regression are presented in Table 2.6. They
indicate that subjects in the Ambiguity and Abstract treatment groups were sig-
nificantly more likely to choose lower deductibles (less risky) than in the base
Insurance treatment. The marginal effects for the treatment effects and other
coefficients are presented in Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3 respectively.
Compared to the Abstract treatment, the Insurance treatment contained lan-
guage that is much closer to insurance choices in the field, which subjects may
have experienced before. The fact that choices made in the Insurance and Ab-
stract treatment differed significantly highlights the fact that context matters.
Subjects in the Ambiguity treatment were 5-10% more likely to choose the
$1000 deductible than subjects in the insurance treatment. The coefficient on the
Ambiguity treatment was also lower than the Abstract treatment coefficient at a
1% significance level in both auto contexts and a 5% level in the home insurance
context.10 Because the Ambiguity treatment group received a range of claim rate
probabilities, the choice of lower deductibles could indicate that subjects are am-
biguity averse. It is possible that given a range of claim rates, subjects could have
perceived a higher subjective claim rate than the average. We discuss the ambigu-
ity result further and test whether their underlying preferences are consistent with
maxmin utility in Section 2.5.2.
10A one-sided chi-squared tests was used here. With a 2-sided test, the coefficient is different
at 1% for comprehensive, 5% for collision, and 10% for home.
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Table 2.6: Impact of treatment and subject groups on deductible choice
Comp Coll Home
Price of $500 Deductible (per $100) 0.20∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.035) (0.015)
Claim rate (per %) -0.13∗∗∗ -0.053∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.014) (0.011)
Ambiguity treatment -0.37∗∗∗ -0.32∗∗∗ -0.36∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.064) (0.066)
Abstract treatment -0.17∗∗ -0.17∗∗ -0.24∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.064) (0.065)
Student -0.024 -0.060 -0.15∗∗
(0.053) (0.053) (0.054)
κJ1 -1.48
∗∗∗ -1.18∗∗∗ -1.55∗∗∗
(0.092) (0.11) (0.13)
κJ2 -0.94
∗∗∗ -0.71∗∗∗ -0.21
(0.089) (0.11) (0.13)
κJ3 -0.49
∗∗∗ 0.18 0.55∗∗∗
(0.088) (0.10) (0.13)
κJ4 -0.11 0.90
∗∗∗
(0.088) (0.11)
κJ5 0.43
∗∗∗
(0.088)
N 1639 1639 1639
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: The deductible prices, the claim rates, and the estimated coefficients are specific to each
insurance context: home, auto collision, or auto comprehensive insurance.
In addition, our analysis controls for other sources of variation between subjects’
choice sets that come from using actual data. Figure 2.3 presents the marginal
effects predicted at the means of the $500 priced deductible, the claim rate for each
respective insurance domain, and being a student. Due to the premium structure
of the field data, increases in p500 results in both more expensive deductibles and
makes it more expensive to switch to a lower deductible, e.g. p500 − p1000 is also
increasing in p500.
11 When the premium for the $500 deductible is higher, subjects
were significantly more likely to buy less insurance and choose higher deductibles
11See BMOT for more details on the pricing structure.
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Figure 2.2: Marginal effects of treatment groups on deductible choices
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Note: Sample size 1639. The image presents the marginal effect on the probability of choosing
one of the deductible choices when there is a change of 0 to 1 of the indicator of being in the
treatment. The marginal effects are calculated after the ordered probit regression of Equation 2.1
for home and the other insurance domains. The marginal effects are assumed to be at means for
other variables.
in all three contexts. This indicates that for a $100 increase in the price of the $500
deductible in comprehensive (about 2 standard deviations), the subjects are 6.4%
more likely to choose a $1,000 deductible. In auto collision and home all-perils
insurance, $100 is about 1.25 and 0.55 standard deviations of the $500 deductible
respectively. While a $100 dollar increase in the $500 deductible results in a smaller
predicted changes in the probability of deductible choices than comprehensive, the
change for all deductibles are statistically significant.
Similarly, as the risk or probability of an accident increases, subjects were sig-
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Figure 2.3: Marginal effects of price, risk, and subject group on deductible choices
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Note: Sample size 1639. The image presents the marginal effect on the probability of choosing
deductibles due to a change in $100 on the price of the $500 dollar deductible, a percentage change
in the claim rate, and the marginal effect for being a student in the comprehensive, collision, and
home insurance domains. The marginal effects are calculated after the ordered probit regression
of Equation 2.1 for home and the other insurance domains and are calculated at the means.
nificantly more likely to buy more insurance. A one-percentage point change is
approximately a one standard deviation change in the comprehensive claim rate, a
0.5 standard deviation change in the collision claim rate and a 0.4 standard devi-
ation change in the home claim rate. A one-percentage point increase in the claim
rate decreases the marginal probability of choosing a $1,000 deductible by approx-
imately 4%. Only the change in the probability of choosing the comprehensive
deductible of $250 is not significant.
Students were more likely to choose lower deductibles than MTurk subjects,
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but both the estimated coefficient and marginal effect are only significant in the
context of home insurance choices. Student subjects were also not substantially
likely to respond differently to our experimental treatments, thus the discussion
of how their responses differed from MTurk subjects is included in Appendix B.3.
Further, the effect of student demographics on their choices are also discussed in
Appendix B.3.
2.5 Estimating Structural Models
Beyond understanding how choices differ due to our experimental treatments, we
are interested in comparing how the underlying risk preferences of our experimental
subjects differ from field subjects. Broadly, we follow the same modeling assump-
tions of BMOT, but the functional forms and distributional assumptions differ to
fit the experimental data.
Subjects’ decisions are modeled as choices over deductible-premium menus over
risk. Our subjects are presented with the probability (or probability range) of a
loss µ and a menu of premium-deductible pairs {(pd, d) : d ∈ D}. If subjects choose
to pay premium pd for deductible d, then they have chosen the lottery
Ld = (−pd, 1− µ;−pd − d, µ).
We assume that subjects choose the deductible-premium pairs to maximize
their utility from the lottery Ld = (−pd, 1 − µ;−pd − d, µ). The utility from the
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lottery is
U(Ld) = (1− Ω(µ))u(w − pd) + Ω(µ)u(w − pd − d) (2.2)
where Ω(µ) is a probability distortion function that nests nonlinear probability
weighting, Ko˝zesgi-Rabin loss aversion, and Gul disappointment aversion.12 Fol-
lowing Cohen and Einav (2007), Barseghyan et al. (2011), and BMOT, the utility
u is modeled parametrically with a normalized second-order Taylor approximation.
Thus, Equation 2.2 becomes
U(Ld) = −[pd + Ω(µ)d]− r
2
[(1− Ω(µ))(pd)2 + Ω(µ)(pd + d)2] (2.3)
where r = −u
′′(w)
u′(w) is a coefficient of absolute risk aversion (CARA).
Using this model, we employ an estimation strategy allowing for homogeneous
risk preferences and for unobserved heterogeneous risk preferences of our experi-
mental subjects. We estimate parameters for the coefficient of absolute risk aver-
sion r, the probability distortion function Ω(µ), and scale σ.
In order to account for households choosing different deductibles and making
“inconsistent” choices, we use a random utility model (McFadden, 1974, 1981)
with additively separable choice noise. Then the utility from choosing deductible
d ∈ D is given by
U(d) = U(Ld) + εd (2.4)
where εd is i.i.d. with a type 1 extreme value distribution and scale parameter σ.
Subjects choose deductible d ∈ D to maximize their utility U(d). As in BMOT,
12See BMOT for identification proofs.
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the probability that a household choses deductible d in one insurance context is
Pr(d) = Pr(U(Ld) + εd > U(Ld′) + εd′∀d′ 6= d) = exp(U(Ld)/σ)∑
d′∈D exp(U(Ld′)/σ)
. (2.5)
2.5.1 Analysis with homogeneous risk preferences
We first estimate models of homogeneous risk preferences, where all subjects are
assumed to have the same risk aversion parameter r, probability distortion function
Ω(µ), and scale parameter σ, which is the same across all contexts to reduce
the dimensionality of the estimation problem.13 We make two functional form
assumptions to estimating Ω(µ) that are unique to our paper. For Model 1a,
because the claim rates presented to the experimental subjects are discrete, we
can estimate a nonparametric probability distortion function at every claim rate
value.14 In Model 1b, we reduce the dimensionality of the estimation problem and
assert parametric assumptions on Ω(µ) with a polynomial form.15
The Ω(µ) function is then modeled in a nonparametric form in Model 1a
Ω(µ) =

ω0.01, if µ = 0.01
...,
ω0.12, if µ = 0.12
(2.6)
and with the polynomial form in Model 1b
Ω(µ) = a+ bµ+ cµ2 (2.7)
13This single σ assumption differs from BMOT, which estimated a different scale parameter
σj for each insurance context j.
14This form differs from BMOT who estimated Ω(µ) with three model variations: a quadratic
expansion of ln(Ω(µ)), a quadratic expansion of Ω(µ) and an 11-point cubic spline on the interval
(0, 0.20).
15We estimate a Chebyshev polynomial expansion of Ω(µ) and selected a quadratic on the
basis of the Bayesian information criterion (BIC).
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with the restriction that Ω(µ) ∈ [0, 1]∀µ.
These models are estimated using maximum likelihood to recover Model
1a parameters θ ≡ (ω0.01, ..., ω0.12, r, σ) and Model 1b parameters θˆ ≡
(a, b, c, r, σ) for each insurance context j and experimental treatment τ ∈
{Insurance, Ambiguity, Abstract}. Figure 2.4 and Table 2.7 present the estimated
Ωˆ(µ), rˆ, and σˆ with 95% confidence interval bounds from the Insurance treat-
ment. The results from the Abstract and Ambiguity treatment are similar and are
presented in Appendix B.5.
Figure 2.4: Model 1a and 1b probability weighting functions in Insurance treatment
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Note: This figure displays the estimated Ωˆ(µ) from Model 1a and Model 1b across the 539
subjects in the Insurance treatment. The 95% confidence intervals from these estimated values
are constructed with 1,000 bootstraps with a subsample of 80 percent of 539 with replacement.
The bootstrap was conducted with a subsample due to estimated r, ω0.01 and ω0.02 being close
to or at the lower bound of 0.
Our results are summarized in three key findings: the risk preference parameter
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Table 2.7: Model 1a and 1b for Insurance
Model 1a Model 1b
Estimate 2.5% 97.5% Estimate 2.5% 97.5%
σ 89.5 73.0 108.9 102.6 81.5 131.6
r 2e-13 2e-13 2e-13 4e-14 4e-14 4e-14
Note: 539 households in the Insurance treatment. See additional notes in Figure 2.4 on how
estimates are constructed.
r is negligible; on average our subjects engage in substantial probability weighting
to explain their premium-deductible choices; and there is substantial heterogeneity
that is not explained by the model. In the Insurance treatment, the risk aversion
parameter estimate is computationally zero, while the the majority of the estimated
probability distortion function Ωˆ(µ) lies above the 45 degree line. These estimates
of Ωˆ(µ) indicate our subjects engage in large and significant amounts of probability
overweighting. At a 10% percent probability of a loss, the subjects behaved as if
the probability was 23%. At very low probabilities, the estimate of Ωˆ(µ) in both
models indicate probability underweighting.
The estimated σˆ ranges from 89.5 to 102.6 in Model 1a and 1b, respectively.
This σˆ estimate is substantially higher than those estimated from a similar model
on the field data in BMOT Model 1 (a, b, and c)16 and from subsequent models in
this paper. The large σ indicates that there is a substantial amount of noise that
is not yet explained by the homogenous model parameters.
While the homogeneous model indicates that subjects may be underweighting
low probabilities, this finding is not robust to further models with heterogeneous
risk preferences discussed below.
16The BMOT Model 1a/b/c differ from the homogenous model only in the functional forms
assumed for Ω(µ) and the fact that BMOT estimated a σj for each insurance context j. Given
the similarities in the models, the difference in the σ estimates between our paper and BMOT are
driven primarily by the underlying data differences between the field and experimental setting.
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2.5.2 Analysis with heterogeneous risk preferences
We know from even the raw data in Section 2.3 that there is a substantial amount
of heterogeneity in the dispersion of premium-deductible choices. This indicates
that there may also be substantial heterogeneity in underlying preferences that the
homogeneous preference model cannot capture.
We present results from six additional models that allow for individual un-
observed heterogeneity in risk preferences. Model 2a and 2b allow for the most
heterogeneity with both individually specific curvature of the utility function ri
and a scaled probability distortion function Ωi(µ) for each subject i. Model 3a
and 3b are a simplification of Model 2a and 2b, respectively, and assume the same
homogenous curvature in utility r for all individuals. Model 4a and 4b is further
restricted to assume r = 0. In these models, we also recover estimates for the noise
scale parameter σ that is the same across all individuals and insurance contexts.17
In the most general case of Model 2a and 2b, assume
ri = rξr,i and Ωi(µ) = Ω(µ)ξΩ,i
where
 ξr,i
ξΩ,i
 iid∼ Logit− normal

 0
0
 ,Φ
 , with Φ ≡
 Φr Φr,Ω
Φr,Ω ΦΩ

and Ωi(µ) is bound between 0 and 1, and Ω(µ) is modeled in a nonparametric
and polynomial form from Equation 2.6 and Equation 2.7 in Model 2a and 2b
17Notice Model 1 a and b are also nested in Model 2 a and b by assuming both ri and Ωi(µ)
are constant between all individuals.
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respectively. We assume that choice noise is independent of any observed or unob-
served heterogeneity in preferences and also independent between the experimental
contexts.
We choose to model heterogeneity with a logit-normal error distribution, so ξr,i
and ξΩ,i are naturally constrained to [0, 1], which also constrains Ωi to [0, 1] and
ri to [0, r].
18 Further, while ri is not theoretically bound from above, it is bound
in practice. Due to the nature of the choices, where the least risky deductible
is either $50 or $100, what we can estimate for ri is either in a bounded range
or not identified. While the underlying model here is similar to that used in
BMOT Model 3 and 4, they had assumed a log-normal error distribution for ri
and Ωi(µ). We prefer the logit-normal distribution in this case because the log-
normal distribution is unbounded and not well behaved when r approaches 0 as
it does in the experimental data. Another important benefit of using the logit-
normal error distribution for ξΩ,i is that this functional form can allow for a single
centered distribution or an approximation of a bimodal distribution of two types
at the extremes, which allows our estimated probability distortion function to be
comparable to the type estimation from Bruhin et al. (2010).
We estimate these models using maximum likelihood methods and re-
cover Model 2a parameters (ω0.01, ..., ω0.12, r, σ,Φr,ΦΩ,Φr,Ω), Model 2b parame-
ters (a, b, c, r, σ,Φr,ΦΩ,Φr,Ω), Model 3a parameters (ω0.01, ..., ω0.12, r, σ,ΦΩ), Model
3b parameters (a, b, c, r, σ,ΦΩ), Model 4a parameters (ω0.01, ..., ω0.12, σ,ΦΩ), and
Model 4b parameters (a, b, c, σ,ΦΩ) for each experimental treatment τ . We approx-
imate the likelihood function using a symmetric Gaussian-Hermite quadrature rule
with 25 nodes in each dimension.19 We use the estimates to assign fitted values of
18Ω is bound by [0,1]. Then, if ξΩ,i is also bound by 0 to 1, then the product Ωi(µ) is bound
as well.
19For Model 2, because there are two dimensions of heterogeneity, in practice, after constructing
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ri and Ωi(µ) to each subject i.
20
Table 2.8 summarizes the estimates for Model 2a, 2b, 3a, 3b, 4a, and 4b using
only the responses from individuals randomized into the Insurance treatment. Fig-
ure 2.5 depicts the median estimate of Ωˆi(µ) in the Insurance treatment for these
models. Figure 2.6 depicts the scope of the heterogeneity in Ωˆi(µ) using these six
models.21
Table 2.8: Model 2, 3, and 4 for Insurance
Model 2a Model 2b
Estimate 2.5% 97.5% Estimate 2.5% 97.5%
σ 33.66 28.13 39.17 34.66 29.27 41.46
ri 10
th percentile 5.3e-33 8.5e-32
median(ri) 1.6e-10 1.6e-10 1.6e-10 1.4e-08 1.3e-08 1.5e-08
ri 90
th percentile 3.2e-10 2.8e-08
ΦΩ 4.28 3.48 5.44 4.29 3.50 5.49
ΦΩ,r -156.77 -199.34 -114.10 -162.38 -210.26 -72.09
Implied corr(ξr,i, ξΩ,i) -0.89 -0.93 -0.71 -0.90 -0.94 -0.38
Model 3a Model 3b
Estimate 2.5% 97.5% Estimate 2.5% 97.5%
σ 33.79 28.11 40.52 34.85 29.33 43.11
r 1.6e-12 1.6e-12 1.6e-12 2.4e-11 2.4e-11 2.4e-11
ΦΩ 4.11 3.40 38.30 4.16 3.40 37.76
Model 4a Model 4b
Estimate 2.5% 97.5% Estimate 2.5% 97.5%
σ 33.79 28.49 39.99 34.85 29.46 42.08
ΦΩ 4.11 3.41 7.51 4.16 3.46 35.58
Note: 539 households in the Insurance treatment. The reported value is median rˆi instead of
rˆ, because r is the maximal value that the risk aversion parameter can take for ξr,i = 1. See
additional notes in Figure 2.5 on how estimates are constructed.
252 = 625 pairs, we drop those whose associated weight is less than 10−6 and reweigh. This give
us 177 weights.
20We choose quadrature and MLE methods to approximate the integral in the likelihood func-
tion as opposed to using the stochastic Markov-chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) estimation technique
used in BMOT and Cohen and Einav (2007). This estimation method allows for faster compu-
tation and can be easily determined to converge, unlike MCMC.
21We report median Ωˆi(µ) rather than Ωˆ(µ), since in Model 2a and 2b model form Ωi(µ) = Ω(µ)
only if ξΩ,i = 1 the maximal value given the logit-normal distribution.
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Figure 2.5: Median Ωi(µ) in Insurance treatment
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Note: This figure displays the estimated median Ωi(µ) from Model 2 a/b, 4 a/b, and 3 a/b
across the 539 subjects in the Insurance treatment. Because the probability weighting function
and r has a lower bound at 0, the 95% confidence intervals from the estimated values of Model
2a, 2b, 3a, and 3b are constructed with 1,000 bootstraps with random subsamples that are
approximately 80% the size of the Insurance treatment subjects (431). Subsampling is used
in these cases because the estimate of r approaches a lower bound in these models. The 95%
confidence intervals for Model 4a and 4b are constructed from 1,000 bootstraps of N=539 drawn
from the original sample with replacement.
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Figure 2.6: Heterogeneity of Ωi(µ) in Insurance treatment
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Model 2a, 3a, and 4a
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Model 2b, 3b, and 4b
Note: Two panels that show the quantiles of the estimated Ωi(µ) given the estimated noise ΦΩ,i
using subjects from the Insurance treatment. The quantiles of Ω(µ) from Model 2a, 3a, and 4a,
are displayed on the left, while the quantiles from Model 2b, 3b, and 4b are displayed in the right
panel. See additional notes in Figure 2.5 on how estimates are constructed.
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In the Insurance treatment of Model 2a and 2b, we find the risk aversion pa-
rameters rˆi to be effectively zero even in the 90th highest percentile of subjects.
The estimates of rˆi in a narrow range close to zero motivates Model 3a, 3b, 4a,
and 4b in which r is first assumed to be homogenous between subjects in the first
two models and then assumed to be zero in the later two.
Given negligible rˆi in Model 2, 3, and 4, we find the estimates of the median
Ωˆi(µ) are the same for the respective functional form of Ω(µ), though the confidence
interval bands differ slightly. We again find substantial probability overweighting.
The median Ωˆi(µ) under all models is significantly above the 45
◦ line at all ob-
served probabilities µ, even at very low probabilities. For µ = 0.01, the median
probability weighing is Ωˆi(0.01) = 0.05, and at µ = 0.12, the median is approxi-
mately Ωˆi(0.12) = 0.38. The estimates of the median Ωˆ(µ) are far tighter at low
probabilities, because far more of our subjects received those values. The estimate
of σˆ is in the 30-35 range in Model 2a/b, 3a/b, and 4a/b and is approximately one
third of the σˆ estimated in Model 1a and 1b.
The experimental subjects exhibit a tremendous amount of heterogeneity in
their risk preferences, but that heterogeneity is mostly a result of heterogeneity in
probability distortions and not heterogeneity in the curvature ofutility. Figure 2.6
displays the heterogeneity in Ωˆi(µ). Individuals in the 33rd percentile and below
underweighted their probabilities, while those in the 90th percentile behaved as if
losses were 70% likely at µ = 0.1 in all models. This heterogeneity can be seen in
the raw data where we observed many individuals choosing the $100 and $1,000
deductibles. From the rank correlations between the deductible choices, we know
that the heterogeneity in choices is largely a result of the between-individual het-
erogeneity that was built into Model 2, 3, and 4 rather than just within-individual
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heterogeneity.
The findings in these models are consistent with the field literature because
choices are primarily explained through probability weighting rather than through
curvature in the utility function through the risk aversion parameter r. Our esti-
mation indicates that the experimental subjects in the Insurance treatment relied
even less on curvature in the utility to explain their decision than field households
did in BMOT, which reported rˆ = 0.00064, rˆ = 0.00063, rˆ = 0.00049 in their Model
1a, 1b, and 1c, respectively. Comparing the probability distortion functions, the
median Ωˆi(µ) estimates indicate less probability weighting of very low probabili-
ties and substantially higher probability weighting at higher µ. BMOT estimated
a mean probability distortion function Ω˜(0.01) = 0.07 and Ω˜(0.1) = 0.15.22 While
our estimates differ from those estimated in the field and experiments, they are
closer to the estimates of probability weighting in prior experimental works such
as (Bruhin et al., 2010). Unlike Bruhin et al. (2010), about a third of our subjects
display probability underweighting, and this is potentially due to the difference of
using certainty equivalent tasks in their experiment and a complicated menu of
risky choices in ours.
The estimate of the median Ωˆi(µ) in the heterogeneous models is higher than
those from the homogeneous risk preference models (Model 1a and Model 1b) at
all µ. Qualitatively, the most apparent difference is that Model 1a and 1b both
recovered probability underweighting at low µ, while the median estimate from
the heterogeneous preference models do not result in probability underweighting.
When considering the underlying amount of heterogeneity in the choices subjects
22In BMOT’s notation, their estimated mean probability distortion function would be Ωˆ(µ).
Because of the difference in the functional form and error distribution between our paper and
BMOT, our Ωˆ(µ) is the upper bound of the probability distortion function rather than the
mean/median.
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made and the distribution of Ωˆi(µ), it is reasonable that the estimates from Model
1 differ from Model 2, 4, and 3 and that the later models, which allow for hetero-
geneous risk preferences, would be a better fit.
Further, the difference in the estimates from the homogeneous versus hetero-
geneous risk preferences models is in itself a difference between the field and our
laboratory setting. The estimates from BMOT’s homogeneous and heterogeneous
models were comparable. This difference again highlights the heterogeneity of
choices and preferences collected from the lab, because the heterogeneity in the
distribution of Ω(µ) results in different estimates from the homogeneous model and
the median heterogeneous model. The field data in BMOT could have been gen-
erated by households with more similarities than individuals in the experimental
setting.
Another key finding from our models of heterogeneous risk preferences is that,
unlike the field, our estimates do not necessarily rule out Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007)
“rational expectations” loss aversion or Gul (1991) disappointment aversion. If we
were to evaluate the Model 2b, 3b, or 4b at µ = 0, our polynomial estimates of
the median Ωˆi(0) would be approximately zero. In BMOT, their estimate of Ω˜(0)
is significantly higher than zero in all of their models and approximately 0.06.
Treatment Effects
To evaluate the effect of the three treatments, we focus the discussion on the results
of Model 4b. This model allows us to reduce the dimensionality of the estimation
problem, while still capturing a reasonable approximation of the Ω(µ) probability
distortion function. The evidence from Model 2 and 3 that r is negligible for our
subjects, allow us to use Model 4b to directly compare the differences in the median
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Ωˆi(µ) probability distortions between the treatment groups without concern for
large changes in ri.
Figure 2.7 displays the median Ωˆi(µ) from the Ambiguity and Abstract treat-
ments from Model 2b, 3b, and 4b, and Table 2.9 displays the corresponding pa-
rameter estimates. The results for Model 2a, 3a, and 4a for these treatments are
similar and are included in Appendix B.6 along with details about heterogeneity
in these models. Similar to the ordered probit evaluation, we initially assume that
the subjects in the Ambiguity treatment consider the median value from the set
of claims probabilities that are presented to them, i.e. µ = median(µ).
Table 2.9: Model 2b and 4b for Ambiguity and Abstract
Ambiguity: Model 2b Abstract: Model 2b
Estimate 2.5% 97.5% Estimate 2.5% 97.5%
σ 39.83 33.50 47.34 45.18 37.87 54.95
ri 10
th percentile 2.2e-22 7.4e-23
median(ri) 1.0e-08 9.8e-09 1.2e-08 4.6e-15 4.6e-15 4.6e-15
ri 90
th percentile 2.1e-08 9.2e-15
ΦΩ 2.61 2.24 3.08 4.99 3.90 16.16
ΦΩ,r -64.95 -74.55 -0.00 64.96 0.00 97.34
Implied corr(ξr,i, ξΩ,i) -0.99 -0.99 -0.00 0.89 0.00 0.99
Ambiguity: Model 3b Abstract: Model 3b
Estimate 2.5% 97.5% Estimate 2.5% 97.5%
σ 39.83 33.51 47.34 46.47 38.08 58.48
r 2.4e-11 2.4e-11 2.4e-11 2.7e-10 2.6e-10 2.7e-10
ΦΩ 2.62 2.24 3.06 5.20 3.78 94.00
Ambiguity: Model 4b Abstract: Model 4b
Estimate 2.5% 97.5% Estimate 2.5% 97.5%
σ 39.83 34.39 46.19 46.47 38.76 57.82
ΦΩ 2.62 2.25 3.03 5.20 3.87 78.35
Note: Display select parameter estimates from Model 2b and 4b across the 544 subjects in the
Ambiguity treatment and the 556 subjects in the Abstract treatment. The value we report is
median rˆi instead of rˆ, because r is the maximal value that the risk aversion parameter can
take for ξr,i = 1. See additional notes in Figure 2.7 on how estimates are constructed. See
Appendix Table B.7 and Appendix Table B.8 for Model 2a, 3a, and 4a results for the Ambiguity
and Abstract treatments, respectively.
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Figure 2.7: Median Ωi(µ) in Ambiguity and Abstract treatment
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Note: Display the estimated median Ωi(µ) from Model 2b, 3b, and 4b across the 544 subjects
in the Ambiguity treatment and the 556 subjects in the Abstract treatment. In the estimation
for the Ambiguity model, assume that subjects consider the median value in the set of claim
probability values presented to them µ = µ. The 95% confidence intervals are constructed
from 1,000 bootstraps drawn from each sample with replacement. See Appendix Figure B.6 and
Figure B.7 for Model 2a, 3a, and 4a results.
Subjects in the Ambiguity and Abstract treatments are similar to those in
the Insurance treatment in that the estimated median risk aversion parameter is
small and the median probability distortion function exhibits substantial proba-
bility overweighting. While the risk aversion parameter is larger in the Ambiguity
treatment, it is still only a fraction of the estimates found in the field. There are
larger differences in the estimates for the median Ωˆi(µ).
Figure 2.8 depicts how the estimated median probability distortion functions
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in the Abstract and Ambiguity treatments differ from the baseline Insurance treat-
ment in Model 4a and 4b. In both models, the treatment effect of the Am-
biguity and Abstract treatments compared to the baseline Insurance treatment
resulted in higher median estimated probability distortion functions, and the ef-
fect is greater in the Ambiguity treatment. In Model 4b, the estimate of the
Ambiguity treatment effect is almost 5% at µ = 0.01, peaks at µ = 0.06 with
ΩˆAmbiguity(0.06) − ΩˆInsurance(0.06) = 0.11, and is statistically significant at most
claim probabilities from 1-10%.
Figure 2.8: Treatment differences with polynomial form and heterogeneous risk
preferences
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Note: Displays the difference in the Model 4a and 4b estimated median Ωi(µ) from the Ambi-
guity and Abstract treatments to the Insurance treatment. Let δΩˆ(µ) denote the difference of
δΩˆi(µ) = median Ωˆi(µ)
τ − median Ωˆi(µ)Insurance where τ indicates the treatment of Ambiguity
or Abstract in the top and bottom graphs respectively.
The median difference between the Abstract and Insurance treatments in Model
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4b are not as high and are only statistically significant on the range of 2-7% claims
probabilities. The Abstract treatment effect is zero at µ = 0, peaks at µ = 0.06
where ΩˆAbstract(0.06)− ΩˆInsurance(0.06) = 0.076. The Abstract treatment effect has
a wider confidence interval than the Ambiguity treatment effect indicating that
there is less consistency in the choices in the Abstract treatment. These results
are consistent with our reduced-form analysis. The estimation results reveal that
subjects behaved as if the claim probabilities were higher in the Ambiguity and
Abstract treatments than in the Insurance treatments, choosing significantly less
risky deductibles as a result.
Modeling ambiguity aversion
We next investigate whether the effects of the Ambiguity treatment are consistent
with the predictions of a standard maxmin model of ambiguity aversion (Etner
et al., 2012; Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989).
The estimation in Section 2.5.2 assumes for the Ambiguity treatment that the
subjective claim rate is the median of the set of claim rates that subjects received.
However ambiguity aversion would predict that, when subjects are unsure of the
distribution of a risk, they might be pessimistic and react as if the probability of
a loss were higher than the median. Indeed, the estimates from the Ambiguity
treatment are consistent such an effect.
We consider a model with a maxmin expected utility that incorporates the
pessimism of ambiguity aversion (Etner et al., 2012; Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989).
This model would predict that individuals act according to the worst possible prior
in a set of potential outcomes, which in this context means using the highest loss
probability in the range that is given. In other words, the maxmin utility assumes
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that Ambiguity treatment subjects behave as pessimistically as possible.
We test the maxmin model using the results from Model 4a and 4b by com-
paring the difference23
∆Ω(µ) = ΩˆAmbiguityi (µ)− ΩˆInsurancei (µ+ 0.01) if µ = 0.01
and
∆Ω(µ) = ΩˆAmbiguityi (µ)− ΩˆInsurancei (µ+ 0.02) if µ ≥ 0.02.
(2.8)
Figure 2.9 displays the Model 4a and 4b Ambiguity treatment effect assuming
maxmin utility as a function of µ the median claim rate received. Similar to the
prior analysis of the treatment effects, we focus our discussion on the results of
Model 4b. We find that under the assumption of maxmin utility the Ambiguity
treatment effect is lowest at ∆Ωˆ(0.02) = −0.03 and highest at ∆Ωˆ(0.08) = 0.095;
however, the confidence bounds are wide and ranges from 10% to almost 20%.
This finding indicates that not only are our experimental subjects ambiguity
averse, their response to ambiguity could be consistent with the maximin expected
utility model. It is reasonable then, that estimating our Ambiguity treatment using
the median claim probability, would generate more overweighting of probabilities
than the Insurance treatment.
The findings from the Ambiguity treatment have important implications for
choices made by households in the field when there is possibly both risk and am-
biguity. If households in the field are unsure of but aware of the range of their
objective claims probabilities, they may also have responded to the ambiguity by
23The difference is between the median estimated ΩˆAmbiguityi (µ) compared to a shifted version
of the median estimate ΩˆInsurancei (µ).
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Figure 2.9: Model 3: Difference between Maxmin Ambiguity and Insurance
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Note: Displays the difference in the Model 4a and 4b estimated median Ωˆi(µ) from the Ambiguity
treatment to the Insurance treatment assuming maxmin utility as defined in Equation 2.8.
making less risky premium-deductible choices than the strict objective probabili-
ties would predict. In other words, ambiguity aversion could contribute to some
of the estimated probability distortions observed in BMOT.
2.6 Discussion and Conclusion
We conducted a novel experiment to understand how risk preferences differ be-
tween the laboratory and the field. Our experiment was designed to allow us to
untangle the role of probability weighting, subjective beliefs, and ambiguity—a
challenge for studying risk preferences in the field—and to be more realistic than
prior experiments on risk preferences. Subjects made choices over multiple risky
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options that closely resemble choices that people have to make in the real world.
Unlike analysis of field data that must assume subjects’ perceived probabilities of
an insurance loss, in the experiment, an explicit claim rate probability or a range
of probabilities are given to subjects and are known. And unlike the traditional
experimental literature, our choices are not binary and were not certainty equiv-
alents, instead they were modeled after the insurance data of Barseghyan et al.
(2013) (BMOT).
Similar to the field literature on risk preferences, we find that the standard risk
aversion measures using curvature in the utility function had a negligible impact
on premium-deductible choices. Large and overweighting probability distortions
play a prominent role in how subjects make decisions over risky prospects.
Unlike results from the field, results from our laboratory experiment suggest
less curvature in utility and more between-subjects heterogeneity in choices and es-
timated risk preferences, particularly in probability distortions. While probability
distortions are important in explaining subject choices, the shape of the probabil-
ity distortion functions in the lab have different theoretical implications than those
estimated in the field.
The probability distortion functions estimated in the lab exhibit less probability
overweighting at small probabilities than in the field. BMOT found that their
estimates from field data could not be explained by other models of risk averse
behavior such as KR loss aversion and Gul disappointment aversion, but we were
not able to reject those models due to the small probabilities. Our paper does
not fully address mechanisms for these lower estimates, but they may be due to a
combination of factors. It is possible that heterogenous subjects in the lab may not
take the experimental insurance decision as seriously as a home or car owner would
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treat the actual decision and thus be more prone to engaging in what Cumulative
Prospect Theory called “editing”, where subjects assume very low probabilities are
zero. It may also be that there is more ambiguity in the real world which could
contribute to households inflating the probability of rare events.
Further, the probability distortion functions estimated in the lab have a much
steeper increase in the probability distortions with median estimates of Ωˆi(0.1)
between 30% and 40%. These estimates are much higher than those found in
the field and most experimental studies. Our estimates are comparable to the
probability weighting estimates of the risky types found in Bruhin et al. (2010),
but our subjects exhibited more probability underweighting which is potentially
due to the real world multiple choice task as opposed to a certainty equivalent task
in their experiments.
We also find that ambiguity aversion may also play a role in insurance decisions
in the field. The subjects in our ambiguity treatment chose significantly lower
deductibles, and their estimated risk preferences could be explained through the
maxmin utility model.
Further research into how misperceptions may influence probability weighting
could be conducted where higher amounts of noise in the claim rate probabilities
could be given to subjects (i.e. more than µij ± 2%). In addition, within-subject
responses to higher and lower degrees of claim rate ambiguity would also be im-
portant to capture in order to investigate individual responses to ambiguity.
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CHAPTER 3
DIFFERENT CONTEXTS, DIFFERENT RISK PREFERENCES?
(WITH LEVON BARSEGHYAN AND JOSHUA C. TEITELBAUM)
3.1 Introduction
Classical theories of risky choice posit that risk preferences are stable across de-
cision contexts. The stability hypothesis reflects a basic tenet of rational choice
theory known as invariance (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986) or context indepen-
dence (Hausman, 2012). Context independence requires that preferences over op-
tions be invariant to the aspects of the choice situation other than the economic
fundamentals, which in the case of risky options are the induced lotteries over
outcomes.
Broadly speaking, the empirical literature on the stability hypothesis offers two
main findings. On the one hand, studies that focus on the (strong) hypothesis of full
stability—which usually take a structural approach and examine the within-person
consistency of model-based estimates of risk aversion across domains—generally
find that a person’s risk aversion differs from one domain to the next, suggesting
that risk preferences are not perfectly stable across contexts (e.g., Barseghyan et al.,
2011). On the other hand, studies that focus on the (weak) hypothesis of some
stability—which usually take a model-free approach and examine the within-person
correlation of risk taking across domains—generally find that a person who takes
on more risk in one context tends to do so in other contexts as well, suggesting that
risk preferences have a stable component and are not entirely context dependent
(e.g., Einav et al., 2012).
108
We provide new evidence on the stability hypothesis using data on households’
coverage choices in five insurance contexts. A key feature of our data is that three
contexts involve small-stakes choices while two involve large-stakes choices. The
small-stakes choices are deductibles in three lines of property insurance: auto col-
lision, auto comprehensive, and home all perils. The large-stakes choices are limits
in two lines of liability insurance: auto single limit and home personal liability.
We adopt the model-free approach of Einav et al. (2012) and assess the stability in
ranking across the five contexts of each household’s willingness to bear risk relative
to its peers. Essentially, we rank the coverage options by risk within each context
and compute the pairwise rank correlations among the households’ choices across
the five contexts. In our preferred baseline specification, we estimate the rank
correlations controlling for variation across households in the price of coverage and
the risk of loss in each context.
Consistent with prior results in the literature, we find that the households’
small-stakes choices are positively rank correlated. We also find that their large-
stakes choices are positively rank correlated. Strikingly, however, we find that the
households’ small-stakes choices are negatively rank correlated with their large-
stakes choices. That is, we find that a household who takes on more risk than its
peers in small-stakes contexts tends to take on less risk than its peers in large-
stakes contexts, and vice versa, which does not support the stability hypothesis,
even in its weak form. Moreover, we provide evidence that this result is not driven
by heterogeneity in wealth or access to credit. As we argue below, this complicates
seemingly ready explanations of our results.
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3.2 Related Literature
There are several previous empirical investigations of the stability hypothesis. We
highlight a few key studies in the economics literature,1 giving separate treatment
to studies that use data on market choices and those that rely on data from ex-
periments and surveys.
3.2.1 Studies Using Market Data
In an early paper, Wolf and Pohlman (1983) compare the risk aversion of a dealer
in U.S. government securities as first measured by his assessments of hypothetical
wealth gambles and then estimated from his bid choices in Treasury bill auctions.
The authors take a structural approach and assume the dealer is an expected utility
(EU) maximizer. They find that “the dealer was substantially more risk averse in
his bid choices than his assessments predicted” and conclude that people’s “degree
of risk aversion may depend on the specific context in which their choices are made”
(p. 849).
Though pioneering, Wolf and Pohlman (1983) has two important limitations.
First, it studies one person. Second, it compares hypothetical choices with market
choices, which confounds the question of stability with that of external validity.
Overcoming these limitations, Barseghyan et al. (2011) examine the deductible
choices of 702 households across three insurance contexts: auto collision, auto
comprehensive, and home all perils. Assuming that households are EU maximizers,
the authors obtain three interval estimates of each household’s risk aversion based
1Barseghyan et al. (2011) and Galizzi et al. (2016b) discuss additional studies. A separate lit-
erature investigates the consistency of risk preference measures obtained from different elicitation
methods employed in experiments and surveys. For a summary, see Galizzi et al. (2016a).
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on its three choices. They find that these intervals intersect—implying that the
choices can be rationalized by the same degree of risk aversion—for only 23 percent
of households, leading them to reject the hypothesis of full stability.
Rejecting the hypothesis of full stability does not imply that risk preferences
have no stable component. Moreover, structural approaches to testing stability
invariably comprise a joint test of the stability hypothesis and the assumptions of
the structural model. With these points in mind, Einav et al. (2012) examine the
workplace benefits choices made by 12,752 Alcoa employees in six contexts: health
insurance, drug insurance, dental insurance, short-term disability insurance, long-
term disability insurance, and 401(k) investments. The authors pursue a model-
free approach (which we adopt here) in which they rank by risk the options within
each context and assess the rank correlation of the employees’ choices across the
six contexts. They find that an employee’s choice in each context is positively rank
correlated with her choice in every other context, with stronger correlations across
“closer” contexts (p. 2609), leading them to reject the hypothesis of no stability
and conclude that risk preferences have a context-invariant component.2
In the wake of this methodological shift, Barseghyan et al. (2016) explore the
connection between full stability under a structural approach and rank stability
under a model-free approach. Using data on the deductible choices of 3,629 house-
holds across the three insurance contexts studied by Barseghyan et al. (2011), the
authors document two findings: (i) the households’ deductible choices are posi-
tively rank correlated, echoing the finding of Einav et al. (2012), and (ii) five in
six households exhibit full stability under a rank-dependent EU model. They then
show that the fully stable households drive the rank correlations.
2Einav et al. (2012) also pursue a structural approach that is conceptually similar to the
approach in Barseghyan et al. (2011). Under this approach, they find that for roughly 30 percent
of employees all six choices can be rationalized by the same degree of risk aversion.
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Our paper builds directly on Einav et al. (2012). Like them, we take a model-
free approach and examine rank stability across multiple contexts using data on
market choices. The main distinction between our papers is the degree to which
the stakes vary across contexts. In the contexts we study, the dollar values of
the options range from the hundreds and thousands (in our small-stakes contexts)
to the hundreds of thousands and millions (in our large-stakes contexts). As we
discuss in Section 3.4.3, the dollar values of the options in Einav et al. (2012) range
from the hundreds and thousands (in three contexts) to the tens of thousands
(in the others). It is this distinction that reconciles our results. Both papers
find evidence of rank stability across contexts involving stakes of the same or
near orders of magnitude, while ours also finds evidence of rank instability across
contexts involving stakes of remote orders of magnitude.3
3.2.2 Studies Using Nonmarket Data
Anderson and Mellor (2009) compare the responses of laboratory subjects to a se-
ries of hypothetical job gambles and a series of hypothetical inheritance gambles.
The authors construct a categorical measure of the subjects’ risk aversion based
on the job gamble responses and then do the same for the inheritance gamble
responses. They find that 34 percent of subjects exhibit the same degree of risk
aversion across the two contexts and report a rank correlation of 0.175 between
3Collier et al. (2017) also study choices with remote stakes. Using data on households’ de-
ductibles and coverage limits in flood insurance, the authors structurally estimate the risk pref-
erences implied by the two choices and find that they differ. Because they take a structural
approach, their paper relies on stronger modeling assumptions than ours. Indeed, their estima-
tion approach—parametric MLE of a random utility model—entails even stronger assumptions
than the partial identification approach taken by Barseghyan et al. (2011). In addition, the two
choices they study are made in the same context. We therefore view their paper as more in line
with the related literature on how risk aversion varies with stake size (e.g., Binswanger, 1980;
Kachelmeier and Shehata, 1992; Holt and Laury, 2002; Fehr-Duda et al., 2010).
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the two measures.4 Dohmen et al. (2011) use survey data from the German Socio-
Economic Panel to compare respondents’ self-reported willingness to take risks
across five contexts: car driving, financial matters, sports and leisure, health, and
career. The authors report that while the responses “are not perfectly correlated
across contexts, . . . the pairwise correlations are large, typically in the neighbor-
hood of 0.5,” which they argue “is suggestive of a stable, underlying risk trait” (p.
537). More recently, Ioannou and Sadeh (2016) compare the selections made by
laboratory subjects from a set of real monetary gambles and a set of real “envi-
ronmental” gambles (where the payoffs are numbers of bee-friendly plants). The
authors find that subjects “exhibit a higher degree of risk aversion in the environ-
mental domain relative to the monetary domain; that is, individuals tend to be
more reluctant to take on large gambles with environmental outcomes than with
monetary ones” (p. 31).5 In addition to using nonmarket data, these studies differ
from ours in that they either lack meaningful variation in stakes across contexts
(e.g., Anderson and Mellor, 2009; Ioannou and Sadeh, 2016) or they study general
domains of risky behavior in which the stakes are neither explicit nor well-defined
(e.g., Barksy et al., 1997; Dohmen et al., 2011).
4The job and inheritance gamble questions are taken from the Heath and Retirement Study
(HRS). Barksy et al. (1997) use the responses to the job gamble questions in the HRS to construct
a measure of respondents’ risk tolerance. They then present evidence that their measure pre-
dicts certain self-reported risky behaviors, “including smoking, drinking, not having insurance,
choosing risky employment, and holding risky assets” (p. 551).
5In another incentivized experiment, Choi et al. (2007) test within-subject consistency (as-
suming maximization of a well-behaved concave utility function) across 50 risky portfolio choices.
They find that while only 17 percent of subjects exhibit perfect consistency (app. C), a “signifi-
cant majority” perform “only a bit worse” (pp. 1927-1928). More to the point, the authors re-
port (without providing details) that “some subjects” exhibit a “switching” pattern—sometimes
choosing extremely safe portfolios, sometimes choosing extremely risky portfolios, and some-
times chooisng intermediate portfolios—wherein their choices are “individually consistent” with
risk averse utility maximization but “mutually inconsistent” with one another (pp. 1925 &
1936-1937).
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3.3 Data and Sample
The source of our data is a large U.S. property and casualty insurance company.
Our dataset contains annual information on more than 400,000 households who
purchased auto or home insurance from the company between 1998 and 2007. The
data contain all the information in the company’s records regarding the households
and their policies, including claims information.
We focus on three small-stakes choices and two large-stakes choices. The small-
stakes choices are deductibles in three lines of property coverage: auto collision,
auto comprehensive, and home all perils. Auto collision coverage pays for damage
to the insured vehicle caused by a collision with another vehicle or object, without
regard to fault. Auto comprehensive coverage pays for damage to the insured
vehicle from all other causes, without regard to fault. Home all perils coverage pays
for damage to the insured home from all causes, except those that are specifically
excluded (e.g., flood). The deductible options range from $100 to $1,000 in auto
collision, $50 to $1,000 in auto comprehensive, and $100 to $5,000 in home all
perils. The mean increment between options is $225 in auto collision, $190 in auto
comprehensive, and $980 in home all perils.
The large-stakes choices are limits in two lines of liability coverage: auto single
limit and home personal liability. Auto single limit coverage pays for bodily injury
or property damage to others for which the insured driver is legally responsible.
Home personal liability coverage pays for bodily injury or property damage to
others for which the insured homeowner is legally responsible. The limit options
range from $60,000 to $1,000,000 in auto single limit and $100,000 to $1,000,000 in
home personal liability. The mean increment between options is $188,000 in auto
single limit and $180,000 in home personal liability.
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Our baseline sample comprises households who (i) purchased all three property
coverages and both liability coverages and (ii) first purchased each coverage within
any six-month window during the period from 2004 to 2007. The latter restriction
helps avoid temporal issues, such as changes in household characteristics or the
economic environment. We consider only the households’ coverage choices at the
time of first purchase. This helps ensure that we are working with active choices;
one might worry that households renew their policies without actively reassessing
their coverage options (Handel, 2013). These restrictions yield a baseline sample
of 2,690 households.
For each household in our baseline sample, we observe its deductible or limit
choice (as the case may be) in each coverage, as well as the pricing menu it faced in
each coverage. According to conversations with the company and an independent
agent who sells company policies, the choice environment is conducive to house-
holds making active and informed choices—there are no default choices, the pricing
menu is available to a household when it makes a choice, and a household must
choose a deductible or limit separately for each coverage.
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 provide descriptive statistics for the baseline sample. Ta-
ble 3.1 reports demographic characteristics and claim frequencies. Table 3.2 sum-
marizes the coverage choices and pricing menus.
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Table 3.1: Demographics and Claims
Mean Std dev 5th pctl 95th pctl
Auto policies
Driver 1 age (years) 57 15 32 80
Driver 1 female 0.38 0.49
Driver 1 single 0.2 0.4
Driver 1 married 0.58 0.49
Driver 2 indicator 0.43 0.5
Driver 3+ indicator 0.03 0.16
Vehicle 1 age (years) 4.95 3.36 1 11
Vehicle 2 indicator 0.48 0.5
Vehicle 3+ indicator 0.03 0.17
Insurance score 788 106 602 957
Collision claims (per annum) 0.089 0.286 0.000 0.600
Comprehensive claims (per annum) 0.024 0.125 0.000 0.000
Single limit claims (per annum) 0.085 0.277 0.000 0.597
Home policies
Home age (years) 44 31 2 105
Home value (thousands of dollars) 213 155 90 430
Insurance score 733 100 562 888
All perils claims (per annum) 0.058 0.192 0 0.451
Personal liability claims (per annum) 0.002 0.027 0.000 0.000
Notes: The table reports descriptive statistics for the baseline sample of 2,690 households. In-
surance scores in auto and home are based on information contained in credit reports.
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Table 3.2: Choices and Prices
Share Premium saving relative to safest option (dollars)
(percentage) Mean Std dev 5th pctl 95th pctl
Auto collision
$100 1
$200 15.2 40 23 15 84
$250 11.6 80 46 31 168
$500 63.8 134 77 52 281
$1,000 8.3 174 100 67 365
Auto comprehensive
$50 5.1
$100 4.7 45 32 15 93
$200 34.9 67 48 23 140
$250 11.2 74 53 26 155
$500 39.3 104 75 36 217
$1,000 4.8 127 91 43 264
Home all perils
$100 0.3
$250 22.3 186 156 83 403
$500 54.9 248 207 110 529
$1,000 21 330 275 146 694
$2,500 1.3 391 326 176 820
$5,000 0.3 463 386 206 1001
Auto single limit
$60,000 0.2 109 46 55 200
$100,000 8.6 102 43 52 189
$200,000 0.7 78 33 40 143
$300,000 43.9 68 29 34 125
$500,000 43 57 24 29 106
$1,000,000 3.6
Home personal liability
$100,000 9.6 42
$200,000 0.8 32
$300,000 47.6 24
$400,000 0.2 19
$500,000 36.4 16
$1,000,000 5.4
Notes: The table summarizes the coverage choices and pricing menus for the baseline sample of
2,690 households. Share is the percentage of households who chose a given option (deductible or
limit, as the case may be). The safest option is the lowest deductible in the property coverages
and the highest limit in the liability coverages.
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3.4 Methods and Results
3.4.1 Empirical Strategy and Baseline Results
We adopt the model-free approach of Einav et al. (2012) and assess the stability in
ranking across contexts of each household’s willingness to bear risk relative to its
peers. To begin, we rank the options by risk within each context, ordering them
from highest to lowest risk exposure. There are five or six options in each context
(see Table 3.2). The safest option is the lowest deductible in property coverages
and the highest limit in the liability coverages. We then compute the pairwise
Spearman rank correlations in the households’ choices across the five contexts.
Because these rank correlations do not control for potentially important covari-
ates, we also examine the correlation structure of the residuals from a system of
five equations:
yAuto collisioni
yAuto comprehensivei
yHome all perilsi
yAuto single limiti
yHome personal liabilityi

=

βAuto collision
βAuto comprehensive
βHome all perils
βAuto single limit
βHome personal liability

·xi +

εAuto collisioni
εAuto comprehensivei
εHome all perilsi
εAuto single limiti
εHome personal liabilityi

,
(1)
where yji denotes the rank-ordered choice of household i in context j, β
j is a vector
of context-specific coefficients, xi is a vector of household-specific covariates, and
εji is a household- and context-specific residual. In theory, a household’s choices
depend not only on its risk preferences but also on the prices it faces and its
risk profile. The baseline set of covariates (xi), therefore, includes controls for
prices and risk. The price controls are log-transformed premiums for each coverage
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assuming a $250 deductible or $200,000 limit, as the case may be.6 The risk controls
are expected annual claims under each coverage based on separate Poisson-gamma
Bayesian credibility models. By construction, the risk controls take into account
both the systematic and idiosyncratic components of a households’ risk type. For
further details, see Appendix C.1.
Following Einav et al. (2012), we estimate system (1) in two different ways.
First, we treat it as a multivariate ordered probit regression model and estimate
it by maximum likelihood.7 Second, we treat it as a multivariate linear regression
model and estimate it by least squares. Because the set of options in each context
is discrete, the probit regression is our preferred specification.
Table 3.3 reports the baseline results. Panel A shows the Spearman rank cor-
relations. Panels B and C display the estimated correlations from the probit and
linear regressions, respectively. Each panel tells the same story. Across all pan-
els, the correlation between each pair of small-stakes choices is positive, ranging
from 0.26 to 0.70. Similarly, the correlation between the two large-stakes choices is
positive, ranging from 0.44 to 0.57. By contrast, however, the correlation between
every pairing of a small-stakes choice and a large-stakes choice is negative, ranging
from −0.05 to −0.34. Overall, the baseline results suggest that the households
exhibit a fairly stable degree of risk aversion relative to their peers across contexts
that involve stakes of the same order of magnitude. At the same time, however, the
results suggest that households who exhibit a higher degree of risk aversion than
their peers in small-stakes contexts tend to exhibit a lower degree of risk aversion
than their peers in large-stakes contexts, and vice versa.
6We do not include a price control for home personal liability because the premiums do not
vary across households.
7We estimate the system by performing bivariate ordered probit regressions on every pair of
equations. In each regression, we use the Huber/White/sandwich estimator to obtain robust
standard errors.
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Table 3.3: Baseline Results
Auto Auto Home all Auto single
collision comprehensive perils limit
Panel A. Spearman rank correlations
Auto comprehensive 0.617
Home all perils 0.395 0.383
Auto single limit -0.129 -0.108 -0.224
Home personal liability -0.206 -0.219 -0.339 0.563
Panel B. Correlation estimates from probit regression
Auto comprehensive 0.702
Home all perils 0.398 0.338
Auto single limit -0.104 -0.056 -0.134
Home personal liability -0.149 -0.133 -0.205 0.574
Panel C. Correlation estimates from linear regression
Auto comprehensive 0.552
Home all perils 0.29 0.263
Auto single limit -0.077 -0.055 -0.113
Home personal liability -0.121 -0.114 -0.163 0.437
Notes: The table provides results for the baseline sample of 2,690 households. Each cell reports
a pairwise correlation coefficient. For each correlation coefficient, the p-value associated with a
test of whether the coefficient is different from zero is less than 0.01. The only exception is the
correlation coefficient between auto comprehensive and auto single limit in panel B, for which
the associated p-value is 0.023. The probit and linear regressions include controls for prices and
risk.
3.4.2 Sensitivity Analysis
Umbrella Coverage
Twenty-six percent of the households in the baseline sample purchased umbrella
liability coverage from the company to supplement their auto single limit and
home personal liability coverages. The umbrella coverage options range from $1
million to $5 million in $1 million increments, and the premium associated with
each coverage option is the same for all households.
The baseline results disregard the households’ umbrella choices. To explore
whether this biases our results, we treat households who purchased umbrella cov-
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erage as having chosen a new “highest limit” option (i.e., a limit of unspecified
amount greater than $1,000,000) in auto single limit and home personal liability,
and we re-estimate (1) treating it as a system of ordered probits and including the
baseline set of controls.8
Table 3.4, panel A reports the results, which tell the same story as the baseline
results. Indeed, all but one of the pairwise correlations involving a liability insur-
ance context are stronger than the corresponding baseline correlations. The only
exception is the correlation between home all perils and home personal liability,
which is slightly weaker than the corresponding baseline correlation.9
8We do not add a price control for umbrella coverage because the premiums do not vary across
households.
9As a further check, we also re-estimate (1), again treating it as a system of ordered probits
and including the baseline set of controls, on the subsample of 1,993 households who did not
purchase umbrella coverage. Those results also tell the same story as the baseline results.
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Table 3.4: Sensitivity Analysis
Auto Auto Home all Auto single
collision comprehensive perils limit
Panel A. Correlation estimates accouting for umbrella choices
Auto comprehensive 0.702
Home all perils 0.398 0.338
Auto single limit -0.134 -0.103 -0.135
Home personal liability -0.165 -0.150 -0.176 0.842
Panel B. Correlation estimates with control for weath
Auto comprehensive 0.703
Home all perils 0.399 0.336
Auto single limit -0.106 -0.060 -0.144
Home personal liability -0.151 -0.138 -0.214 0.570
Panel C. Correlation estimates with controls for insurance scores
Auto comprehensive 0.702
Home all perils 0.398 0.338
Auto single limit -0.105 -0.061 -0.136
Home personal liability -0.148 -0.132 -0.204 0.576
Panel D. Correlation estimates with same-day choice window
Auto comprehensive 0.707
Home all perils 0.446 0.375
Auto single limit -0.137 -0.103 -0.157
Home personal liability -0.133 -0.159 -0.203 0.649
Notes: Panels A, B, and C provide results for the baseline sample of 2,690 households. Panel D
provides results for the subsample of 1,694 households who purchased all five coverages on the
same day. Each cell reports a pairwise correlation coefficient estimated from a system of ordered
probits with controls for prices and risk. In panel A, households who purchased umbrella coverage
are treated as having chosen a new ”highest limit” option in both auto single limit and home
personal liability. In panel B, the probit regression includes an additional control for wealth. In
panel C, the probit regression includes additional controls for insurance scores in auto and home.
For each correlation coefficient, the p-value associated with a test of whether the coefficient is
different from zero is less than 0.01. The only exception is the correlation coefficient between
auto comprehensive and auto single limit in panels B and C, for which the associated p-value is
0.015.
Wealth
Economists have long hypothesized that risk preferences depend on wealth (Fried-
man and Savage, 1948; Pratt, 1964; Arrow, 1971). The standard assumption is that
absolute risk aversion is decreasing in wealth, which implies that, ceteris paribus,
a household’s willingness to pay for insurance decreases with its wealth. See, for
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example, Pratt (1964, pp. 122-123): “Utility functions for which [the coefficient
of absolute risk aversion] is decreasing are logical candidates to use when trying
to describe the behavior of people who, one feels, might generally pay less for
insurance against a given risk the greater their assets.”
Our baseline analysis does not control for household wealth. To examine
whether wealth effects may be driving our results, we add a control for wealth
to the baseline set of controls and re-estimate (1) treating it as a system of ordered
probits. We do not directly observe a household’s wealth in our data, but we do
observe a plausible proxy: the insured value of the dwelling covered by its home-
owners policy (”home value”). Of course, we do not know the correlation between
home value and wealth in our data. However, according to combined extract data
(1989-2016) from the Survey of Consumer Finance, the correlation between home
value and wealth is 0.47 (std. err. = 0.002).
Table 3.4, panel B reports the results. Each pairwise correlation is virtually
identical to the corresponding baseline correlation. It thus appears that wealth
effects are not driving our results.
Access to Credit
In theory, a household’s ability to borrow after a loss event can affect its demand
for insurance (Handel et al., 2015; Jaffe and Malani, 2017). To investigate whether
differences in access to credit may be driving our results, we add controls for
households’ insurance scores in auto and home to the baseline set of controls and
re-estimate (1) treating it as a system of ordered probits. Insurance scores are akin
to credit scores. Both are derived using the same five categories of information
contained in credit reports (payment history, level of indebtedness, length of credit
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history, new credit and pursuit of new credit, and types of credit), though they
differ somewhat in how they weight these categories (Morris et al., 2017). For this
reason, we believe that insurance score, like credit score, is a good proxy for a
household’s access to credit.10
Table 3.4, panel C reports the results. Again, each pairwise correlation is
virtually identical to the corresponding baseline correlation. This suggests that
differences in access to credit are not driving our results.11
Choice Window
In the baseline sample, we restrict attention to households who, inter alia, pur-
chased all five coverages within a six-month window. There are two opposing
considerations in selecting a choice window. On the one hand, a narrower window
helps to avoid what Einav et al. (2012, p. 2611) call “the problems of inferring
preferences from ‘stale’ choices,” which they note “could be particularly concerning
if individuals might have made their choices . . . at different points in time.” On
the other hand, a wider window helps to improve inference by increasing sample
size.
We are not concerned that a six-month window is too narrow. Our baseline
sample comprises 2,690 households, which we believe is sufficiently large to draw
valid inferences. To address the concern that a six-month window may be too
wide, we re-estimate (1) on the subsample of 1,694 households who purchased all
five coverages on the same day. As before, we treat (1) as a system of ordered
10There is ample evidence that credit score is a good proxy for access to credit (e.g., Baker,
2017).
11As a further check, we re-estimate (1), again treating it as a system of ordered probits, with
controls for wealth and insurance scores (and their interactions) added to the baseline set. Once
again, the results tell the same story.
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probits and include the baseline set of controls. Table 3.4, panel D reports the
results. They tell the same story as the baseline results. Indeed, all but two of
the pairwise correlations are stronger than the corresponding baseline correlations.
The only exceptions are the pairwise correlations between auto collision and home
personal liability and between home all perils and home personal liability, which
are slightly weaker than baseline.
3.4.3 Comparison with Einav et al. (2012)
We close this section with a discussion comparing our results with those of Einav
et al. (2012). Using data on the workplace benefits choices of 12,752 Alcoa employ-
ees, Einav et al. (2012) pursue the same model-free approach (which they develop)
to assess the rank stability of the employees’ risk preferences across six contexts:
health insurance, drug insurance, dental insurance, short-term disability insurance,
long-term disability insurance, and 401(k) investments. In their baseline analysis,
where they control for variation in benefit menus, they find that an employee’s
choice in every context is positively rank correlated with its choice in every other
context, implying that employees who exhibit a higher degree of risk aversion than
their peers in one context tend also to do so in other contexts, and vice versa.
They find very similar results when they add controls for risk. The strongest pair-
wise correlations are between short- and long-term disability insurance (0.76) and
among health, drug, and dental insurance (ranging from 0.30 to 0.49). Somewhat
weaker are the correlations across the disability and medical insurance contexts
(ranging from 0.21 to 0.26). The weakest are between 401(k) investments and ev-
ery other context (all below 0.05, including two that are slightly negative but not
125
statistically different from zero).12
In order to compare our results with those of Einav et al. (2012), we must
classify their contexts according to the magnitude of the stakes involved, applying
the same criteria that we use to classify our contexts. Recall that in our small-
stakes contexts the values of the options and the inter-option increments range
in the hundreds and thousands dollars, whereas in our large-stakes contexts the
value of the options range in the hundreds of thousands and millions of dollars
with inter-option increments that range in the hundreds of thousands dollars.
For the reasons we detail in Appendix C.2, we conclude that none of the con-
texts in Einav et al. (2012) involve large-stakes choices. Specifically, we conclude
that three contexts—health, drug, and dental insurance—involve small-stakes
choices. In two contexts—short-term disability insurance and 401(k) investments—
we determine that the stakes range in the thousands and tens of thousands of
dollars but not the hundreds of thousands of dollars, and so we classify them as
moderate-stakes contexts. We also classify the remaining context—long-term dis-
ability insurance—as involving moderate-stakes choices, though the reasons are
less straightforward.13
Given these classifications, we see that our results and those of Einav et al.
(2012) complement one another. We both find a pattern of positive pairwise corre-
12The quoted results are from Table 3.3B, panel A in Einav et al. (2012), which reports
correlation estimates from a system of ordered probits with controls for benefit menus and risk.
13We note that in an effort to establish the comparability of the choices they study, Einav et al.
(2012, p. 2616) argue that “the incremental decisions across each domain are quite comparable
in expected magnitude, . . . ranging from several hundred to a few thousand dollars” (emphasis
added). We do not disagree. But the fact remains that the choices in their first three contexts
differ categorically from the choices in their last three contexts in terms of the absolute magnitude
of the stakes involved. Morever, were we to classify choices according to the expected magnitudes
of the options (or inter-option increments), this arguably would be inconsistent with taking a
model-free approach, as it would presuppose a model that entails comparisons over expected
values or utilities.
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lations among small-stakes choices. To this common result, Einav et al. (2012) add
two findings: patterns of positive (or at least non-negative) pairwise correlations
among moderate-stake choices and across small- and moderate-stakes choices. We
also add two findings. The first is a pattern of positive pairwise correlations among
large-stakes choices, which taken together with the previous findings hints at a sta-
ble component of risk preferences that operates across contexts involving stakes of
the same or near orders of magnitude. The second finding that we add to the mix
is our main contribution: a pattern of negative pairwise correlations across small-
and large-stakes choices, which hints at a lack of risk preference stability across
contexts involving stakes of remote orders of magnitude.
There is another way to see how we build on Einav et al. (2012). Leaving 401(k)
investments aside for the moment, Einav et al. (2012) find (i) moderately positive
correlations between contexts involving stakes of the same order of magnitude
(small/small or moderate/moderate) and (ii) weakly positive correlations between
contexts involving stakes of adjacent orders of magnitude (small/moderate). We
corroborate the first finding (for small/small) and extend it (to large/large) and
progressively add a third: (iii) weakly negative correlations between contexts in-
volving stakes of remote orders of magnitude (small/large). Returning to 401(k)
investments, Einav et al. (2012) acknowledge that this context is “the most difficult
to reconcile with any of the others” (p. 2636), and they attribute the difficulty to
a difference in kind between investments and insurance. Our results suggest an al-
ternative explanation: employees may perceive 401(k) investments as a borderline
large-stakes context, particularly if they view their allocation choice as applying to
more than just their current year’s contributions. This could explain the extremely
weak correlations (more or less zero) between 401(k) investments and every other
context in Einav et al. (2012).
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3.5 Discussion
We examine the hypothesis that risk preferences have a stable, context-invariant
component using data on households’ insurance choices. We study five insurance
contexts, three involving small-stakes choices (deductibles) and two involving large-
stakes choices (liability limits). Adopting the model-free approach of Einav et al.
(2012), we assess the extent to which the households’ choices display a stable
ranking in their willingness to bear risk relative to their peers. While we find
that the households’ choices reflect a stable ranking in risk taking across the three
small-stakes choices and across the two large-stakes choices, we also find that the
households who take on more risk than their peers in small-stakes contexts tend
to take on less risk than their peers in large-stakes contexts, and vice versa, which
does not support the stability hypothesis.
What could explain our results? Three stories come readily to mind. None is
unassailable, however, and so each leaves open questions for future research.
The first is a story about relative risk aversion. Suppose that rich households
choose higher deductibles and higher liability limits than poor households. The
intuition might be that rich households want insurance against large losses but not
small losses (which they can self-insure at a lower cost), whereas poor households
want insurance against small losses but not large losses (because you can’t get
blood from a stone). This pattern of choices, which could explain our results,
could arise from a population of households with standard EU preferences and
heterogeneous relative risk aversion. Standard EU preferences feature a concave
utility function that is defined over wealth and exhibits DARA (Pratt, 1964; Arrow,
1971).14 Concavity implies a positive willingness to pay for insurance. Let pi
14In this paragraph, DARA stands for decreasing absolute risk aversion, and IRRA, CRRA,
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denote this willingness. DARA implies that pi decreases with wealth, which could
account for rich households choosing higher deductibles than poor households. If
the utility function also exhibits IRRA/CRRA/DRRA,15 then, ceteris paribus, pi is
increasing/constant/decreasing in stakes (Menezes and Hanson, 1970; Zeckhauser
and Keeler, 1970). Thus, the right kind of heterogeneity in relative risk aversion
(e.g., rich households have IRRA and poor households have CRRA) could account
for rich households also choosing higher liability limits than poor households.
This story, while plausible, has at least two important counterpoints. The first
is our analysis in Section 3.4.2, which casts doubt on the possibility that wealth
differences are behind our results. The second is the Rabin (2000) critique, which
contends that EU theory is not a plausible model of risk aversion across small- and
large-stakes gambles.16
A second story features consumption commitments (i.e., spending obligations
that are costly to adjust). Suppose that some households have consumption com-
mitments while others do not. Chetty and Szeidl (2007) show that, within an
EU framework, consumption commitments can induce non-concavities in the util-
ity function (cf. Friedman and Savage, 1948; Markowitz, 1952) that increase risk
aversion over small- and moderate-stakes gambles relative to large-stakes gambles.
Hence, the right kind of heterogeneity in consumption commitments (e.g., com-
mitted households have lower risk aversion over large-stakes gambles than other
households) could generate a pattern of choices in which committed households
choose lower deductibles and lower liability limits than other households, which
could explain our results.
and DRRA stand for increasing, constant, and decreasing relative risk aversion, respectively.
15For instance, Saha’s (1993) expo-power utility function can exhibit DARA/IRRA or
DARA/DRRA, while the power utility function exhibits DARA/CRRA.
16We note that the Rabin critique is not directly related to our main finding of rank instability
of risk preferences across small- and large-stakes contexts.
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Again, this story, while plausible, is complicated by our sensitivity analysis.
One implication of Chetty and Szeidl’s (2007) theory is that consumption commit-
ments “have a larger effect on risk aversion when agents are borrowing constrained”
(p. 850). It follows that if heterogeneity in consumption commitments were driv-
ing our results, we would expect them to be sensitive to differences in access to
credit. Our analysis in Section 3.4.2, however, suggests they are not.17
Probability distortions headline a third possible story. Suppose that house-
holds’ subjective beliefs (in a subjective EU model) or decision weights (in a rank-
dependent EU model) do not correspond to the objective risks. The right kind
of heterogeneity in such beliefs or weights could explain our results. For example,
suppose that some households overweight loss probabilities in large-stakes gambles
but not small-stakes gambles, while other households overweight loss probabilities
in small-stakes gambles but not large-stakes gambles. This could lead the former
households to choose higher deductibles and higher liability limits than the latter
households. Alternatively, suppose that some households grossly overweight loss
probabilities in small-stakes gambles and mildly overweight them in large-stakes
gambles, while other households do not overweight loss probabilities in any gam-
bles (cf. Fehr-Duda et al., 2010).18 If in addition the former households are low
risk while the other households are high risk, this could lead the former to choose
lower deductibles and lower liability limits than the latter.
The issue with each version of this story is that it requires a peculiar hetero-
geneity structure. (Indeed, we could level this criticism against the first two stories
as well.) We are not aware of any empirical or theoretical support for the kind
17Although Chetty and Szeidl (2007) adopt an EU framework, the non-concavities of the utility
function insulate their model from the Rabin critique.
18Fehr-Duda et al. (2010) present evidence of this kind of pattern, but only for gambles in the
gain domain. They find no substantial difference in stake-dependent probability weighting for
gambles in the loss domain (like insurance).
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of heterogeneity—including, in some versions, the correlation between probability
distortions and risk types—that is required by this story.
In future research it would be worthwhile to further probe these and other
potential explanations of our results and to explore whether similar results obtain
in other comparable datasets.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX OF CHAPTER 1: DYNAMIC PURCHASING
BEHAVIOR IN HEALTHCARE CONSUMPTION
A.1 Data Appendix
Appendix Figure A.1 displays the 2009 Medicare-defined standard plan.
Appendix Table A.1 details the reasons why beneficiaries are excluded from
the full sample and also includes the percentage of the 5% sample they encompass.
Beneficiaries are limited to those who are 65 or older, are enrolled in Medicare
PDPs in 2009-2012, and who originally and are currently enrolled in Medicare
through the Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) and not for disability insur-
ance or other qualifiers for Medicare. Similar to Einav et al. (2015), the sample
also excludes individuals who are dual eligible for Medicaid financial assistance
or receive other types of low-income subsidies (LIS) for premiums or cost-sharing.
These individuals are excluded because they face very low cost-sharing and minor
differences in their marginal costs. Individuals who only receive premium subsidies
are also omitted, because they are more likely lower income and are more likely to
be influenced by budget constraints. Joyce et al. (2013) used these LIS individuals
as a control group for their analysis of the donut hole, but this paper takes a differ-
ent approach. Further, my analysis also excludes individuals whose Medicare Part
B claims indicate beneficiaries were in long-term care institutions (LTI) such as
nursing homes in the prior year. The LTI beneficiaries are excluded on the chance
that their Part D prescription purchases are managed by the nursing homes. In
addition, the full sample excludes individuals who did not have a Medicare Part D
plan for the full year (“Not Same Plan in 12 Months”), because those individuals
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Figure A.1: Part D 2009 coverage regions
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Note: The figure depicts the nonlinear structure of the standard Medicare Part D benefit con-
tract. Actual plans offered in 2009 were either actuarially equivalent or better. The premium or
the amount the patient pays out-of-pocket for the benefit package is not displayed. The Total
Expenditure includes the drug expenditure between the patient, insurance company, and Medi-
care, while the Out-of-Pocket (OOP) Cost only includes the patient’s drug expenditure. The
5% coinsurance coverage in the catastrophic region is simplified for the figure. The actual 2009
coverage benefit requires beneficiaries to pay the maximum of either 5% the cost of the drug or
$2.40 and $6.00 for a one-month supply of generic and branded drugs respectively. This means
that patients may pay either the copay dollar amount or a percentage share of the drug price
and the remainder is covered by insurance or the government. The bottom panel displays the
marginal costs of the plan.
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would have varying time-frames over which their contracts run.
Table A.1: Summary of 5% sample of Medicare data and exclusion reason 2009-
2012
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2009 2010 2011 2012
mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
Dual eligible 20.01 40 20.09 40 22.94 42 22.71 42
Disabled or end-stage renal disease 16.05 37 17.00 38 17.13 38 17.04 38
Originally not OASI 22.73 42 23.86 43 24.15 43 24.26 43
Currently not OASI 16.53 37 17.89 38 18.26 39 18.25 39
Receive state subsidy 17.52 38 17.92 38 18.15 39 18.16 39
No prescription coverage 40.64 49 40.46 49 39.03 49 36.91 48
Low-Income subsidy 22.32 42 22.62 42 22.72 42 22.55 42
Long term care (or undef) 4.38 20 04.65 21 4.69 21 4.58 21
Cost sharing other (or undef) 43.48 50 43.46 50 41.69 49 39.40 49
Employer subsidy 14.94 36 14.65 35 16.38 37 14.93 36
Undefined creditable coverage 0.01 1 0.01 1 0.05 2 0.06 3
Has creditable coverage 18.48 39 18.81 39 16.29 37 15.44 36
Died in plan year 14.97 36 4.30 20 3.97 20 3.90 19
Not same plan in 12 months 43.76 50 44.46 50 41.96 49 40.03 49
Not PDP 63.89 48 64.38 48 63.62 48 62.97 48
Employer group waiver (or undef) 48.62 50 48.42 50 47.57 50 47.05 50
Full 12 month sample 10.89 31 11.99 32 12.13 33 12.27 33
Main 4 year sample 3.68 19 3.88 19 3.76 19 3.63 19
Observations 2677143 2539492 2619222 2716094
Note: Percentage of the 5% sample that fit the exclusion restriction and reason. An additional
exclusion (not shown) was for individuals whose demographics or plan detail data were undefined
or unavailable.
Further, beneficiaries may not have the same plan through the entire year if it
is their initial year of enrollment, since patients are eligible to enroll for 7 months
around their birthdays (three months before and after and including their birth-
day month).1 Beneficiaries who died may also pass away mid-year. Beneficiaries
who switch from Medicare Advantage (prescription coverage) to Medicare Part D,
may also not be in plans for the full 12 months since the Medicare Advantage
disenrollment period occurs within a year January 1-February 14, taking effect the
1If enrolled in the initial enrollment period, patients would be enrolled on the first day of their
birthday month if enrolled prior. If sign-up occurs in the birthday month or in the three months
after, coverage start is delayed 1-3 months after enrollment.
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first month after disenrollment (either February or March). Enrollees may also
have switched plans mid-year under the special enrollment periods: after moving;
losing current Medicaid/Employer/etc coverage; new creditable coverage options,
specific plan changes, and other special circumstances.2
Appendix Table A.2 includes demographic summary statistics for the entire
5% Medicare sample. These individuals in the entire 5% sample do not necessarily
have Medicare Part D or meet the sample criteria as shown in Appendix Table A.1.
Appendix Table A.3 includes demographic summary statistics for the “full” sample
of Medicare Part D individuals who met the exclusion criteria and were in each
plan for the full year. The individuals in the full sample are older than the average
Medicare Part D enrollee and are more white. They also have higher rates of
chronic diseases. The differences from the 5% sample and the “full” sample reflect
the fact that older and sicker people are more likely to select into Medicare Part
D. The differences in race between the two samples may also have to do with who
qualifies for Medicare (and is thus excluded).
2https://www.medicare.gov/sign-up-change-plans/when-can-i-join-a-health-or-drug-
plan/special-circumstances/join-plan-special-circumstances.html
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Table A.2: 5% Sample of Medicare beneficiary demographics 2009-2012
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2009 2010 2011 2012
mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
Age 72.07 12.49 71.56 12.51 71.43 12.51 71.26 12.35
Female 0.58 0.49 0.56 0.50 0.55 0.50 0.55 0.50
Race: Undefined 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.08
White 0.83 0.37 0.83 0.38 0.82 0.38 0.82 0.39
Black 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.31
Other 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.14
Asian 0.03 0.13 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.14
Hispanic 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.16
N. American Native 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.07
Observations 2,677,135 2,539,486 2,619,219 2,716,093
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2009 2010 2011 2012
mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
2011 RxHCC weight 0.38 0.43 0.39 0.44 0.40 0.44 0.40 0.45
2011 RxHCC demo. weight 0.49 0.19 0.49 0.19 0.49 0.19 0.49 0.19
Diabetes 0.21 0.41 0.21 0.41 0.21 0.41 0.21 0.41
Hypertension 0.42 0.49 0.41 0.49 0.41 0.49 0.41 0.49
Cancer 0.06 0.25 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.24
High Cholesterol 0.43 0.49 0.43 0.49 0.43 0.49 0.43 0.49
Long Term Care 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.22 0.050 0.22
Observations 2,318,357 2,381,965 2,430,325 2,507,147
Note: The age is the age at the end of the reference year. The total number of observations in
the first panel differ from Table A.1 due to missing values in gender and race fields. The number
of observations differ between the two panels since the information on risk factors and conditions
are generated from the Medicare Part A and B claims from the prior year. Patients who did not
have relevant claims to be scored from the prior year did not have values for these conditions.
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Table A.3: Full sample of medicare beneficiary demographics 2009-2012
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2009 2010 2011 2012
mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
Age at End of Reference Year 75.79 7.18 75.97 7.32 75.95 7.30 75.81 7.30
Start Medicare Year 1998.3 7.2 1999.0 7.3 2000.1 7.3 2001.2 7.3
Years in Medicare 10.7 7.2 10.9 7.3 10.9 7.3 10.8 7.3
Female 0.65 0.48 0.65 0.48 0.64 0.48 0.64 0.48
Race: White 0.95 0.22 0.95 0.22 0.95 0.22 0.95 0.23
Race: Black 0.03 0.17 0.04 0.16 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.17
Race: Other 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.11
Race: Asian 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.08
Race: Hispanic 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06
Race: North American Native 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04
2011 RxHCC weight 0.45 0.32 0.47 0.33 0.48 0.33 0.48 0.33
2011 RxHCC demo. weight 0.42 0.01 0.42 0.01 0.42 0.01 0.42 0.01
Diabetes 0.23 0.42 0.24 0.42 0.24 0.43 0.25 0.43
Hypertension 0.61 0.49 0.62 0.49 0.62 0.48 0.62 0.48
Cancer 0.09 0.29 0.10 0.29 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.30
High Cholesterol 0.66 0.47 0.67 0.47 0.68 0.47 0.68 0.47
Baseline 4 Year Sample 0.34 0.47 0.32 0.47 0.31 0.46 0.30 0.46
Observations 291,550 304,477 317,670 333,309
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A.1.1 Standard Plans
Appendix Tables A.4, A.5, and A.6 present summary statistics on individuals who
selected into plans with the standard Medicare-defined plan (with the standard
deductible) in all four years.
Table A.4: Average Coinsurance in Phases in Baseline Sample Standard Plans
2009-2012 (person-week)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2009 2010 2011 2012
mean count mean count mean count mean count
sd sd sd sd
Deductible 0.78 152,348 0.82 158,028 0.80 159,524 0.85 174,615
0.30 0.26 0.28 0.24
ICR 0.22 253,123 0.20 248,750 0.21 243,824 0.23 231,479
0.13 0.13 0.12 0.13
Gap 0.68 34,249 0.54 33,136 0.36 35,389 0.38 33,197
0.40 0.42 0.24 0.25
Catastrophic 0.06 4,336 0.05 4,397 0.05 5,428 0.05 4,967
0.08 0.04 0.03 0.03
Total 0.45 444,056 0.44 444,311 0.43 444,165 0.48 444,258
0.36 0.36 0.35 0.36
Note: Table is generated from the baseline sample individuals with standard deductible, ICL,
and OOPT limits. The coinsurance rates are averaged over the amount the patient pays (does
not include the drug manufacture discounts in 2011 and 2012) divided by the total expenditure
cost in the person-week observation where spending occurs. The count reflects the fact that there
are more person-week observations in the ICR region than others. These sums do not reflect the
counterfactual coinsurance rates that beneficiaries with low spending would have faced if they
had reached higher spending.
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Table A.5: Proportion of Beneficiaries in Each Phase at the End of the Year in
Baseline Sample Standard Plans 2009-2012
Standard
2009 2010 2011 2012
Deductible 11.26 12.97 13.41 16.55
ICR 61.46 60.68 59.26 58.72
Gap 22.76 22.23 22.28 20.41
Catastrophic 4.52 4.13 5.04 4.33
Observations 9,178 9,178 9,178 9,178
Note: Table is generated from the baseline sample individuals with standard limits. The propor-
tion of beneficiaries that end the year in each phase is averaged over the individual beneficiary.
Table A.6: Average Probability of Weekly Spending in Coverage Regions in Stan-
dard Plans 2009-2012 (person-week)
2009 2010 2011 2012
mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd
Deductible 29.08 29.83 30.16 30.18
45.41 45.75 45.90 45.90
ICR 40.04 40.94 41.13 42.22
49.00 49.17 49.21 49.39
Gap 47.85 48.50 48.77 51.60
49.95 48.98 49.99 49.98
Catastrophic 55.74 56.01 56.85 57.34
49.67 49.64 49.53 49.46
Total 37.05 37.72 38.01 38.37
48.29 48.47 48.54 48.63
Note: Table is generated from the baseline sample individuals with standard deductible, ICL,
and OOPT limits. Table displays the raw probability of spending in a week in each coverage
region and year.
A.2 Alternative Model Results
Appendix Figures A.2 and A.3 present the results from the falsification specifica-
tions False 1 and 2. The main takeaway from these falsification tests is that even
under different specifications for the spline with four and three knots at different
locations, the findings from the main specification still hold. It appears that the
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probability of claims occurring decreases far in advance of individuals entering the
coverage gap and there are no sharp discontinuities at the kinks (except at the end
of the year when they are expected).
Figure A.2: False 1: Probability of Claims Occurring in a Week
Note: Displays the predicted values of the claim occurrence probability oˆiyw in a week from the
fixed-effects panel regression of Equation 1.5 under the assumptions of False 1 on the beneficiaries
in the No Deductible sample. Each panel represents a quarter of the year where a quarter consists
of 13 weeks except for quarter 4, where the last “week” of the year consists of the remainder
8 or 9 days of the year. Images display a 95% confidence interval around the predicted values.
The predicted values are generated within each panel by holding all variables constant except
for the cumulative total expenditure displayed on the x-axis and the cumulative out-of-pocket
expenditure. See Figure 1.10 for the exact values used to generate the prediction.
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Figure A.3: False 2: Probability of Claims Occurring in a Week
Note: Displays the predicted values of the claim occurrence probability oˆiyw in a week from the
fixed-effects panel regression of Equation 1.5 under the assumptions of False 2 on the beneficiaries
in the No Deductible sample. Each panel represents a quarter of the year where a quarter consists
of 13 weeks except for quarter 4, where the last “week” of the year consists of the remainder
8 or 9 days of the year. Images display a 95% confidence interval around the predicted values.
The predicted values are generated within each panel by holding all variables constant except
for the cumulative total expenditure displayed on the x-axis and the cumulative out-of-pocket
expenditure. See Figure 1.10 for the exact values used to generate the prediction.
A.3 Dynamic Panel with Fixed Effects Bias Simulated
Simulated data was created to have a claims occurrence value oiyw and a cumulative
total spending value Ziyw with 208 weeks. The data generating process allows for
individual heterogeneity in a base probability of spending. For the simulated case,
the probability of spending and the amount spent is independent of the Ziyw and
region effects Riyw.
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The following 3 cases are graphed in Figure A.4. They show the shape the bias
would have on the cumulative total spending measure.
T=208
oiyw = αi +Riyw + Ziyw + βr ∗ Ziyw + qiyw + τy + εit
T=52
oiyw = αiy +Riyw + Ziyw + βr ∗ Ziyw + qiyw + εit
T=13
oiyw = αiyw +Riyw + Ziyw + βr ∗ Ziyw + εit
Figure A.4: Estimation of a linear model of simulated data with different time
frames
Note: The green- T=13, red - T=52, blue - T=208
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX OF CHAPTER 2: THE NATURE OF RISK
PREFERENCES: EVIDENCE FROM EXPERIMENTAL
INSURANCE CHOICES
B.1 Experimental Materials
Figure B.1 includes a screenshot of the recruitment page for the Amazon Mechan-
ical Turk workers. Figure B.2 and B.3 include screenshots of the attention check
and an example verification check that both of the MTurk and student subjects
were required to pass prior to proceeding through the experiment.
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Figure B.1: Amazon Mechanical Turk Recruitment Page
Note: The screenshot is taken of the Mechanical Turk Developer Sandbox platform for testing
out survey recruitment prior to implementation. The Sandbox environment is meant to replicate
the actual text and functionality that the workers experience.
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Figure B.2: Attention Check in Web Experiment
Note: If subjects fail this attention check once, they receive a warning. If they fail it twice, the
survey ends and they are not able to proceed. Both MTurk and student subjects received the
exact same attention check.
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Figure B.3: Verification Question on Payout Scheme in Web Experiment
Note: Image is from the MTurk version of the experiment. The student version divides the
payout by 50 and does not include Amazon Hit wording. Wording for other insurance contexts
are similar.
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B.2 Data summary by subject group
Table B.1 and B.2 include the summary statistics for the deductible choices broken
down by the treatment group for the MTurk and student subjects, respectively.
Table B.1: MTurk subjects: Summary of deductible choices between the three
treatments
Abstract Ambiguity Insurance
Auto Auto Auto Auto Auto Auto
Deductible Coll Comp Home Coll Comp Home Coll Comp Home
$50 15.7 14.1 8.8
$100 19.2 9.9 14.7 21.2 17.5 14.1 11.9 9.4 9.1
$200 16.7 14.4 13.1 17.2 11.6 13.5
$250 25.6 15.4 38.5 35.9 18.1 40.6 27.0 11.3 31.8
$500 18.6 12.8 22.4 19.1 15.0 31.6 29.9 23.0 27.7
$1000 19.9 31.7 24.4 10.6 18.1 13.8 19.5 34.0 31.4
Num obs. 312 320 318
Note: Values are percent of subjects.
Table B.2: Student subjects: Summary of deductible choices
Abstract Ambiguity Insurance
Ambiguity Auto Auto Auto Auto Auto Auto
Deductible Coll Comp Home Coll Comp Home Coll Comp Home
$50 11.1 9.8 6.8
$100 15.6 16.0 9.4 15.6 16.5 10.7 13.1 13.6 7.2
$200 13.9 14.3 13.8 22.3 13.6 14.5
$250 37.7 13.1 53.7 45.1 13.4 52.7 36.7 15.4 47.5
$500 18.0 21.7 19.7 18.3 21.9 26.8 24.4 24.9 25.8
$1000 14.8 23.8 17.2 7.1 16.1 9.8 12.2 24.9 19.5
Num obs. 244 224 221
Note: Values are percent of subjects.
B.3 Reduced-form analysis of subject groups
Appendix Table B.3 Model I presents the results from Table 2.6, and Model II
presents the estimates from an additional specification. Model II is still defined by
Equation 2.1, but the Xj independent variables that pertain to insurance context
j include those from the original specification (price for the $500 deductible plan,
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the average claim rate that the subjects were given, the treatment group, and
the subject pool), and also variables controlling for the interaction between the
treatment and subject group. Comparing subject groups with just a indicator
Table B.3: Impact of treatment and student group on deductible choices
I II
Comp Coll Home Comp Coll Home
Price of $500 deduc. (per $100) 0.20∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.035) (0.015) (0.057) (0.035) (0.015)
Claim rate (per %) -0.13∗∗∗ -0.053∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -0.053∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.014) (0.011) (0.030) (0.014) (0.011)
Ambiguity treatment -0.37∗∗∗ -0.32∗∗∗ -0.36∗∗∗ -0.46∗∗∗ -0.42∗∗∗ -0.44∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.064) (0.066) (0.084) (0.084) (0.086)
Abstract treatment -0.17∗∗ -0.17∗∗ -0.24∗∗∗ -0.22∗ -0.25∗∗ -0.29∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.064) (0.065) (0.085) (0.084) (0.086)
Student -0.024 -0.060 -0.15∗∗ -0.13 -0.21∗ -0.26∗∗
(0.053) (0.053) (0.054) (0.092) (0.092) (0.095)
Ambiguity X student 0.22 0.26∗ 0.20
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Abstract X student 0.10 0.20 0.13
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
κJ1 -1.48
∗∗∗ -1.18∗∗∗ -1.55∗∗∗ -1.52∗∗∗ -1.24∗∗∗ -1.60∗∗∗
(0.092) (0.11) (0.13) (0.098) (0.11) (0.13)
κJ2 -0.94
∗∗∗ -0.71∗∗∗ -0.21 -0.98∗∗∗ -0.77∗∗∗ -0.25
(0.089) (0.11) (0.13) (0.095) (0.11) (0.13)
κJ3 -0.49
∗∗∗ 0.18 0.55∗∗∗ -0.53∗∗∗ 0.13 0.51∗∗∗
(0.088) (0.10) (0.13) (0.093) (0.11) (0.13)
κJ4 -0.11 0.90
∗∗∗ -0.16 0.85∗∗∗
(0.088) (0.11) (0.093) (0.11)
κJ5 0.43
∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗
(0.088) (0.093)
Observations 1639
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: The deductible prices, the claim rates, and the estimated coefficients are specific to each
insurance context: home, auto collision, or auto comprehensive insurance.
variable for students, student behavior was not significantly different from Amazon
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) behavior in our auto insurance contexts, but they were
significantly different in the home context. Students were more likely to choose
lower deductibles (less risky).
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When we analyze the interactions between being a student and being assigned
to one of the treatment groups, we find that while on average the direction of
the students’ and MTurk workers’ responses are in the same direction, there is a
difference in the magnitudes of their responses. The MTurk workers who are in
any treatment are more likely to choose lower deductibles than students who are
in the same treatment but only significantly in the collision and home insurance
contexts at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. Students who are in the Ambi-
guity treatment are more likely to choose lower deductibles than students in the
insurance treatment. These are one sided significant at less than the 1% level for
comprehensive and home, and at the 5% level for collision. (Two sided significant
at the 5% level for comp and home, and 10% for collision). Abstract students are
more likely to choose lower deductibles than students in the insurance treatment,
but these are not significant in any insurance context.
We analyze the impact of student demographics on their choices in Table B.4
Model II. This model is again defined by Equation 2.1 over a sample of only the
student subjects. The Xj independent variables include: price for the $500 de-
ductible plan, the average claim rate that the subjects were given, the treatment
group, and subject demographic characteristics. Fewer of the coefficients are sig-
nificant in part because of the smaller sample size. It is still notable that females
were significantly more likely to choose conservative deductibles. Economics ma-
jors were significantly more likely to choose less conservative deductibles, which
are more actuarially fair according to the given claim rate.1
1Biology students were the baseline. While there are double majors, there are only six Biology
students who were double majors with either Economics or Government.
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Table B.4: Impact of treatment and observables on student deductible choice
I II
Comp Coll Home Comp Coll Home
Price of $500 deduc. (per $100) 0.20∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.21∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.053∗
(0.057) (0.035) (0.015) (0.095) (0.058) (0.023)
Claim rate (per %) -0.13∗∗∗ -0.053∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ -0.064 -0.079∗∗∗ -0.063∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.014) (0.011) (0.046) (0.021) (0.017)
Ambiguity treatment -0.37∗∗∗ -0.32∗∗∗ -0.36∗∗∗ -0.27∗∗ -0.19 -0.26∗
(0.064) (0.064) (0.066) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Abstract treatment -0.17∗∗ -0.17∗∗ -0.24∗∗∗ -0.14 -0.083 -0.19
(0.064) (0.064) (0.065) (0.099) (0.099) (0.10)
Student -0.024 -0.060 -0.15∗∗
(0.053) (0.053) (0.054)
Female -0.37∗∗∗ -0.29∗∗∗ -0.36∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.083) (0.087)
Graduation year -0.11∗∗ -0.082∗ -0.078
(0.040) (0.040) (0.042)
Econ 0.091 0.26∗∗ 0.18
(0.097) (0.097) (0.10)
Govt -0.013 0.14 -0.16
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
κJ1 -1.48
∗∗∗ -1.18∗∗∗ -1.55∗∗∗ -221.5∗∗ -166.3∗ -158.2
(0.092) (0.11) (0.13) (80.5) (81.5) (84.6)
κJ2 -0.94
∗∗∗ -0.71∗∗∗ -0.21 -220.9∗∗ -165.8∗ -156.5
(0.089) (0.11) (0.13) (80.5) (81.5) (84.6)
κJ3 -0.49
∗∗∗ 0.18 0.55∗∗∗ -220.4∗∗ -164.7∗ -155.7
(0.088) (0.10) (0.13) (80.5) (81.5) (84.6)
κJ4 -0.11 0.90
∗∗∗ -220.0∗∗ -163.9∗
(0.088) (0.11) (80.5) (81.5)
κJ5 0.43
∗∗∗ -219.3∗∗
(0.088) (80.5)
Observations 1,639 687
Note: The deductible prices, the claim rates, and the estimated coefficients are specific to each
insurance context: home, auto collision, or auto comprehensive insurance. While we observed
the choices of 689 students, two were omitted from the Model II results here because of missing
data on gender and graduation year, respectively.
B.4 More on Probability Weighting
To our knowledge, there has been an extensive amount of theoretical and
experimental work to estimate risk preferences and the probability weight-
ing function. However, ours will be the first experimental piece to estimate
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the probability weighting function from subject choices over menus (similar
to actual insurance data) rather than elicited certainty equivalents. Tversky
and Kahneman (1992) suggest a functional form for probability weighting of
pi(p) = p
γ
[pγ+(1−p)γ ]1/γ for some γ ∈ (0.279, 1) while Prelec (1998) suggests pi(p) =
exp(−(− ln(p))α)for some α ∈ (0, 1). Gonzalez and Wu (1999) present a discus-
sion on the shape of the probability weighting function along with a nonparametric
estimation algorithm. However, their data is collected from a total of 10 partici-
pants who were asked for their certainty equivalents over multiple lotteries. Bruhin
et al. (2010) also estimate the parameters of a mixture model of risk preferences
based on experimental data, and while their experiments included questions framed
in the insurance context, they elicited certainty equivalents. In addition, they as-
sume an inverse-S shaped functional form on the probability weighting function
using the two-parameter specification suggested by Goldstein and Einhorn(1987)
and Lattimore, Baker, and Witte (1992).
B.5 Model 1: Homogenous r and Ω(µ) for Ambiguity and
Abstract treatments
Table B.5 and Figure B.4 present the estimates from Model 1a and 1b for the
Ambiguity treatment. Similarly, Table B.6 and Figure B.5 present the estimates
from Model 1a and 1b for the Abstract treatment.
The estimates from the Ambiguity and Abstract treatment are similar to the
baseline Insurance treatment in that the estimated risk aversion parameter is small
in all cases (less than 0.00024), there are significant probability distortions, and
the scale parameter σ is large relative to estimates of risk preferences from other
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Table B.5: Model 1a and 1b for Ambiguity
Model 1a Model 1b
Estimate 2.5% 97.5% Estimate 2.5% 97.5%
σ 89.6 72.8 125.7 90.0 74.1 134.6
r 4.6e-05 7.8e-12 0.00058 3.6e-05 1.2e-10 0.00057
Note: 544 households in the Insurance treatment. See additional notes in Figure B.4 on how
estimates are constructed.
Figure B.4: Model 1a and 1b probability weighting functions in Ambiguity treat-
ment
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Note: This figure displays the estimated Ω(µ) from Model 1a and Model 1b across the 544
subjects in the Ambiguity treatment. The 95% confidence intervals from these estimated values
are constructed with 1,000 bootstraps with a subsample of 80 percent of 544 with replacement.
The bootstrap was conducted with a subsample due to estimated r, ω0.01 and ω0.02 being close
to or at the lower bound of 0.
Table B.6: Model 1a and 1b for Abstract
Model 1a Model 1b
Estimate 2.5% 97.5% Estimate 2.5% 97.5%
σ 134.3 102.5 166.9 174.2 115.4 504.7
r 6e-14 6e-14 6e-14 0.00024 1.2e-11 0.0028
Note: 556 households in the Insurance treatment. See additional notes in Figure B.5 on how
estimates are constructed.
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Figure B.5: Model 1a and 1b probability weighting functions in Abstract treatment
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Note: This figure displays the estimated Ω(µ) from Model 1a and Model 1b across the 566
subjects in the Abstract treatment. The 95% confidence intervals from these estimated values
are constructed with 1,000 bootstraps with a subsample of 80 percent of 556 with replacement.
The bootstrap was conducted with a subsample due to estimated r, ω0.01 and ω0.02 being close
to or at the lower bound of 0.
specifications. The Ωˆ(µ) estimates are overall slightly higher than those in the
Model 1 Insurance treatment. In the Abstract treatment, the estimate ωˆ0.01 does
still indicate probability underweighting at extremely low probabilities. In the Am-
biguity treatment, the estimate ωˆ0.01 does not indicate probability underweighting,
but the confidence interval around the estimate does not reject underweighting nor
overweighting.
As with the Insurance treatment, the estimates of the probability distortion
functions using Model 1 a/b are not robust to other specifications.
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B.6 Additional tables and graphs for models with het-
erogenous risk preferences: Model 2, 3, and 4
Table B.7, Figure B.6, and Figure B.8 display the estimates and heterogeneity
from Model 2, 3, and 4a/b for the subjects in the Ambiguity treatment. Similarly,
Table B.8, Figure B.7, and Figure B.9 display the estimates from Model 2, 3, and
4a/b for the Abstract treatment.
The qualitative results from these models are similar to the results presented
for the Insurance treatment. The risk aversion parameter is estimated to be negli-
gible throughout all of the Model 2 and 3 results with the probability distortions
functions (and heterogeneity in these functions) driving the apparent differences
in choices.
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Table B.7: Model 2, 3, and 4 for Ambiguity
Model 2a Model 2b
Estimate 2.5% 97.5% Estimate 2.5% 97.5%
σ 39.13 32.53 45.53 39.83 33.50 47.34
ri 10
th percentile 6.0e-26 2.2e-22
median(ri) 5.3e-11 5.3e-11 5.3e-11 1.0e-08 9.8e-09 1.2e-08
ri 90
th percentile 1.1e-10 2.1e-08
ΦΩ 2.63 2.23 3.10 2.61 2.24 3.08
ΦΩ,r -0.01 -28.02 23.39 -64.95 -74.55 -3.3e-03
Implied corr(ξr,i, ξΩ,i) -1.1e-04 -0.38 0.36 -0.99 -0.99 -4.5e-05
Model 3a Model 3b
Estimate 2.5% 97.5% Estimate 2.5% 97.5%
σ 39.13 32.58 45.53 39.83 33.51 47.34
r 1.8e-12 1.8e-12 1.8e-12 2.4e-11 2.4e-11 2.4e-11
ΦΩ 2.63 2.23 3.08 2.62 2.24 3.06
Model 4a Model 4b
Estimate 2.5% 97.5% Estimate 2.5% 97.5%
σ 39.13 33.50 44.94 39.83 34.39 46.17
ΦΩ 2.63 2.26 3.04 2.62 2.25 3.03
Note: 544 subjects in the Ambiguity treatment. See additional notes in Figure B.6 on how
estimates are constructed.
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Table B.8: Model 2, 3, and 4 for Abstract
Model 2a Model 2b
Estimate 2.5% 97.5% Estimate 2.5% 97.5%
σ 44.29 36.69 53.12 45.18 37.87 54.95
ri 10
th percentile 2.8e-15 7.4e-23
median(ri) 3.8e-12 3.8e-12 3.8e-12 4.6e-15 4.6e-15 4.6e-15
ri 90
th percentile 7.6e-12 9.2e-15
ΦΩ 4.93 3.86 7.30 4.99 3.90 16.16
ΦΩ,r 27.17 18.87 42.28 64.96 0.00 97.34
Implied corr(ξr,i, ξΩ,i) 0.89 0.71 0.99 0.89 0.00 0.99
Model 3a Model 3b
Estimate 2.5% 97.5% Estimate 2.5% 97.5%
σ 45.34 36.68 56.54 46.47 38.08 58.48
r 9.0e-09 8.1e-09 9.0e-09 2.7e-10 2.6e-10 2.7e-10
ΦΩ 5.06 3.74 57.66 5.20 3.78 94.00
Model 4a Model 4b
Estimate 2.5% 97.5% Estimate 2.5% 97.5%
σ 45.33 37.41 56.54 46.47 38.76 57.82
ΦΩ 5.06 3.82 55.74 5.20 3.87 78.35
Note: 556 subjects in the Abstract treatment. See additional notes in Figure B.7 on how estimates
are constructed.
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Figure B.6: Median Ωi(µ) in Ambiguity treatment
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Note: This figure displays the estimated median Ωi(µ) from Model 2 and 3 across the 544 subjects
in the Ambiguity treatment. Because the probability weighting function and r has a lower bound
at 0, the 95% confidence intervals from the estimated values of Model 2a, 2b, 3a, and 3b are
constructed with 1,000 bootstraps with random subsamples that are approximately 80% the size
of the Ambiguity treatment subjects. Subsampling is used in these cases because the estimate of r
approaches a lower bound in these models. The 95% confidence intervals for Model 4a and 4b are
constructed from 1,000 bootstraps of N=544 drawn from the original sample with replacement.
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Figure B.7: Median Ωi(µ) in Abstract treatment
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Note: This figure displays the estimated median Ωi(µ) from Model 2 and 3 across the 556 subjects
in the Abstract treatment. Because the probability weighting function and r has a lower bound
at 0, the 95% confidence intervals from the estimated values of Model 2a, 2b, 3a, and 3b are
constructed with 1,000 bootstraps with random subsamples that are approximately 80% the size
of the Abstract treatment subjects. Subsampling is used in these cases because the estimate of r
approaches a lower bound in these models. The 95% confidence intervals for Model 4a and 4b are
constructed from 1,000 bootstraps of N=556 drawn from the original sample with replacement.
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Figure B.8: Heterogeneity of Ωi(µ) in Ambiguity treatment
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Note: Two panels that show the quantiles of the estimated Ωi(µ) given the estimated noise ΦΩ,i
using subjects from the Ambiguity treatment. The quantiles of Ω(µ) from Model 2a, 3a, and 4a
are displayed on the left, while the quantiles from model 2b, 3b, and 4b are displayed in the right
panel. See additional notes in Figure B.6 on how estimates are constructed.
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Figure B.9: Heterogeneity of Ωi(µ) in Abstract treatment
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Note: Two panels that show the quantiles of the estimated Ωi(µ) given the estimated noise ΦΩ,i
using subjects from the Abstract treatment. The quantiles of Ω(µ) from Model 2a, 3a, and 4a,
are displayed on the left, while the quantiles from Model 2b, 3b, and 4b are displayed in the right
panel. See additional notes in Figure B.7 on how estimates are constructed.
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APPENDIX C
APPENDIX OF CHAPTER 3: DIFFERENT CONTEXTS,
DIFFERENT RISK PREFERENCES?
C.1 Risk Controls
The risk controls are expected annual claims under each coverage based on sep-
arate Poisson-gamma Bayesian credibility models. More specifically, we assume
that household i’s claims under coverage j in year t follow a Poisson distribution
with arrival rate λijt. We treat λijt as a latent random variable and assume that
lnλijt = z
′
ijtαj + ij,where zijt is a vector of observables, αj is a vector of coef-
ficients, ij is an iid error term, and exp(ij) follows a gamma distribution with
unit mean and variance φj. Utilizing our full dataset, we perform separate Poisson
panel regressions with random effects to obtain maximum likelihood estimates of
αj and φj for each coverage j. For each household i in the baseline sample, we then
calculate the expected number of claims λ̂ij for each coverage j, conditional on the
household’s ex ante characteristics zij and ex post claims experience γij, as fol-
lows: λ̂ij = exp(z
′
ijα̂j)E(exp(ij)|γij), where E(exp(ij)|γij) is calculated assuming
exp(ij) follows a gamma distribution with unit mean and variance φ̂j. Observe
that by construction λ̂ij takes into account both the systematic and idiosyncratic
components of a households’ risk type.1
1We refer to the above-described model as a Bayesian credibity model because λ̂ij corresponds
to the Bayesian credibility premium in the actuarial literature (Denuit et al., 2007, ch. 3).
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C.2 Classification of the Contexts in Einav et al. (2012)
In order to compare our results with those of Einav et al. (2012), we classify each
of their contexts according to the magnitude of the stakes involved. Moreover,
we apply the same criteria to classify their contexts that we use to classify our
contexts. Recall that in our small-stakes contexts the values of the options and
the inter-option increments range in the hundreds and thousands dollars, whereas
in our large-stakes contexts the value of the options range in the hundreds of
thousands and millions of dollars with inter-option increments that range in the
hundreds of thousands dollars.
Based on their description of the coverage options in each context (Einav et al.,
2012, pp. 2612-2616),2 we conclude that none of their contexts involve large-stakes
choices. Three of their six contexts—health, drug, and dental insurance—involve
small-stakes choices. In health insurance, employees effectively choose among de-
ductible options that range from zero to $3,000 (with a mean inter-option incre-
ment of $750) for in-network care and from $500 to $6,000 (with a mean inter-
option increment of $1,375) for out-of-network care. In drug insurance, employees
choose among brand drug cost-sharing percentages that range from 30 percent to
50 percent for retail purchases and from 20 percent to 40 percent for mail-order
purchases. The mean of the resulting annual drug claims is approximately $1,500
and the 95th percentile is approximately $5,500. In dental insurance, employees
effectively choose between a maximum annual benefit of $1,000 or $2,000.
In two of the three remaining contexts—short-term disability insurance and
401(k) investments—the stakes range in the thousands and tens of thousands of
dollars but not the hundreds of thousands of dollars, and so we classify them
2See also pp. 4-5 in their Online Appendix.
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as moderate-stakes contexts. In short-term disability insurance, which replaces
lost wages due to disability for up to six months, employees choose among wage-
replacement rates that range from 60 percent to 100 percent.3 The mean annual
wage of the employees in their baseline sample is approximately $58,000 and the
95th percentile is approximately $114,000. At the mean claim duration, which
Einav et al. (2012) report is approximately two months, this suggests that the
value of the benefit ranges approximately from $5,800 to $9,700 for the average
employee and does not exceed $19,000 for 95 percent of employees. Even at the
maximum claim duration, the value of the annual benefit ranges approximately
from $17,000 to $29,000 for the average employee and does not exceed $57,000 for
95 percent of employees. In 401(k) investments, contributing employees choose
how to allocate their contributions among 13 different funds whose prospective
monthly returns range from −11.69 percent to 16.79 percent.4 The mean annual
contribution is approximately $4,600 and the maximum allowable is $18,000,5 with
Alcoa matching contributions up to six percent. This suggests that the stakes
range approximately from −$2, 200 to $8,300 for the average contributor and from
−$8, 500 to $32,400 for all contributors.
We also classify the remaining context—long-term disability insurance—as in-
volving moderate-stakes choices, though the classification is less straightforward
than in the other contexts. Alcoa’s long-term disability plan replaces lost wages
due to disability for durations longer than six-months, subject to a six-month
3In their Appendix Table A1, Einav et al. (2012) note that “sometimes” the wage-replacement
rates in short-term disability insurance range instead from 40 percent to 80 percent.
4Einav et al. (2012) abstract from the employees decisions as to whether and how much to
contribute, but rather focus on how contributing employees choose to allocate their contributions
across the funds. The range of monthly returns is taken from Appendix Table A2 in Einav et al.
(2012), which reports summary statistics of the funds’ monthly returns from August 2005 to
December 2007.
5Einav et al. (2012) state that the choices were made in 2004. We assume they reflect benefit
elections for 2005. In 2005, the annual contribution limit was $14,000 for employees under age
50 and $18,000 for older employees.
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elimination period.6 Employees choose among three wage-replacement rates: 50
percent, 60 percent, or 70 percent. At the mean claim duration, which Einav et al.
(2012) report is approximately one year,7 this suggests that the value of the benefit
ranges approximately from $29,000 to $41,000 for the average employee and does
not exceed $80,000 for 95 percent of employees. At the maximum claim duration,
which we assume could be as long as 45 years,8 the present value of the benefit
could range into the hundred of thousands of dollars; but even in this extreme case
the present value of the inter-option increments would range in the tens of thou-
sands of dollars.9 All things considered, we conclude the stakes are best classified
as moderate.
6The elimination period is the period of time between the onset of disability and the time at
which the employee is eligible to receive benefits.
7Einav et al. (2012) note that their claims data are truncated at about two years, which
suggests the mean claim duration may be longer than one year. In a recent study of employer-
provided long-term disability insurance, Autor et al. (2014) report a mean claim duration of
1.55 years and a median of one year. Their sample consists of approximately 8 million quarterly
observations from nearly 10,000 unique employers, and their claims data span eight years.
8Einav et al. (2012) do not report the maximum claim duration (or the 95th percentile) in
their data, nor do they report the maximum benefit period under Alcoa’s long-term disability
plan. The maxmimum benefit period under many long-term disability plans is 2, 5, or 10 years,
but under the most generous plans it runs until the employee’s social securty full retirement
age, which is 67 for employee’s born in 1960 or later. Assuming that Alcoa’s plan has the most
generous maximum benefit period and that its youngest eligible employee is 22 years old, we
arrive at the assumption that the maximum claim duration could be as long as 45 years.
9We are assuming annual discount rates well in excess of 10 percent, which is consistent
with the preponderance of the empirical evidence on time preferences (Frederick et al., 2002,
pp. 377-380). For instance, Warner and Pleeter (2001) estimate the personal discount rates of
approximately 66,000 U.S. millitary personnel who were offered separation benefits that consisted
of a choice between a lump sum or an annuity, where the break-even discount rate was at least
17.5 percent. They find that “over half of the officers and over 90 percent of enlisted personnel
chose the lump-sum payment, implying that the vast majority of personnel had discount rates
of at least 18 percent” (p. 33). Based on regression analysis, they report mean discount rates of
between 10 percent and 19 percent for officers and between 35 percent and 54 percent for enlisted
personnel, depending on the model specification (p. 48, tbl. 6). As Frederick et al. (2002, p.
385) note, this field study “is particularly compelling in terms of credibility of reward delivery,
magnitude of stakes, and number of subjects.”
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